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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON APPLIED MICROECONOMICS: AIRLINE NETWORKS AND JOB
SEARCH
Kristijan Gjorgjevik
Katja Seim
This dissertation consists of three chapters that develop and implement economic
models to analyze modern problems in Industrial Organization and Labor Supply. In
the first chapter, I extend the standard BLP model (Berry et al. [1995]) to account for
capacity constraints in a network and evaluate the welfare effects of the 2013 merger be-
tween American Airlines and US Airways. I show that including capacity as a constraint
in the profit maximization problem that airlines face generates better out-of-sample pre-
dictions and leads to different policy implications. In particular, I find that the merger
increased consumer surplus by 1.5-1.7%, while the benchmark model could predict it to
have decreased by as much as 4.5%. In other words, ignoring capacity constraints could
lead regulators to erroneously believe that this merger harmed consumers. I find that,
on average, the merger increased the variable profit margins of airlines by 0.3-0.4%, and
American Airlines’ by 2.5%. I develop and implement an approach for ex-post merger
evaluation that could be useful in antitrust legislation.
In the second chapter, I extend the theory of efficiency wages (Shapiro and Stiglitz
[1984]) to incorporate employer-sponsored health insurance. I develop sufficient conditions
under which the Affordable Care Act increases efficiency wages. In particular, if the
iv
Affordable Care Act succeeds, at least in part, in inducing employers to provide health
insurance and individuals to self-insure, then wages will rise after its implementation. I
suggest that the Affordable Care Act may provide efficiency wage subsidies towards the
welfare-maximizing wage level, and numerically show the existence of regions where this
is the case.
In the third chapter, I extend Mirrlees’ theory of optimal taxation (Mirrlees [1971])
to include endogenous job search. I use a public-use microdata file on the Canadian labor
force to calculate the optimal, revenue-neutral federal tax rates. The results are highly
sensitive to the level of inequality aversion chosen for the social welfare function. The
optimal tax rate schedule is hump-shaped in income.
v
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1 An Empirical Analysis of the Airline Industry
with Capacity Constraints
1.1 Introduction
Bankruptcies and mergers are common and costly to the United States airline indus-
try. Since the turn of the century, all major legacy carriers have filed for, and emerged
from, Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection at least once. US Airways (“US”) first filed for
bankruptcy protection on August 11, 2002 and again on September 12, 2004; United Air-
lines (“United”) filed on December 9, 2002; Delta Air Lines (“Delta”) filed on September
14, 2005; and American Airlines (“AA”) filed on November 29, 2011.
Since the Great Recession, there have been 7 major mergers amongst airlines in the
United States. Southwest acquired ATA Airlines (November 19, 2008) and AirTran Air-
ways (September 27, 2010); Republic Airways acquired Midwest Airlines (June 23, 2009)
and Frontier Airlines (August 14, 2009); Delta acquired Northwest Airlines (April 14,
2008); United acquired Continental Airlines (May 3, 2010); and AA acquired US (Febru-
ary 14, 2013).
In recent years, in addition to changes in the ownership of products, the United
States airline industry changed markedly in another dimension as well: its load factors.
1
In particular, the number of flights that were operated at or close to capacity1 markedly
increased. For example, from the third quarter of 2012 (before the most recent airline
merger between AA and US) and the third quarter of 2015 (after said merger), the number
of flights that Southwest and AA operated at or close to capacity more than doubled.
Given the continually changing structure of the United States airline industry through
bankruptcies and mergers, accurate cost and merger analyses are important. Given the
large fixed costs of operating a flight, the changes in load factors can dramatically af-
fect the marginal costs per passenger of operating a route. For example, the cost per
passenger of flying a single passenger in a Boeing 747, averaged over different capacity
levels, is dramatically higher than the cost per passenger of flying a Boeing 747 operated
at capacity. As a result, any accurate cost and merger analyses need to take capacity
considerations into account.
This paper builds on recent literature on estimating differentiated products with ag-
gregate data in the spirit of Berry et al. [1995] (“BLP”). Notably, Berry et al. [2006] and,
more recently, Berry and Jia [2010] have applied the techniques in BLP to provide esti-
mates of a model of airline competition with differentiated products. But their approach
has supply-side shortcomings: it assumes there are constant marginal costs per passenger
and no network effects.
To understand what I mean by “network effects”,2 consider what happens when an
airline lowers the price on one of its direct connections. For example, consider United
lowering the price of its ORD-JFK route. The BLP prediction is that consumers substitute
1The threshold “at or close to capacity” will be defined as a load factor greater or equal to 90%.
2Barla and Constantatos [2000] and Pels [2008] provide theoretical results on the optimal network
structure (hub and spoke vs. point to point).
2
towards the ORD-JFK route and away from similar flights (connecting or otherwise) from
United and other carriers, as if these products were operated independently of one another.
This is not the case. In particular, we might think that the increase in passengers towards
the ORD-JFK route could have secondary effects on the utility of passengers (demand-side
network effect), or on the ability of United to fulfill all the demand (supply-side network
effect) — on this route or on any routes that use this segment as a connecting flight.
Consider the demand-side first: flow can affect utility. This is to say, the increasing
number of passengers now flying ORD-JFK could affect each individual passenger’s utility
from flying the ORD-JFK route, either through congestion (negative effect) or more
scheduled flights (positive effect). Wei [2014] explicitly models this second effect and
generates higher supply-side marginal cost estimates than the existing literature. He does
this by including “positive utility of frequency” in the individual’s problem to capture
network effects. He justifies this by claiming that individuals care about frequency in
that it reduces the cost of delays — one can more quickly catch the next flight.
On the supply-side, consider the obvious constraint: capacity. Flow cannot increase
indefinitely; indeed, each route has some capacity (the number of seats on scheduled
flights), and changing that capacity is not feasible in the short-run.3 In other words, the
firm does not face an unconstrained optimization problem, and capacity on a single link
can affect a firm’s pricing on its entire network. The role of this paper is to provide a
theoretical foundation for constrained multiproduct optimization problems in a network,
3See e.g. Barnhart et al. [2003]. Roughly speaking, an airline scheduling process includes four steps.
The airline (i) first allocates to each city-pair planes by type (e.g. two 737 flights a day between Chicago
and Cleveland), then (ii) allocates specific planes (i.e., tail numbers), then (iii) determines a maintenance
schedule, and (iv) assigns crews. The procedure is done using demand forecasts and flights are typically
scheduled more than six months before takeoff.
3
and to estimate a model with an empirical notion of capacity constraints in the observed
network of airline products. I show that the inclusion of capacity constraints is important
in accurately predicting realized costs, prices, and profits of airlines; ignoring these, as
previous literature has, leads to inaccurate predictions.
While the pricing decisions in this chapter are static, there is a large literature on
dynamic pricing. In particular, Lazarev [2013] studies how a firm’s ability to price dis-
criminate over time affects production, product quality, and product allocation among
consumers. Williams [2013] goes one step further and takes into account the effects of
stochastic demand in a model with limited capacity. Due to the complexity of the prob-
lem, these authors must restrict themselves to the considerations of monopoly routes only.
Moreover, such an analysis requires high-frequency (daily) data, which is not publically
available. I leave dynamic pricing considerations for future work.
There is also a growing literature on estimating static models of competition while
allowing for market structure to be endogenous. Some works include Reiss and Spiller
[1989], Ho [2009], Draganska et al. [2009], and Benkard et al. [2010]. More recently,
Roberts and Sweeting [2014] estimate a model of endogenous entry for the airline industry
but only consider sequential move equilibria. On the other hand, Ciliberto et al. [2016]
consider the simultaneous entry and pricing problem. They find that post-merger entry
mitigates the price effects of a merger, and the merged firm has a strong incentive to
enter new markets. While I take the network structure as exogenous in this chapter, I
perform different robustness checks on the fixed network structure using pre-merger data,
post-merger data, or a combination of both. The results in this chapter are robust to a
host of resulting post-merger network structures.
4
Due to the recency of the AA-US merger, there are few papers that explore its welfare
effects. Indeed, while Ciliberto et al. [2016] perform a counterfactual exercise on the AA-
US merger, they focus on the route entry problem, and do not perform a welfare analysis.
Rupp and Tan [2016] explore the effects of 5 mergers between 1998 and 2015, and find that
airlines offer improved product quality at de-hubbed airports after a merger, due to more
reliable flight schedules and shorter travel times. The nature of their reduced-form model
does not allow them to perform a welfare analysis. Kwoka and Shumilkina [2010] explore
the effects of an earlier merger between US-Piedmont (in 1989), and find that prices
rose by 5-6% on routes that one carrier served and the other was a potential entrant.
However, Luo [2014] finds that the fares for airport-pairs where Delta and Northwest
competed with each other prior to their 2008 merger did not increase. I find that average
fares increased by 0.6-1.2% because of the merger, and go one step further by performing
a welfare analysis, highlighting the effects of capacity constraints.
I find that the merger increased consumer surplus by 1.5-1.7%. Ignoring capacity
constraints and economies of scale, the same analysis could have found a decrease in
consumer surplus as high as 4.5%. The difference between these numbers is not obvious:
there are two competing forces introduced by capacity constraints and economies of scale.
On the one hand, due to economies of scale, airlines want to keep flights operating at or
close to capacity, so they lower prices of particular routes to drive up demand. This lowers
marginal costs, and allows them to price even lower, increasing consumer surplus. On the
other hand, due to capacity constraints, airlines cannot increase demand indefinitely, so
they are forced to limit the demand of certain routes, especially those that are used by
many connecting flights. This leads them to price higher, decreasing consumer surplus.
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In short, this chapter contributes to the large literature on the estimation of models
of airline competition with differentiated products using aggregate data by introducing
capacity-constraint considerations on the supply-side,4 the estimates of which are shown
to be superior to benchmark models in prediction. I find that, in 2012, flights operated at
or near capacity had lower marginal costs per passenger by $128. In 2015, this discount
reduced to $57. I also develop a robust approach for ex-post merger evaluation that can
be used for future antitrust work. I use it to simulate a counterfactual but-for world
without the AA-US merger, and perform a welfare analysis. I find that the AA-US
merger benefited consumers and airlines — specifically AA, which enjoyed 2.5% higher
profit margins directly as a result of the merger.
This chapter has contributions above and beyond a pure “case study” of the AA-US
merger. In particular, it provides a framework for estimating general equilibrium models
using aggregate product-level data in a network with constraints. In this sense, we can
think of the airline industry as a good example of an observable network with observable
constraints (capacity), and the AA-US merger as a means to test the theory developed in
this paper and show that network considerations can drastically affect policy implications.
In this case, I find that benchmark models would predict that the merger hurts consumer
welfare, when in fact it is welfare-enhancing. The theory and approach developed in this
paper could affect future policy decisions both within the airline industry, and in other
industries with network constraints.
A limitation of this approach is that the full structural model cannot be estimated:
4There are also contributions on the demand-side: I am able to construct a previously unidentified
“stopover” variable by comparing two datasets: one that does not distinguish between direct and nonstop
flights, and another that includes only nonstop flights. I find that stopovers require 1/3 to 1/5 of the fare
discount that a layover does.
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capacity constraints never bind empirically. For this reason, a reduced-form model is
used for estimation, while the full model is used for the counterfactuals. Moreover, this
paper abstracts from strategic capacity considerations: network structure is assumed to
be fixed.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the economic model. Section
3 discusses the airline data, sample selection, instruments, and accounting adjustments.
Section 4 presents the results, and demonstrates the usefulness of the results for prediction:
first in establishing model fit, and then in performing counterfactual exercises. Section 5
concludes.
1.2 Model
1.2.1 Demand
I define a product, j, as any distinct way of getting from point A to point B and back, in
a given fare bin, with a given set of operating carriers. This is to say, a direct flight from
Philadelphia to London purchased with US, a connecting flight via New York purchased
with US, and a connecting flight via New York purchased with United are all distinct
products, j. I use the term “purchased” intentionally; I differentiate products according to
their ticketing carrier. Moreover, a connecting flight via New York with the Philadelphia-
New York link operated by Delta Connection is a different product than, ceteris paribus,
that link operated by United Express. Finally, a direct flight with United priced at $300
is a different product than the same flight priced at $400.
While it may seem odd to define products conditional on a strategic variable (price),
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this is standard and necessary in the airline literature (see Berry and Jia [2010] for a more
elaborate discussion). In short, the necessity is driven by data limitations; there are large
price variations in seemingly identical products (but-for the price) in the data, because
many product characteristics are unobserved. For example, I do not know the class of
travel (Economy, Economy Plus, Business, etc.). I also do not know the time or day of de-
parture (red-eye, daytime, weekend, holiday, etc.).5 There are further unobserved product
characteristics, such as whether a ticket was purchased with frequent flyer miles,6 whether
there was advance-purchase, or whether there were length-of-stay requirements, etc. For
this reason, it is particularly important to allow for product-unobservable characteristics
that are correlated with price.
The suffix “with a given set of operating carriers” makes this product definition slightly
different than that of Berry and Jia [2010]. Since a goal of this paper is to determine
which products have capacity-constrained links, it is important to differentiate products
according to the operating carrier on each of their links. For example, while previous
literature would have treated a flight ticketed by United but operated by American as
identical to a flight ticketed and operated by United, these two flights could have different
load factors. As a consequence, they must be distinct products on the supply-side. By
extension, they must be distinct products on the demand-side as well. This leads to a
larger set of products than in Berry and Jia [2010].
The demand model is a random-coefficient discrete-choice model as in McFadden
[1973] and BLP. As in Berry and Jia [2010], I use a discrete-type version of the random
5All I know is the year and quarter of departure, though I abstract from seasonality by using only one
quarter of data in estimation.
6Though these are mostly filtered out by excluding abnormally low fares.
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coefficient model, with two types namely: tourists and business travelers. I define a
market, t, as any directional pair of cities, A→ B. In market t, the utility of consumer i
who is of type r and purchases product j is given by:
uijt = xjtβr − αrpjt + ξjt + vit(λ) + λijt (1.2.1)
where
1. xjt is a vector of product characteristics
2. βr is a vector of “tastes for characteristics” for consumers of type r
3. αr is the marginal disutility of a price increase for consumers of type r
4. pjt is the product price
5. ξjt is the unobserved (to researchers) characteristic of product j
6. vit is a “nested logit” random taste that is constant across airline products and
differentiates “air travel” from the “outside good”
7. λ ∈ [0, 1] is the nested logit parameter
8. ijt is an iid (across products and consumers) “logit error”
where the error structure, vit(λ) + λijt, is assumed to be generalized extreme value.
Let the utility of the outside good (think of this as driving, taking the train, or making a
phone call) be given by:
uiot = iot (1.2.2)
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Using random coefficients introduces a correlation in utility between products with
similar characteristics, but I also want to introduce a correlation in utility between prod-
ucts in the same market. The reason for this is that I believe the outside good in each
market is not at all similar to the “inside” goods (the airlines’ products in a market).
To do this, I impose two nests within each market : one with all the airline products in
a market, and the other with just the outside option of not flying. This choice of nests
allows for correlations in the unobservables of different airline products, while maintaining
independence from the outside option of alternate transportation methods. I estimate a
single set of parameters across all markets.7
The share of type r consumers who purchase any airline product in market t, srt , is
given by:
srt =
Dλrt
1 +Dλrt
(1.2.3)
where
Drt =
Jt∑
k=1
e(xktβr−αrpkt+ξkt)/λ (1.2.4)
where Jt is the number of products in market t.
Then, the share of type r consumers that purchase product j in market t, and the share
7There are a few approaches to capture consumer differences across markets. In order of estimating
most to least parameters, one could: include market fixed effects, allow parameters to vary across regions
(Northeast, Southwest, etc.), or include region fixed effects. Alternatively, to just capture the effect of
income differences across markets, one could aggregate the income per capita in the endpoint cities of
each market and estimate a single parameter.
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of type r consumers that do not purchase a flight in market t are given by, respectively:
srjt =
Dλrt
1 +Dλrt
e(xjtβr−αrpjt+ξjt)/λ
Drt
(1.2.5)
sr0t =
1
1 +Dλrt
(1.2.6)
Let γr denote the percentage of type r consumers in the population. Then, the overall
market share of product j in market t is given by:
sjt =
∑
r
γrs
r
jt (1.2.7)
Let Mt denote the effective size of the market. Empirically, I will estimate this as µGt,
where Gt is the geometric mean of the Metropolitan Statistical Area (“MSA”) populations
of the endpoint cities of the market, and µ is a parameter to be estimated. The use of the
geometric mean has both empirical and (weak) theoretical precedents in the literature on
travel demand. For a more elaborate discussion, see Berry et al. [2006]. Then, the overall
market demand of product j in market t is given by:
qjt = Mtsjt (1.2.8)
A central assumption in this paper is that network structure is exogenous. In par-
ticular, I take route composition and fleet allocation as fixed. Amongst other things,
this allows me treat the conventionally endogenous variable “number of direct flights” as
exogenous, and include it on the demand side without instrumenting for it. For the rest
of this section, when there is no confusion, I may omit some subscripts on these variables.
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Regression, 2SLS
Using the product share equations from above, I get that:
ln srj = (xjβr − αrpj + ξj)/λ+ ln(
Dλ−1r
1 +Dλr
)
ln sr0 = ln(
1
1 +Dλr
)
ln srj − ln sr0 = (xjβr − αrpj + ξj)/λ+ (λ− 1) lnDr
Moreover,
ln srt = ln(
Dλr
1 +Dλr
)
⇒ lnDr = (ln srt − ln sr0)/λ
Plugging into the previous equation, I get that:
ln srj − ln sr0 = (xjβr − αrpj + ξj)/λ+ (λ− 1)(ln srt − ln sr0)/λ
λ(ln srj − ln sr0) + (1− λ)(ln srt − ln sr0) = xjβr − αrpj + ξj
ln srj − ln sr0 + (1− λ) ln(
srt
srj
) = xjβr − αrpj + ξj
ln srj − ln sr0 = xjβr − αrpj + (1− λ) ln(
srj
srt
) + ξj
Notice that if λ = 1 (correlation within the nests = 1 − λ = 0), the final equation
reduces to the familiar multinomial logit market share expression. Notice also that srj
is not observed, only sj is. Thus, it is not possible to identify different types, r, from
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the regression approach; if I include more than one type on the RHS, the regression
specification will exhibit perfect multicollinearity. For this reason, when using the 2SLS
approach, I must restrict the model to only have one type of consumer.8 I proceed by
estimating this regression equation using different instruments. In this way, I assess which
instruments work best before extending the model to include random coefficients.
The reason I need instruments is because I allow for an arbitrary correlation between
prices and the product-level unobservable attributes, ξj . In other words, E(pjξj) 6= 0.
Similarly, the product’s market share relative to the outside share is simultaneously deter-
mined with its within-nest share. Using the 2SLS approach above will make the estimates
for β, α, and λ consistent, and allow me to test how well my instruments perform, by
the following logic: the correlation between pj and ξj will likely be positive, given that
products with higher prices likely have more unobserved product attributes (first class
ticket, last-minute purchase, etc.) that are desirable. For this reason, I expect products
with higher prices to also have a larger error term, ξj , and a simple OLS regression would
erroneously attribute higher utility when there are higher prices to be caused by the higher
prices, making the fare coefficient, α, less negative. On the other hand, good instruments
should not attribute the effect of demand-unobservables to the fare variable, making α
more negative. I test for this, along with instrument relevance, in order to determine a
set of instruments to use for the GMM estimation of the full structural model.
8In the next section, I will outline the GMM approach where I can back out both types.
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Structural, GMM
Notice that from the observed market shares, s, I can back out the vector of product-
unobservable characteristics in each market, t, denoted by ξt, as a function of the product
characteristics, prices, the observed market shares and parameters:
ξt = s
−1(xt, pt, qt, θd) (1.2.9)
As in Berry and Jia [2010], the multiple-type nested logit model requires a slight modifi-
cation to the contraction mapping method used in BLP. In particular, the “step” between
each iteration of the ξjt is as follows:
ξMjt = ξ
M−1
jt + λ[ln sjt − ln sjt(xt, pt, ξt, θd)] (1.2.10)
Let zt be a vector of instruments. Then the moment conditions used in estimation are
based on restrictions of the form:
E[ξ(xt, pt, qt, θd)|zt] = 0
⇒ E[h(zt)ξ(xt, pt, qt, θd)] = 0 (1.2.11)
Then I can estimate θd using GMM.
I use the same instruments chosen in the regression analysis, and minimize:
θˆd = arg min
θd∈Θ
1
T
T∑
t=1
h(zt)ξ(xt, pt, qt, θd)
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The instruments should include exogenous variables to help predict the endogenous
characteristics (prices). Moreover, they have to identify parameters that govern substitu-
tion patterns across products in a market, such as the type specific parameters βr, αr, the
nested logit coefficient λ, and the share of nonbusiness travelers γr.
9 Exogenous variation
in choice sets across markets will help to identify these substitution patterns,10 and I
discuss instruments and identification in more detail after outlining the data I will use.
1.2.2 Supply
I assume that prices are set according to a static Nash equilibrium with multiproduct
firms. Each firm, f , chooses the prices of its products, j in the set F , so as to maximize
its profit subject to its capacity constraints. Let p be the vector of prices of all products,
not just those produced by firm f , and let qf be the vector of demands for products
produced by firm f :
max
pj
pif =
∑
j∈F
(pj −mcj)qj(p)
s.t. Bqf (p) ≤ c
Where B is an L x F sparse matrix of 1’s and 0’s that capture the set of all products
that use a particular link (F is the set of all products produced by firm f across all
markets, t, and L is the set of all links operated by firm f11), and c is a vector of capacity
constraints of length L. Recall that links are differentiated by their operating carrier, so
9These are all components of θd in the equations above.
10See Berry and Haile [2009] for a more formal argument, in a nonparametric context.
11Recall that a particular product can use multiple links. Similarly, a link can be used by multiple
products.
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there could be more than one link between two cities. Letting blj be the lj-th element of
the matrix B:
blj =

1 if product j uses link l
0 otherwise
While there are fixed costs of operation in the short-run, an airline cannot change
them so they will not affect the airline’s optimal choice of prices. This chapter abstracts
from the choice of network structure and capacity; in the appendix, I provide some ideas
on the extension where airlines can endogenously choose their capacity.
Using µl to denote the Lagrange multiplier on a particular link, l, the first order
condition of the above problem reads as follows:
qj(p) +
∑
r∈F
(pr −mcr)∂qr(p)
∂pj
+
∑
l∈L
µl
∑
r∈F
blr
∂qr(p)
∂pj
= 0
This equation captures the effects of changing the price of a product by one unit.
Consider an increase of a dollar: first, it increases profit by the amount of passengers
on that route, qj(p). Second, it lowers demand on that route, decreasing profit by the
markup, pj−mcj , times the quantity change, ∂qj(p)∂pj . This relaxes the capacity constraints
of all products that use this route. Third, this price increase may increase demand on all
other products operated by this airline. This leads to two things: a positive change in
profit on all other products (where this profit change is equal to the sum of all markups,
pr −mcr, times the quantity change, ∂qr(p)∂pj ), and a possible adverse effect on all products
(except for the one whose price was increased), if those products have capacity-constrained
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links (µl > 0), caused by the tightening of constraints.
12 To simplify notation, let:
4jr =

−∂qr∂pj if r and j offered by the same (ticketing) carrier
0 otherwise
Then, I can re-write the above in matrix form and include the complementary slack-
ness conditions to get the optimality conditions below. Notice that they differ from the
standard supply-side model in Berry and Jia [2010] via the addition of the term with the
Lagrange multiplier, and the complementary slackness condition. In the event that the
constraints do not bind (i.e., µl = 0 ∀l), we are back to the benchmark model in Berry
and Jia [2010].
q −4(p−mc)−4BTµ = 0 (1.2.12)
µT [c−Bq] = 0 (1.2.13)
To derive an analytic form for 4, let 41 and 42 be the matrices of derivatives of
market share with respect to mean utility, δ, for consumers of type 1 and type 2, respec-
tively13. Then,
4 = γα141 + (1− γ)α242
Next, notice that sj =
Dλ−1
1+Dλ
eδj/λ and ∂D∂δk =
eδk/λ
λ
12There is a fourth effect that I do not explicitly write out here, for brevity, but that I take into account
in simulation: marginal costs will be endogenous (they will depend on demand via an economy of scale
variable), so changes in quantity will also change marginal costs.
13As before, if the products j and k are not offered by the same ticketing carrier, the jk-th element of
the matrix is zero
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∂sj
∂δk
=

eδk/λ
λ (
Dλ−2(−Dλ+λ−1)
(Dλ+1)2
)eδj/λ : k 6= j
eδk/λ
λ ((
Dλ−2(−Dλ+λ−1)
(Dλ+1)2
)eδj/λ + D
λ−1
1+Dλ
) : k = j
I can re-write the first-order condition as:
ln(mc) = p−4−1(q +4BTµ)
Since p, q, B as well as the matrix of partial derivatives,4, are from the data, if I know
the multipliers, µ, I can solve for the implied marginal costs, mc. In order to perform
counterfactuals, I need to project the implied marginal costs onto the observables (the
determinants of marginal costs). For this reason, I specify a functional form for marginal
cost. As in Berry and Jia [2010], let the marginal cost on route j be:
mcj = ρ
′wj + ωj
The observable determinants of marginal cost, wj include the following variables: the
distance of the route, the distance of the route squared, the number of connections in the
route, a dummy for whether the origin or destination is a hub for the operating carrier,
a dummy for whether the product originates, ends, or passes through a slot-controlled
airport, dummies for the different carriers, and the number of links in the route that
are capacity constrained. The first three terms shifters of wj , as well as the constant,
are interacted with a dummy variable that distinguishes between short-haul and long-
haul routes, since different aircraft are used for short-medium haul routes and long haul
routes. The threshold for a long-haul route is a one-way distance greater than 1500 miles.
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In other words, load factors and capacity enter in two places: 1) as a determinant of
marginal costs, and 2) in the constraint. The first is indistinguishable from a specific form
of economies of scale that arise once scale has reached near-capacity levels; in effect, my
estimation procedure accounts for nonconstant marginal costs by allowing for a marginal
cost “discount” once a certain load factor threshold is reached. The second is more
interesting, and is used in estimating counterfactuals.14 With just economies of scale,
an airline is incentivized to set (lower) prices such that load factors are high. With
constraints, the airline is incentivized to set (higher) prices such that all links are operated
within capacity. The interplay of these two effects is what distinguishes this paper from
previous literature, and makes the answer nonobvious.
That said, in estimation, the capacity-constraint variable is endogenous since it de-
pends on demand. For this reason, I assume that the cost-unobservables, ωj , are mean-
independent of some vector of observed instruments. I discuss instruments after describing
the data.
1.3 Data
1.3.1 DB1B
The Airline Origin and Destination Survey (“DB1B”) is a 10% sample of airline tickets
from reporting carriers collected by the Office of Airline Information of the Bureau of
Transportation Statistics (“BTS”), for itineraries with both endpoints in the US. This
data is aggregated quarterly.
14The reason I cannot use the constraints in estimation is due to the fact that they never bind in the
data. In particular, since I only have aggregated monthly data, the total number of passengers is always
less than the total number of seats. I discuss this further after describing the data.
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The data is sorted into ticket, market, and coupon data. The ticket data provides
itinerary-level information (fare, origin and destination, passengers). This ticket data is
divided into markets, which are defined by a trip break, where a trip break is a point
in the itinerary at which a passenger is assumed to have stopped for a reason other
than changing planes. Note that this market definition is not the same as the market
definition in this paper. Rather, my market definition is more closely related to the
DB1B’s definition of itinerary. For example, an itinerary (ticket-level) BOS-LAS-BOS
would have two markets: BOS-LAS and LAS-BOS. In this paper, a market is defined as
a round-trip, e.g. BOS-LAS-BOS.
Finally, the market data is sorted into coupon-level data. A coupon is a piece of paper
or series of papers indicating the itinerary of the passenger. For example, the market
from BOS-LAS might include a layover in ORD. Thus, there would be two coupons for
this market. As will be elaborated in the next section, a single coupon may involve a
stopover, where the plane lands at an intermediate airport to deplane/enplane passengers
but the flight number does not change.
1.3.2 T-100
The Air Carrier Statistics database, also known as the T-100 data bank (“T-100”), con-
tains domestic and international airline market and segment data. To match the DB1B,
I focus on the domestic airline market. This data is aggregated monthly.
In the T-100, a segment is defined as a nonstop flight between two points, while a
market is defined as a “direct” flight between two points, where the flight number does
not change. To clarify, a direct flight can contain a stopover, where the plane lands to
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pick up and drop off passengers but has “continuing service” on to another airport. In
fact, the plane can be changed at the stopover, but if the flight number remains the same,
it still counts as a single market.
For this reason, the market data contains information on “on-flight market passengers
emplaned,” while the segment data has the more informative “available seats” and “non-
stop segment passengers transported,” along with characteristics of the plane. Also for
this reason, matching the T-100 segment data to the coupon-level link data will lead
to a nonnegligible portion of links from the coupon-level data (close to 25%) not being
identified in the T-100 segment data. The reason for this is that these “links”, which had
been implicitly assumed in the literature to be nonstop, were actually direct, and included
a stopover. In this way, I can use the mismatch between the T-100 and coupon-level link
data to generate a stopover dummy. The fraction of products with stopovers across
airlines is consistent with expectation: Southwest has stopovers on 18% of its products,
while Delta and United have half that, at 9%. American only has stopovers on 4% of its
products.
1.3.3 Evidence for Load Factors
To provide support for the motivating statements on load factors outlined in the intro-
duction, consider the following histograms of AA’s load factors for a similar period (the
third quarter) before its merger with US (2012Q3) and after its merger with US (2015Q3).
Define a “link” as any direct flight:
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Figure 1.1: Histogram of American Airlines’ Load Factors on Links
Notice that the number of links with a load factor between 90-100% increased by an
order of magnitude from the pre-merger to the post-merger world (this can be seen by the
last two bars on the left figure), while the proportion of links with a load factor between
90-100% more than doubled from the pre-merger to the post-merger world (this can be
seen by the last two bars on the right figure). The difference is caused by the increase in
number of links flown by AA after its merger with US. Either AA acquired more high-load
links than low-load links from US, or the load factor of its links increased in the three
years between 2012 and 2015, whether this was through creating/restructuring links or
through an increase in demand — or a combination of any of the above.
This phenomenon is not limited to AA. Tables 1.1 and 1.2 show the number and
fraction of links that are capacity constrained, for the 5 major airlines plus JetBlue, for
the pre-merger period (2012Q3) and post-merger period (2015Q3). Note that all major
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Table 1.1: Number of Links Operated > 90% Full
2012 (Q3) 2015 (Q3) % Change
Southwest 717 1937 170
Delta 1329 2307 74
United 1786 1956 10
American 349 1166 234
US Airways 681 - -
JetBlue 117 198 69
Table 1.2: Percentage of Links Operated > 90% Full
2012 (Q3) 2015 (Q3) % Change
Southwest 13 26 109
Delta 24 35 46
United 26 30 14
American 15 23 51
US Airways 26 - -
JetBlue 9 12 25
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carriers increased the fraction of their routes that operated 90% full, or more,15 with
Southwest more than doubling its fraction from 1/8 to 1/4.
1.3.4 Sample Selection
The sample selection procedures described below closely follow Berry and Jia [2010]. I
estimate the model separately using data from the third quarters of 2012 and 2015. I
report counterfactuals using estimates from 2012 data. As a result, I report summary
statistics for 2012 data below, and delegate the summary statistics for 2015 data to the
appendix. The sample selection procedure outlined below is almost identical for both
samples.16
In the DB1B data, an itinerary is defined by a set of coupons that correspond to the
individual flights in the journey. For example, an itinerary could be a round-trip between
New York and San Francisco. If the flight connected in Chicago both ways, there would
be a total of 4 coupons for this itinerary. As was mentioned earlier, this does not mean
the plane flies nonstop between all of these cities; indeed, a direct flight from Chicago
to San Francisco would count as an individual coupon even if it had a stopover in Salt
Lake City, provided the flight number did not change. A market, on the other hand, is a
directional pair of an origin and destination airport. The itinerary described above would
have 2 markets — one from New York to San Francisco and the other from San Francisco
to New York.
I drop the following itineraries: those that contain ground transportation (8.7%),
15The relevant measure here is more than 90% full, on average, over a month, since data is aggregated
monthly.
16The only difference is that the top ticketing carriers that are kept in 2015 are different than those
that are kept in 2012.
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those that have more than 4 coupons (4.8%), those that have a self-loop (0.9%) (i.e.,
a non-ground transport connection within the same city, like a flight from LaGuardia
to JFK), those that were not entirely ticketed by the same carrier (6.1%), those with
abnormally low fares (5.6%) (< $25, corresponding to, perhaps, the use of frequent-flier
miles) or abnormally high fares (0.01%) (> $5000), those with more than one stop in
either direction (7.3%), those with more than two markets (1.1%), and those that are not
round trips (32.6%). In total, this drops 46.9% of itineraries.
To define the size of each market, I use the geometric mean of the MSA population
of the end-point cities. I focus on airports located in medium to large metropolitan areas
with at least 700,000 people. I group together geographically close airports like Newark,
LaGuardia and JFK. There were 4552 such markets in the third quarter of 2012. These
markets roughly overlapped with the top 4000 most traveled markets, which is the scope
of focus in many empirical studies. The reasons for excluding other markets are not only
for computational reasons; there are also drastic differences in the nature of these markets,
and they are often subsidized or operated at a loss. I keep these 4552 markets, leading to
30% of itineraries being dropped.
I only keep itineraries operated by the top 9 ticketing carriers, by passengers trans-
ported (dropping 10.5% of itineraries). These are, in order of passengers transported:
Southwest, Delta, United, AA, US, JetBlue, AirTran Airways, Alaska Airlines, and Spirit
Airlines. Note that I do not drop any itineraries by operating carrier — indeed, these 9
ticketing carriers will lead to a total of 23 operating carriers across products.
Finally, conditioning on observed characteristics, many itineraries have very similar
fares and are not likely to be viewed by consumers as distinctive products. For this
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reason, as in Berry and Jia [2010], I use progressive fare bins to aggregate records within
each product.17 As a reminder, conditioning products on fare is important due to many
product-unobservables that are correlated with fares (e.g. ticket class, advance purchase,
date of travel). In summary, I define a product as a unique combination of origin airport,
connecting airport(s), destination airport, operating carriers, ticketing carrier, and binned
fare.
After all of these restrictions, my sample contains 594 thousand products and 4552
markets. This is over twice as many products as in Berry and Jia [2010], due to the
fact that my supply-side analysis requires products be differentiated by their operating
carriers on all legs.18 Overall, the entire sample selection procedure detailed above drops
65.4% of itineraries.
I present some summary statistics of my sample. First, I present summary statistics
of the demand-side observables that are aggregated at the itinerary-level. This is to say,
the averages are not passenger-weighted, but “itinerary-weighted”. Notice that the aver-
age fare ends up being close to $500 this way. I define “Tourist Cities” to include New
York City, Los Angeles, DC, and San Francisco. I define “Vacation/Resort Locations”
to include Las Vegas, Atlantic City, and any airports in the Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico,
Florida, and Hawaii. I define “Number of Direct Flights” as the number of cities the tick-
eting carrier serves directly from the origin.19 I define “Congested Airports” as those that
are slot-controlled; this includes the airports LaGuardia, John F. Kennedy, Ronald Rea-
17In particular, I use the following set of bins: $20 for all tickets under $700, $50 for tickets between
$700 and $1000 and $100 for tickets above $1000.
18As a reminder, this is because two flights ticketed by the same carrier could have different load factors,
depending on which airline is operating the flight. The T-100 dataset tells me the flow and capacity of
direct flights by operating carrier.
19This variable is meant to capture a demand-side network affect akin to the positive utility of frequency
in Wei [2014].
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gan Washington National, and Chicago O’Hare. Since I group nearby airports together,
this indicator effectively includes (all airports in) New York City, DC, and Chicago.20
These variables are consistent with Berry and Jia [2010]. Notice that about 14% of links
in my sample involve stopovers.
Table 1.3: Summary Statistics for the Observables (2012)
Mean SD Min Max
Connection 0.73 0.44 0 1
Fare ($100s) 4.88 3.24 0.4 99
Tourist Cities 0.17 0.38 0 1
Vacation/Resort Locations 0.14 0.35 0 1
Number of Direct Flights 27.6 18.6 0 65
Distance (1000s miles) 2.62 1.48 0.13 11.8
Congested Ends 0.24 0.4 0 2
Congested Connections 0.25 0.58 0 2
Hub Origin 0.3 0.46 0 1
Number of Links w/ Stopovers 0.28 0.82 0 8
Below, I present some additional summary statistics, including the passenger-weighted
fare. Notice how much lower the weighted fare is than the non-weighted one, at $399.
This means that, in our sample, the correlation between fare and number of passengers
is negative. This suggests that larger groups of people are either better at finding lower
fares (or more likely to get a group discount), or they tend to choose products with lower
fares. The average number of products per market is 131 (again, this is more than twice
what Berry and Jia [2010] had, due to the way I define products).
20There is overlap with “Tourist Cities” defined above; only Chicago is uniquely in “Congested Airports”
and only San Francisco and Los Angeles are uniquely in “Tourist Cities”.
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Table 1.4: Other Summary Statistics (2012)
Mean SD Min Max
Products Per Market 131 165 1 1930
Unconditonal Product Share (1e-5) 1.34 5.33 0.06 493
Conditional Product Share 0.01 0.02 0 1
Weighted Fare ($100s) 3.99 2.58 0.5 100
To detail the differences in weighted vs. non-weighted fares further, I plot the distribu-
tion of these fares, and differentiate them by connecting or direct flights. Notice that the
mean fare of connecting flights is higher than direct flights, and the distribution is more
right-skewed. This is not surprising; while direct flights in the same market should be
more expensive than their connecting counterparts, connecting flights should in general
(unconditionally) be more expensive than direct flights. There are two reasons for this:
1) connecting flights may cover more distant markets, and/or 2) connecting flights may
service more remote locations, where airlines’ costs are higher.
Figure 1.2: Distribution of Fares, Non-Weighted vs. Weighted (2012)
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(b) Kernel Density of Fares, Passenger-Weighted
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Finally, I report summary statistics for the 9 ticketing carriers included in my sample.
Notice that Southwest offers fewer products than Delta, but transports nearly 50% more
passengers than Delta. Recalling that products are defined by route as well as by price bin
and operating carrier, these summary statistics might suggest that Delta: 1) flies smaller
planes, 2) has greater variance in fares, and/or 3) employs more operating carriers than
Southwest. Knowing that Southwest is a low-cost carrier and largely operates its own
flights, the third option seems to be particularly plausible. Indeed, this is the case. In
our sample, Southwest operates all of the itineraries that it tickets. On the other hand,
Delta uses 11 different operating carriers. As a result, if I remove product conditioning
on operating carriers, Southwest has the same number of products (132 thousand) while
Delta has much less (124 thousand).
Table 1.5: Summary Statistics for the Ticketing Carriers (2012)
# Passengers % Passengers # Products % Products
Southwest 740593 27.9 132090 22.3
Delta 536892 20.2 171343 28.9
United Airlines 392541 14.8 119454 20.2
American Airlines 314971 11.9 55987 9.5
US Airways 257097 9.7 82584 14
JetBlue 177153 6.7 8105 1.4
AirTran Airways 120028 4.6 15359 2.6
Alaska Airlines 69304 2.7 6280 1.1
Spirit Airlines 54359 2.1 2869 0.5
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1.3.5 Adjustments
Cost of Fuel
While the cost of fuel is a significant driver of airline profits, it is impractical to include it
as an explanatory variable in the marginal cost regression. The reason for this comes down
to a data limitation: fare data is only available at the quarterly level. In other words, to
get variation in fuel prices, I need to include multiple quarters of data in estimation.21
But this would introduce confounding effects arising from seasonality, unless I include
seasonal dummies — these would not be separately identifiable from fuel prices. To get
variation in both fuel prices and seasons, I would need to include many years of data.
However, the product space would not remain constant, which is an important assumption
of this paper. For this reason, existing literature has not included a fuel price explanatory
variable (see, e.g., Berry and Jia [2010]).
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Figure 1.3: Average Domestic Fuel Cost per Gallon
That said, there is significant variation in fuel prices that should not be neglected,
21Recall that I only use a single quarter of data in estimation: the pre-merger period of 2012Q3.
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both across carriers and across time. For example, the average spot price for jet fuel more
than halved from the third quarter of 2012 ($3.20 per gallon) to the third quarter of 2015
($1.55 per gallon) — these are the time periods of interest in this paper. Moreover, due
to long-term contracts and hedging of spot prices, there was significant variation between
the actual cost of fuel paid by different carriers. For example, in the third quarter of 2015,
AA paid $1.44 per gallon while Delta paid $1.91 per gallon, a difference of 33%.22 Finally,
due to differences in aircraft fleet composition and age, there is even more heterogeneity.
For example, according to a 2014 report (Li et al. [2015]), airline efficiency on the A320
in 2014 varied from 8.1 passenger miles/lb fuel (Delta) to 11.3 passenger miles/lb fuel
(Spirit), due to the average fleet age (2 years for Spirit and 19 years for Delta).
To get around the issue of estimating a cost of fuel parameter while still taking into
account the drastic variation in fuel prices, both over time and across carriers, I perform
the following accounting manipulation on the data. Using airlines’ 10-Q filings,23 I calcu-
late the carrier-quarter-specific fuel cost per revenue passenger mile (“FCPM”). This is
given by the table below.
Table 1.6: Fuel Cost per Revenue Passenger Mile (cents/mile)
2012Q3 2015Q3
American 5.77 2.91
Delta 5.96 3.34
JetBlue 5.31 3.09
Southwest 5.61 3
United 6.09 3.39
22All data on fuel prices was obtained from the Bureau of Transport Statistics at http://www.
transtats.bts.gov/fuel.asp.
23Form 10-Q is a quarterly report mandated by the United States Securities and Exchange Commission
(“SEC”) for all publicly traded corporations. 10-Q filings were obtained from the SEC’s website (www.
sec.gov).
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I then multiply the numbers in this table by the distance of each product and subtract
this route-specific number from the backed-out marginal costs of every route. In other
words, I eliminate from the backed-out marginal costs the portion of the “distance” ex-
planatory variable that is due to estimated fuel costs. Then, when I forecast costs in a
new period or in a counterfactual world, I add a new route-specific number derived by
multiplying the numbers in this table by the distance of each product. This approach not
only gets around the issues of including a cost of fuel variable, but it accurately captures
heterogeneity in airlines’ cost of fuel and fuel efficiency. In the results section, I show that
this approach leads to predictions for fuel costs that are consistent with airlines’ 10-Q
filings. I also show that the distribution of fuel cost as a fraction of total variable cost is
well-behaved across products.
In the merger counterfactual, I need to make an assumption on what FCPM would
have been for AA and US, had they not merged (for the other carriers, I assume that
FCPM is the same with or without the merger). I assume that AA has the same FCPM
whether or not it merged with US, and I assume that US inherits the FCPM of the carriers
that had the closest FCPM to it in the pre-merger period.24 I find that my results are
robust to different specifications, such as the case where AA’s FCPM is different if it had
not merged (for example, if I assign AA the FCPM of carriers whose FCPM’s were closest
to AA’s in the pre-merger period, by the same approach used to obtain FCPM for US in
the relevant but-for world).
24In particular, I solve for xj such that the US FCPM in 2012 (which is 5.28) times xj is equal to carrier
j’s FCPM in 2012. Then, I average over the top 5 carriers’ FCPM in 2015 times xj .
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1.3.6 Airfare Taxes
The fare reported in the DB1B data is the fare paid by consumers. In other words,
it includes all taxes and fees. It is the appropriate fare to use in the demand-side of
estimation, but not in the supply-side of estimation. Airlines do not actually receive this
fare, but receive this fare minus all taxes and fees. That said, airlines may also receive
ancillary fees relating to baggage and fuel surcharges, but I abstract from these on both
the demand-side and the supply-side (partly because I am unable to identify whether a
given fare has ancillary fees included, or not, e.g. premium economy vs. economy).
Taxes on domestic airfare fall into the following categories (using 2012 rates):
1. Domestic Passenger Ticket Tax: 7.5% of ticket price.
2. Domestic Flight Segment Tax: $3.80 per segment.
3. Passenger Ticket Tax for Rural Airports: 7.5% of ticket price.
4. Flights between continental US and Alaska or Hawaii: $8.40 tax per one-way trip.
5. Frequent Flyer Tax: 7.5% of value of miles.
6. Passenger Facilities Charges: up to $4.50 (max of 4, for PFC-approved airports).
7. September 11th Security Fee: $2.50 per enplanement (max of 2 per one-way trip).
In 2015, some of these taxes changed. In particular, the Domestic Flight Segment Tax
rose to $4.00; the Alaska/Hawaii Tax rose to $8.90 per one-way trip; the September 11th
Security Fee rose to $5.60 (now, calculated as a total per one-way trip).25
25Data on airfare taxes was obtained from the Federal Aviation Administration’s (“FAA”’s)
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Below, I discuss the details regarding the implementation of these taxes. A rural
airport is defined as one with fewer than 100 thousand enplanements during the second
preceding calendar year, and either 1) is not located within 75 miles of another airport
with more than 100 thousand enplanements, 2) is receiving essential air service subsidies,
or 3) is not connected by paved roads to another airport. Since my analysis focuses only
on MSA’s with a population of over 700 thousand, I omit all “rural airports” from the
analysis and can ignore this tax. The MSA of Anchorage is below 700 thousand, while
the MSA of Honolulu is not. For this reason, all flights to and from Honolulu (and only
those flights) have the additional $8.40 tax added. I abstract from the Frequent Flyer
Tax, since I do not have data on miles earned, and the miles earned can vary drastically
between different types of Economy and Business fares (which I cannot differentiate from
the data). A “Flight Segment” is defined in the same way a “Coupon” is in this paper:
one takeoff and one landing. The Passenger Facilities Charge (“PFC”) is only levied
on PFC-approved airports, and the rate varies between $3.00 and $4.50.26 To simplify
analysis, I assume every airport levies a charge of $3.50.
Putting all of this together results in the following total fare, F , as a function of the
base fare, B, for a round-trip itinerary. Let nS be the number of segments:
F = 1.075 ∗B + 3.80 ∗ nS + 6 ∗max(nS, 4) + 1(Honolulu) ∗ 16.80
website (https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/apl/aatf/media/14.
1.17excisetaxstructurecalendar2014.pdf) and from Delta’s information on taxes and carrier-
imposed fees (http://www.delta.com/content/www/en_US/traveling-with-us/planning-a-trip/
booking-information/fare-classes-and-tickets/taxes-and-fees.html).
26A list of PFC-approved airports was obtained from the FAA’s monthly reports (https://www.faa.
gov/airports/pfc/monthly_reports/media/airports.pdf).
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In other words, given the DB1B fare date, F , I can use the following transformation
as an approximation for the base fare airlines received, B:
B = 0.93 ∗ (F − (3.80 ∗ nS + 6 ∗max(nS, 4) + 1(Honolulu) ∗ 16.80))
The approach is as follows: I use F in demand-side estimation but B and F in supply-
side estimation: e.g. Π = (B −mc)q(F ). I do the same when predicting counterfactuals,
using the taxes in 2015 given above. To see this, notice that the first-order condition for
profit maximization now reads as:
max
p
pij =
∑
j
(f(pj)−mcj)qj(p)
f(pj) = 0.93 ∗ pj − (3.80 ∗ nS + 6 ∗max(nS, 4) + 1(Honolulu) ∗ 16.80))
where pj is the fare paid by consumers, and f(pj) is the fare received by airlines (the base
fare). Then, the first-order condition of the above problem reads as follows:
f ′(pj)qj(p) +
∑
r∈Jj
(f(pr)−mcr)∂qr(p)
∂pj
= 0
Rewriting the above in matrix form, I get:
0.93q(p)−4(f(p)−mc) = 0 (1.3.1)
Note that ∆ is a function of p, not f(p).
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1.3.7 Instruments
In this paper, fares and capacity constraints are endogenous because of a classic simultane-
ous equations problem. In particular, prices and quantities are simultaneously determined
in market equilibrium, causing fares to be correlated with the error terms in the demand
function, and causing capacity constraints (via quantity) to be correlated with the error
terms in the cost function. Fares are also endogenous due to an arbitrary correlation with
the demand-side product unobservables, ξj .
Because of this endogeneity (E(pjξj) 6= 0 and E(CCjωj) 6= 0, where CCj is a dummy
for whether a particular product has capacity-constrained links), I need instruments in
order to identify the fare and capacity-constraint coefficients. I discuss instruments for the
fare coefficient first. Typically, demand studies will exploit the rival product attributes
and the competitiveness of the market environment to instrument fares. But there is a
problem with doing this here. Consider, for example, using the number of products as an
instrument. This seems reasonable since, ceteris paribus, products with closer substitutes
have lower prices. But this instrument may itself be endogenous because of the way
products were defined; in particular, since a product is a group of tickets whose fares fall
in a fixed bin, a market with wider price dispersion will have a larger number of products.
For this reason, I use route-level characteristics instead. Instruments along these lines
are the number of rival carriers, the number of rival routes, the percentage of rival routes
that offer direct flights, and the average distance of rival routes. A second group of
(demand-side) instruments include cost-shifters that do not affect demand. Instruments
along these lines are the number of cities to which a carrier flies nonstop flights from
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the destination airport, and a dummy for connecting at a hub airport. A third group of
instruments are the exogenous variables.
Next, I discuss instruments for the capacity-constraint variable. In addition to the
instruments discussed above, following Wei [2014], I use two additional instruments for
flow. The first instrument relies on the variation of “centrality” across links. In particular,
it is the number of products that use the set of link l in a product. The second instrument
relies on the variation in population across the endpoints of products. In particular, it is
the geometric mean of the market size of the end cities of each product.
These instruments are relevant because a product is likely to have more capacity-
constrained links if its links are used by many different products, or if they connect
cities with large populations. They are valid because of the standard assumption that
ξ is unknown to airlines before entry;27 in other words, ξ is orthogonal to the network
structure.
I also need instruments in order to identify the nested logit parameter, λ, and the
share of nonbusiness travelers, γ. Gandhi and Houde [2015] show that there exists an ideal
set of instruments in mixed logit demand systems that provide the fundamental source of
variation in the data that identifies substitution patterns. They call these “Differentiation
IV’s”; these instruments are aimed at capturing the distance in product space from similar
products. One of my instruments captures the spirit of these Differentiation IV’s directly:
“Rival Routes of Same Type”. This instrument measures the number of products that are
connecting, if the product under consideration is a connecting flight, or the percentage
of products that are direct, if the product under consideration contains a direct flight.
27For a more elaborate discussion, see Aguirregabiria and Ho [2012].
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Other instruments, while not exact matches, also aim to capture the distance in product
space between similar products. I report summary statistics for some of the instruments
used below:
Table 1.7: Summary Statistics for Selected Instruments
Mean SD Min Max
Rival Carriers 4.57 1.49 0 8
Rival Routes 17.4 13.1 0 85
Rival Routes of Same Type 12.4 11.9 0 79
% Rival Routes Direct 0.14 0.14 0 1
Distance of Rival Routes 2.88 1.53 0 12.5
Hub Destination 0.27 0.44 0 1
Own Routes 5.41 5.02 1 49
Link Centrality 705 550 0 3825
I perform instrument diagnostic tests following Nevo [2001]. First, I test for instrument
relevance. To do this, I compute the F-statistic of a joint test of whether all instruments
are significantly different from zero in the first-stage least-squares regression.28 This
statistic should be larger than 10, and it is in both cases. Second, I test for instrument
validity. To do this, I perform the Sargan test on instrument validity (I can do this
because the model is over-identified). I regress the residuals of the IV regression on the
instruments and compare nR2 from this regression to its distribution under the null of
instrument exogeneity. The p-values for this test are 0 for both the price instruments and
the capacity-constraint instruments, meaning that I cannot reject the null of instrument
exogeneity. I conclude that my instruments are relevant and valid.
28This is a partial F-test; it tests whether only the coefficients on the instruments are statistically
different from zero, not whether all the coefficients are statistically different from zero.
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1.3.8 Identification
I briefly outline identification of the nested logit parameter λ and the type-specific param-
eters, since the identification of the other parameters in the utility function is standard.
Consider the identification of λ first. When λ = 0, the aggregate share of the routes
remains fixed as the number of products varies across markets. In other words, the total
demand in a market is inelastic. When λ = 1, the nested logit demand reduces to a
simple logit. In other words, the total demand in a market becomes more elastic. As
discussed earlier, I do not use the number of products as an instruments due to concerns
about endogeneity.29 That said, I use route-level characteristics, and the number of rival
routes and carriers serve as a good proxy to the number of products in a market. Finally,
I identify the type-specific parameters by exploiting substitution patterns among similar
products when the mix of products varies across markets. For a more elaborate discussion
of the above, see Berry and Jia [2010], Wei [2014], or the existing literature on random
coefficient logit estimation.
1.3.9 Empirical Capacity Constraints
No link is capacity constrained, in the strict-sense, in the T-100 data.30 The reason for
this is that data is aggregated monthly, and planes always have a few empty seats over
the course of a month. That said, it seems likely that a plane that had 99% of its seats
full on average, over the course of a month, had at least a few individual flights that were
completely full. Moreover, some flights may have had empty seats that were “off-limits”
29Recall that products are conditioned on fare bin, and fare is an endogenous variable.
30Throughout this paper, capacity and flows are aggregated at the monthly level. In other words, like
the T-100 data, the predictions of flows measure the aggregate over a month, not an average per flight.
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to passengers due to weight-balance considerations.
For this reason, it seems reasonable to assume that a link, j, is effectively capacity
constrained (µj > 0) if the monthly load factor on that link exceeds a threshold, κ ≤ 1:
∑
s:s∈j qs
cj
≥ κ
There is a trade-off in selecting κ. On one hand, we want κ to be high enough to be
meaningful, in the sense that it properly separates flights that are capacity constrained
from flights that are not; on the other hand, we want κ to be low enough to include enough
flights for there to be adequate variation to estimate the effect of capacity constraints
accurately. In essence, we are turning a continuous variable (load factor) into a discrete
binary variable (constrained or unconstrained).
To illustrate how the choice of κ affects the capacity-constraint variable, I plot two
graphs below. The plot on the left shows the number of capacity-constrained links per
product in my sample (recall that a product is a round-trip between an origin and des-
tination, and I only keep trips with at most one stop), as a function of κ. The plot on
the right takes κ = 0.9, and plots the share of capacity-constrained links vs. the share of
total links per carrier. Notice that carriers, for the most part, have their “fair share” of
capacity-constrained routes at κ = 0.9. Recall that our sample is from the third quarter
of 2012.
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Below, I also plot the load factor and capacity-constrained routes (for κ = 0.9) for
United over multiple years. Notice that there is seasonality in load factors: they are
consistently higher in the summer and lower in the spring and fall. Throughout this
paper, I will take κ = 0.9.31 In the results section, I will show how the estimates of the
capacity-constraint coefficient vary with κ.
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I proceed as follows: I estimate the demand-side first, and then use the demand-side
31I find that my results are robust to taking κ to be 0.8, 0.85 and 0.94, and re-running the entirety of
the analysis.
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estimates to estimate the supply-side. I do not solve the full model in this paper; rather,
I use the capacity information to generate a new variable, “capacity constrained” and
include it in the supply-side marginal cost regression. Since this variable is endogenous, I
instrument for it using the demand-side observables and instruments. I discuss extensions
to the approach outlined above and present some ideas on how to solve the complete
model, in the appendix.
1.4 Results
1.4.1 Demand
The BLP estimator minimizes an objective function in which instruments interact with
both ξj and ωj , and the demand-side and supply-side parameters are estimated jointly.
In my application, this requires inverting the matrix ∆ for many trial parameter values.
Because of the very large product space in this paper,32 it is time-consuming to invert
the matrix ∆. For this reason, I estimate the demand and supply side sequentially.
There are closed-form solutions for the price elasticity of demand in both the standard
and nested logit models:
∂sj
∂pj
pj
sj
=

αpj(1− sj) standard logit
αpj
λ (1− (1− λ)sj|g − λsj) nested logit
Elasticities for all individuals (business, tourist) can be obtaining by weighting indi-
vidual elasticities by their relative shares: γ (for business travelers) and 1−γ (for tourists).
32Recall that this is driven by us having to distinguish products amongst operating carriers on each leg
of the trip, in order to implement capacity-constraint analysis.
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Elasticities for all products within a market can be obtained by weighting individual elas-
ticities by their predicted market share (divided by sum of predicted market shares of
all products within that market): sj/
∑
j sj . Elasticities for all products (across markets)
can be obtained by weighting individual elasticities by their predicted market demand
(divided by sum of predicted market demands of all products): Mj ∗ sj/
∑
jMj ∗ sj . The
weighting by market size is important here since some products will be in much larger
markets than others (making the corresponding change in market shares different). I re-
port elasticities for tourist and business travelers separately, as well as together, below.33
I also calculate an “aggregate” price elasticity (as in Berry and Jia [2010]), where I find
the percent change in total demand (sum of all products’ demands) when all prices in-
crease by 1%. To make the coefficients in demand estimation comparable to each other,
I compute a Willingness-To-Pay (“WTP”) measure by dividing each coefficient by the
price coefficient. All carrier fixed effects are relative to US.
I estimate the model using 2012 data and 2015 data, separately. I present the demand
side first. My estimates closely match Berry and Jia [2010], with all of the expected
signs and magnitudes. As expected, the fare coefficient becomes more negative once I
instrument for it.34 I find that the price elasticity of demand of business travelers is
2.78, compared to 6.77 of their nonbusiness counterparts. The average price elasticity of
demand (aggregated across types) is 5.15. The aggregate price elasticity of demand is
1.59. This number is not only consistent with Berry and Jia [2010],35 but with a survey
33These are calculated from the results of GMM with 2 types.
34With standard OLS, we are led to erroneously attribute the effect of demand-unobservables to the
fare variable. If these are positively correlated (as we expect, due to products with high fares likely having
many utility-enhancing unobserved effects), it causes attenuation bias.
35These authors found the aggregate price elasticity to be 1.55 in 1999 and 1.67 in 2006.
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conducted by Gillen et al. [2003]; these authors collected 85 demand elasticity estimates
from cross-sectional studies and found that elasticities ranged from 0.181 to 2.01, with a
median of 1.33. I find that business travelers desire direct flights much more than their
nonbusiness counterparts; in particular, the average business traveler would pay a 74%
fare premium for a direct flight, vs. 32% for a nonbusiness traveler.
American enjoyed a sizeable “brand-name premium” in 2012; ceteris paribus, individ-
uals would pay more to fly AA (over US) than to fly to a vacation/resort location (16%
vs. 7% of average fare for the average nonbusiness traveler, and 40% vs. 17% for the
average business traveler). On the other hand, individuals would need a lower fare to
choose Southwest over US, ceteris paribus (19% for the average business traveler and 7%
for the average nonbusiness traveler). However, AA’s brand-name premium disappeared
in 2015; ceteris paribus, individuals would pay more to fly Delta or United over AA. AA
still maintained its premium over Southwest.
In order to assess whether this change in brand-name premium was driven by AA
acquiring lower-quality US products, I re-ran the above with two AA dummies: one for
its legacy products, and one for its acquired products. I find that, in 2015, AA’s legacy
products had a higher perceived quality than its acquired products from US (WTP about
50% higher). However, the brand-name premium of its legacy products still fell short of
Delta’s or United’s products. For complete results, see the appendix.
The share of business travelers was estimated at 40%. This is consistent with Berry
and Jia [2010], and if this seems high, recall that we implicitly assume individuals can
only purchase one product or not fly. In other words, there is no measure of frequency of
flying, and it may be the case that though business travelers are small in number, they
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fly relatively more frequently than their tourist counterparts. The nested logit parameter
is found to be 0.48 in 2012 and 0.45 in 2015. Berry and Jia [2010] find the nested
logit parameter to be decreasing from 0.77 in 1999 to 0.72 in 2006. My results indicate
that this trend has continued (and sped up) to 2012; in other words, airline products
within a market have become closer substitutes over time. This likely reflects the reduced
differentiation among products offered by different airline carriers as they cut down on
services and competed more on prices.
The contribution of this paper on the demand-side is through the “stopover” variable.
This variable keeps track of the number of stopovers in a product, where a stopover is
defined as a direct flight that makes a stop to enplane/deplane passengers without the
flight number changing. Recall that I was able to define this variable by comparing which
coupons in the DB1B (which include direct and nonstop flights) did not appear in the
T-100 (which include nonstop flights only). I find that the average individual needs about
one-fifth the fare discount to purchase a flight with a stopover vs. a layover (14% for a
stopover vs. 74% for a layover for the average business traveler, and 6% for a stopover vs.
32% for a layover for the average nonbusiness traveler). Previous literature would have
considered flights with stopovers as direct flights. As can be seen from the estimates,
stopovers generate a nonnegligible effect on consumer choice.
My estimates are almost all statistically significant. Following convention, three stars
means significant at 1%, two stars means significant at 5%, and one star means significant
at 10%.
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Table 1.8: Demand-Side Parameter Estimates (2012)
OLS (1-type) IV (1-type) GMM (1-type) GMM (2-types)
Constant (Tourist) -8.274∗∗∗ -6.011∗∗∗ -6.035∗∗∗ -5.908∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.008) (0.002) (0)
Connection (Tourist) -0.633∗∗∗ -1.077∗∗∗ -1.086∗∗∗ -1.076∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0)
Fare (Tourist) -0.029∗∗∗ -0.663∗∗∗ -0.667∗∗∗ -1.052∗∗∗
(0) (0.002) (0.052) (0.002)
Constant (Business) - - - -7.875∗∗∗
- - - (0.001)
Connection (Business) - - - -1.002∗∗∗
- - - (0)
Fare (Business) - - - -0.26∗∗∗
- - - (0.035)
Stopovers -0.193∗∗∗ -0.193∗∗∗ -0.195∗∗∗ -0.194∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0) (0)
Tourist Cities 0.13∗∗∗ 0.206∗∗∗ 0.207∗∗∗ 0.208∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0) (0)
Vacation/Resort Locations 0.516∗∗∗ 0.225∗∗∗ 0.226∗∗∗ 0.226∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0) (0)
Direct Routes 0.004∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.013 0.014
(0) (0) (2.646) (2.399)
Distance 0.016∗∗∗ 0.204∗∗∗ 0.201∗∗∗ 0.206∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.016) (0.018)
Distance2 -0.007∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02 0.02
(0) (0) (0.239) (0.247)
Congested Ends 0.007∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0) (0)
Congested Connections -0.046∗∗∗ -0.087∗∗∗ -0.088∗∗∗ -0.087∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0) (0)
Hub Origin -0.026∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0) (0)
Southwest -0.209∗∗∗ -0.08∗∗∗ -0.081∗∗∗ -0.08∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.004) (0) (0)
Delta -0.448∗∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0) (0)
United -0.432∗∗∗ 0.216∗∗∗ 0.216∗∗∗ 0.217∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.005) (0) (0)
American -0.289∗∗∗ 0.537∗∗∗ 0.536∗∗∗ 0.542∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0) (0)
US Airways -0.357∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.171∗∗∗ 0.171∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.005) (0) (0)
JetBlue 0.083∗∗∗ 0.165∗∗∗ 0.167∗∗∗ 0.165∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.007) (0) (0)
Lambda 0.518∗∗∗ 0.466∗∗∗ 0.463∗∗∗ 0.476∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.079) (0.075)
Gamma - - - 0.597∗∗∗
- - - (0.003)
Mu - - 0.099 0.102
- - (0.201) (0.193)
Test of Over Identification (p-value) - 0 - -
1st Stage R2 - 0.31 - -
1st Stage F-test - 159 - -
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Table 1.9: Demand-Side Parameter Estimates (2015)
OLS (1-type) IV (1-type) GMM (1-type) GMM (2-types)
Constant (Tourist) -8.16∗∗∗ -5.76∗∗∗ -5.787∗∗∗ -5.685∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.008) (0.002) (0)
Connection (Tourist) -0.744∗∗∗ -1.154∗∗∗ -1.163∗∗∗ -1.155∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0)
Fare (Tourist) -0.033∗∗∗ -0.71∗∗∗ -0.715∗∗∗ -1.101∗∗∗
(0) (0.002) (0.05) (0.001)
Constant (Business) - - - -7.659∗∗∗
- - - (0.001)
Connection (Business) - - - -1.079∗∗∗
- - - (0.001)
Fare (Business) - - - -0.307∗∗∗
- - - (0.035)
Stopovers -0.263∗∗∗ -0.37∗∗∗ -0.373∗∗∗ -0.369∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0) (0)
Tourist Cities 0.136∗∗∗ 0.256∗∗∗ 0.256∗∗∗ 0.256∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0) (0)
Vacation/Resort Locations 0.437∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0) (0)
Direct Routes 0.007∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.015 0.015
(0) (0) (2.566) (2.327)
Distance 0.035∗∗∗ 0.228∗∗∗ 0.225∗∗∗ 0.231∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.015) (0.016)
Distance2 -0.007∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.025 0.025
(0) (0) (0.214) (0.221)
Congested Ends -0.084∗∗∗ -0.154∗∗∗ -0.155∗∗∗ -0.154∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0) (0)
Congested Connections -0.03∗∗∗ -0.043∗∗∗ -0.043∗∗∗ -0.043∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0) (0)
Hub Origin -0.115∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0) (0)
Southwest -0.389∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0) (0)
Delta -0.518∗∗∗ 0.728∗∗∗ 0.729∗∗∗ 0.736∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.006) (0) (0)
United -0.579∗∗∗ 0.542∗∗∗ 0.542∗∗∗ 0.547∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.006) (0) (0)
American -0.547∗∗∗ 0.336∗∗∗ 0.337∗∗∗ 0.338∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0) (0)
JetBlue -0.073∗∗∗ 0.473∗∗∗ 0.477∗∗∗ 0.475∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0) (0)
Lambda 0.465∗∗∗ 0.554∗∗∗ 0.444∗∗∗ 0.454∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.077) (0.071)
Gamma - - - 0.596∗∗∗
- - - (0.003)
Mu - - 0.099 0.101
- - (0.184) (0.177)
Test of Over Identification (p-value) - 0 - -
1st Stage R2 - 0.32 - -
1st Stage F-test - 1378 - -
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Table 1.10: Price Elasticity of Demand
Tourist Business Total ElasAgg
2012: −6.77 −2.78 −5.15 −1.59
2015: −7.78 −3.62 −6.17 −1.82
Table 1.11: Willingness to Pay (% of Average Fare in 2012)
Tourist Business
Connection −32 −74
Stopover −6 −14
Tourist Cities 6 15
Vacation/Resort Locations 7 17
Direct Routes 0 1
Distance 6 15
Distance2 1 1
Congested Ends −1 −1
Congested Connections −3 −6
Hub Origin 2 5
Southwest −2 −6
Delta 4 11
United 6 16
American 16 40
US Airways 5 13
Jet Blue 5 12
Average Fare ($) 323 523
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Table 1.12: Willingness to Pay (% of Average Fare in 2015)
Tourist Business
Connection −31 −64
Stopover −10 −22
Tourist Cities 7 15
Vacation/Resort Locations 3 7
Direct Routes 0 1
Distance 6 14
Distance2 1 1
Congested Ends −4 −9
Congested Connections −1 −3
Hub Origin 0 −1
Southwest 3 7
Delta 20 44
United 15 32
American 9 20
Jet Blue 13 28
Average Fare ($) 337 550
Once I have estimated the demand-side, I can back out what marginal costs are for
each product. I compare the fuel component of this cost to airlines’ 10-Q filings below:36
Table 1.13: Fuel Component of Costs (% in 2012)
Model 10-Q (low) 10-Q (high)
Southwest 51 39 56
Delta 33 28 37
United 44 39 50
American 44 37 51
US Airways 47 43 55
I also plot the distribution of the fraction of fuel cost to total variable costs by carrier.
36I report an upper and lower bound for total variable costs. The upper bound is derived by taking the
reported operating costs of each carrier and subtracting Depreciation and Amortization, as well as Special
Items, if there were any. The lower bound is derived by taking the upper bound and further subtracting
Salaries, Wages, and Benefits, since they could be interpreted as fixed costs in the short-run.
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The distribution is well-behaved across products, for each carrier.
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Figure 1.6: Distribution of Fuel Cost as a Fraction of Total Variable Cost
1.4.2 Supply
Next, I estimate the “reduced-form” version of the supply-side model, where capacity
constraints enter as an additional explanatory variable for marginal cost. Note that the
dependent variable, marginal cost, is in hundreds of dollars. I differentiate between short-
haul (“SH”) and long-haul (“LH”) products the same way that Berry and Jia [2010] do:
products with less than 1500 miles between origin and destination cities are SH, while
products with more than 1500 miles between origin and destination cities are LH. 73.7%
of products in my sample are LH.
I find that, for SH products, connections lead to lower marginal costs for the overall
product (by $21), while for LH products, connections lead to lower marginal costs for
the overall product (by $57). There are some intuitive reasons why making a stop would
lower marginal costs: 1) it allows the plane to carry less fuel, and 2) it allows the airline
to allocate better-suited planes to the demand of the route. There are also reasons why
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a stop would increase marginal costs: it translates to an extra takeoff, landing, fuel/time
spent taxiing and ascending/descending, as well as baggage handling and airport fees. It
is reasonable that the cost savings discussed above affect SH routes more than LH routes.
On the first point, carrying fuel for the entirety of a LH flight would translate to burning
more fuel on route, due to extra weight, than for a comparable SH flight. On the second
point, LH routes face constraints in the type/size of planes that can fly the direct distance;
for example, it is not uncommon to see large, long-haul planes flying the relatively short
ORD-JFK route, but there are no small jets flying the SEA-OSL route, even though the
direct-route demand might warrant it. The length of this route requires a larger plane
and, due to insufficient demand, a connection in a larger city or hub.
Including (and instrumenting for) capacity-constrained products, I find that, in 2012,
the coefficient is significant and quite negative (-1.28).37 This means that, ceteris paribus,
capacity-constrained products have a lower marginal cost per passenger by $128. I in-
terpret this parameter as capturing the economies of scale that exist, from an airline’s
point of view, from having its flights near capacity. This is economically significant: the
average marginal costs of products with a link that is operated close to capacity is less
than half that of products without any such links ($97 vs. $202).
Consistent with Berry and Jia [2010], I find that JetBlue operates, ceteris paribus, at
a much lower marginal cost than United — in particular, over $180 lower. Marginal costs
37The direction the coefficient moves after instrumenting is consistent with intuition. In particular,
products with lower marginal costs are likely to be priced lower and hence demand a larger market share,
making them more likely to be capacity constrained. This is a positive feedback effect on the capacity-
constraint variable (higher flow leads to lower marginal cost which leads to even higher flow) that would
cause OLS to underestimate the true effect of the capacity-constraint variable, in this case biasing it
towards zero. Put another way, OLS erroneously attributes the variation in marginal cost to the final
variation in the capacity-constraint variable, when it was likely a smaller variation in the latter that caused
the variation in the former; the final (larger) variation in the latter is due to the feedback effect.
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are increasing and concave in the distance of products: a decreasing amount of extra fuel
and services are required for longer routes. As before, the distance variable is in thousands
of miles.
My estimates are all statistically significant. As before, three stars means significant
at 1%, two stars means significant at 5%, and one star means significant at 10%.
52
Table 1.14: Supply-Side Parameter Estimates (2012)
OLS (no Cap Con) OLS IV
Short-Haul Constant 0.709∗∗∗ 0.714∗∗∗ 0.656∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Short-Haul Distance 1.344∗∗∗ 1.344∗∗∗ 1.685∗∗∗
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14)
Short-Haul Distance2 -0.333∗∗∗ -0.332∗∗∗ -0.248∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Short-Haul Connection -0.213∗∗∗ -0.213∗∗∗ -0.208∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Long-Haul Constant 1.281∗∗∗ 1.259∗∗∗ 0.815∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.07) (0.08)
Long-Haul Distance 0.203∗∗∗ 0.218∗∗∗ 0.91∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Long-Haul Distance2 0.035∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗∗
(0) (0) (0)
Long-Haul Connection -0.575∗∗∗ -0.573∗∗∗ -0.565∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Hub (Origin, Destination, or Transfer) 0.268∗∗∗ 0.268∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Congested Ends 0.169∗∗∗ 0.166∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Capacity Constrained - -0.02∗∗∗ -1.28∗∗∗
- (0) (0.03)
Southwest 0.161∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗ -0.283∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.04)
Delta 0.583∗∗∗ 0.584∗∗∗ 0.667∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.04)
United 0.909∗∗∗ 0.908∗∗∗ 0.934∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.04)
American 0.96∗∗∗ 0.956∗∗∗ 0.535∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
US Airways 0.612∗∗∗ 0.609∗∗∗ 0.442∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.04)
JetBlue -0.085∗∗∗ -0.098∗∗∗ -0.884∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Test of Over Identification (p-value) - - 0
1st Stage R2 - - 0.3
1st Stage F-test - - 15
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Table 1.15: Supply-Side Parameter Estimates (2015)
OLS (no Cap Con) OLS IV
Short-Haul Constant 1.165∗∗∗ 1.184∗∗∗ 1.245∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Short-Haul Distance 0.279∗∗ 0.268∗∗ 0.454∗∗∗
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
Short-Haul Distance2 0.106∗ 0.104 0.149∗∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Short-Haul Connection -0.18∗∗∗ -0.184∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Long-Haul Constant 0.4∗∗∗ 0.437∗∗∗ 0.364∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Long-Haul Distance 0.304∗∗∗ 0.269∗∗∗ 0.649∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Long-Haul Distance2 0.031∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗
(0) (0) (0)
Long-Haul Connection -0.535∗∗∗ -0.545∗∗∗ -0.306∗∗∗
(0) (0) (0.01)
Hub (Origin, Destination, or Transfer) 0.361∗∗∗ 0.349∗∗∗ 0.327∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Congested Ends 0.059∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Capacity Constrained - 0.056∗∗∗ -0.565∗∗∗
- (0) (0.01)
Southwest 0.521∗∗∗ 0.51∗∗∗ 0.495∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Delta 1.278∗∗∗ 1.27∗∗∗ 1.623∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
United 1.304∗∗∗ 1.287∗∗∗ 1.567∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
American 0.927∗∗∗ 0.919∗∗∗ 1.262∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
JetBlue 0.581∗∗∗ 0.606∗∗∗ 0.521∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Test of Over Identification (p-value) - - 0
1st Stage R2 - - 0.26
1st Stage F-test - - 615
In order to assess if there are any differences in costs between AA’s legacy products
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and acquired products in 2015, I ran the above specification with two AA dummies: one
for its legacy products, and one for its acquired products. I find that, in 2015, AA’s legacy
products have almost the same cost fixed-effect (“FE”) as its acquired products from US
($125 vs. $120, respectively). For complete results, see the appendix.
Because the value of κ is assumed, it is prudent to examine how the model’s results
would vary as κ changes. Positive values of the capacity-constraint coefficient, for example,
would cast doubt on the reliability of the model. To this end, I re-run the above regression
for different choices of κ, and plot the resulting capacity-constraint coefficient. This is, in
effect, a plot of the reduction in marginal costs due to a flight being capacity constrained,
given different definitions of “capacity constrained”. I find that the reduction in marginal
costs due to a flight being capacity constrained is U-shaped in the choice of κ, and always
the same sign. This captures the spirit of the this paper: for low values of κ, economies of
scale dominate, causing marginal costs to decrease as we increase the capacity-constraint
threshold, while for high values of κ, capacity constraints dominate, causing marginal costs
to increase as we increase the capacity-constraint threshold. In other words, as the makeup
of capacity-constrained products moves towards those flights with very high load factors,
we lose out on the gains from economies of scale due to the “costs” of capacity constraints
binding. Of course, this increase in marginal costs should not be taken literally — what is
really happening here is that observed prices are higher for capacity-constrained products
once we make κ high. This lends credence to the importance of there being a capacity
constraint in the airline’s pricing problem; when load factors are very high, airlines want
to increase prices on those routes in order to prevent the constraint from binding.38 I
38As mentioned in the previous section, while I take κ = 0.9 for the remainder of the paper, results are
robust to taking κ to be 0.8, 0.85, and 0.94. The figure above illustrates that these choices of κ cover most
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illustrate this in the figure below.
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Figure 1.7: Reduction in Marginal Costs vs. κ
Finally, while some of the observations in the dependent variable in the cost regression
may be negative, due to the fact that I am subtracting an average cost of fuel from
products, almost no marginal costs are negative in prediction.39 Almost all negative
instances of the dependent variable get absorbed in the error term, as per the plot below.
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Figure 1.8: Negative Marginal Costs Fully Explained by Residuals
of the range of values the capacity-constraint coefficient can take.
39In particular, only 0.05% are.
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1.4.3 Prediction
In order to perform an analysis of model fit and counterfactuals, it is necessary to predict
quantities, costs, and prices from the model. Doing so requires the assumption that
preferences and the determinants of costs do not change after a merger. Given the results
in the previous section, it is clear that preferences and the determinants of costs did
change. As a result, I perform the model fit and counterfactual analysis using (third-
quarter) 2012 and 2015 estimates, separately. I find that my predictions are relatively
robust to either specification. Consequently, in the model fit and counterfactual sections
that follow, I report results using 2012 estimates.40
To predict costs, I use the estimated cost function. To predict prices, I minimize the
optimal pricing equation (under Bertrand competition) under some norm:
pˆ = argmin
p
||q(p)−∆(p)[p−mc(p)]|| (1.4.1)
Since there are products in 2015 that did not exist in 2012, this approach requires
predicting the unobserved components of utility, ξ, and costs, ω, for certain products. To
do this, I take the set of ξ’s and ω’s obtained from estimating the model using 2012Q3
data, and place them in price bins41 and a capacity-constrained bin. Then, for each new
product in 2015, I integrate over the conditional distribution of ξ and ω corresponding
to that product’s price bin, and whether it is capacity constrained. In this way, I can
predict costs and demands for new products in 2015 without using 2015 estimates. This
40Moreover, I prefer to use 2012 estimates over 2015 estimates because it allows me to estimate fixed-
effects for US when it is not merged.
41The price bins used here are the same as those used when defining products.
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is consistent with ex-ante merger analysis, where the resulting costs of new products are
now known prior to the merger in question.
Recall that marginal costs are endogenous: prices will affect quantities which could
change which links are capacity constrained. As discussed previously, since I need to
distinguish products by their operating carrier on each link, the product space in this
paper is very large (594 thousand in the third quarter of 2012). In other words, this
problem amounts to solving a very large system of equations, where at each step of the
minimization, I need to construct a large amount of entries in the (sparse) derivative
matrix. That said, I can exploit the monotonicity of the FOC in prices to accelerate
convergence, as follows:
1. Initialize a vector of prices, pN = p0, for all products
2. Calculate ∆(pN ), q(pN )
3. Calculate mc(q(pN )) (depends on q through the capacity-constraint variable)
4. Set a vector of new prices using the first-order conditions: pN+1 = mc−∆−1q
5. Increase prices on products that have links where flow exceeds capacity
6. Stop when ||pN − pN+1|| is sufficiently small and all constraints are satisfied; go to
Step 2 otherwise
The third step allows me to capture economies of scale, and the fifth step allows me
to capture the effect of capacity constraints.42 Notice that these are distinct steps, and
42The fifth step continues until no links are capacity constrained, in the sense that flow exceeds capacity.
These links could still be “capacity constrained” in the sense that they capture the economies of scale
coefficient.
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in the counterfactual section I will show what happens as either is omitted. Note that
the observables must be exogenously determined in any counterfactual, since product
structure and entry/exit is not endogenously determined by the model. In particular, the
structure of the matrix ∆(p) may differ from one counterfactual to the next due to changes
in product ownership/space. For robustness, I try multiple product-space configurations.
While this approach attempts to disentangle the effects of economies of scale and ca-
pacity constraints, it should be made clear that doing so is never fully possible. In particu-
lar, since, in estimation, the capacity-constraint variable captures both economies of scale
and capacity-constraint effects, even if I shut down the capacity constraints themselves
(by allowing the flow on links to exceed capacity), the (negative, capacity-constraint) ef-
fects of operating close to capacity will still be present in the economies of scale variable
that affects marginal costs.
1.4.4 Model Fit
The focus of this paper is on assessing the fit of models with and without capacity-
constraint considerations, in the context of mergers. For this reason, it is natural to
assess model fit in the following way: to what extent do the forecasts of the pre-merger
estimates (cost function and preferences) match the realized equilibrium in the post-
merger world? I define “equilibrium” by the set of prices, quantities, costs, and profits, and
“match” the percentage change in these objects after the merger. I calculate the following
models: the benchmark model without capacity constraints (“No CC”), the model with
exogenous capacity constraints (“Exog. CC”), 43 and the model with endogenous capacity
43By exogenous capacity constraints, I mean that the set of products that are capacity constrained in
the post-merger period (2015Q3) are obtained directly from the data; they do not enter into the airline’s
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constraints (“Endog. CC”). I present results for the 4 major airline carriers and JetBlue,
in the table below:
Table 1.16: Estimated CPM (cents/mile)
No CC Exog. CC Endog. CC 10-Q (low) 10-Q (high)
Southwest 9.1 7.2 6.9 6.9 12.3
Delta 8.6 9.9 10.9 10.4 14.3
United 9.6 12.2 12.4 9.3 13.8
American 8 8.8 9.2 10.6 15
JetBlue 9.5 7.5 8.1 7.8 11.3
Table 1.17: Estimated Variable Profit Margin (%)
No CC Exog. CC Endog. CC 10-Q (low) 10-Q (high)
Southwest 37 59 61 23 121
Delta 37 45 45 14 56
United 36 36 36 14 68
American 38 40 40 14 61
JetBlue 35 50 52 24 80
For all model predictions, I use the pre-merger estimates (2012Q3) to predict the post-
merger world (2015Q3).44 In particular, to calculate costs per passenger mile (“CPM”),
I multiply the predicted marginal costs (using 2012Q3 estimates) of each product45 (in
2015Q3) by the number of passengers purchasing that product, and divide this result by
the distance of the product multiplied by the number of passengers using that product. In
pricing decision.
44I assume that AA’s fixed effects are the same in the post-merger world as they are in the pre-merger
world. I relax this assumption in the counterfactual section.
45I do not make any assumptions on how capacity-constrained links have changed; I find which links
were actually capacity constrained in the post-merger world when predicting marginal costs. In other
words, I make use of all observables here. As outlined in the previous section, I predict demand and costs
for new products by integrating over the conditional distribution of ξ and ω using 2012Q3 estimates.
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other words, my CPM estimate is a weighted average of marginal cost per mile of products
(since some products have many more passengers than others). To calculate profit mar-
gins, I multiply the markup (fare minus predicted marginal cost) of each product by the
number of passengers purchasing that product, and divide this result by the predicted
marginal cost of that product multiplied by the number of passengers purchasing that
product. In other words, my profit margin estimate is a weighted average of markups as
a percentage of cost. I use actual fares (when calculating profit margins) and actual miles
flown.46
I compare the cost estimates from my model to the income statements of the 4 major
airlines’ and JetBlue’s 10-Q filings for the first quarter of 2015. It is important to note that
while my estimation focused exclusively on the domestic market, the income statements
in the 10-Q filings do not distinguish between domestic and international operations.
Prior to the merger, AA stated in its 2013Q3 10-Q filing that about 60% of its passenger
revenues were derived from domestic operations. Given that the majority of revenues
were likely from the domestic market, the usefulness of these benchmarks should not be
neglected. See Nevo [2001].
When calculating CPM and profit margins from the 10-Q filings, I report an upper
and lower bound. For CPM, the upper bound is derived by taking the reported operating
costs of each carrier and subtracting Depreciation and Amortization, as well as Special
Items, if there were any. The lower bound is derived by taking the upper bound and
further subtracting Salaries, Wages, and Benefits, since they could be interpreted as fixed
46To clarify, the above is a partial equilibrium approximation; I do not simulate a full equilibrium
with a corresponding set of prices here, though I do so when discussing fares below, as well as in the
counterfactual section.
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costs in the short-run. Then, I divide both by the total number of revenue passenger
miles (taken directly from the 10-Q filings). For profit margins, I sum operating revenues
from Mainline Passengers and Regional Passengers, and divide these by the upper and
lower bounds of CPM (before they’ve been divided through by revenue passenger miles)
to obtain upper and lower bounds.
Notice that the model with endogenous capacity constraints outperforms the other
models. In particular, for the CPM estimates, the model with endogenous capacity con-
straints is within the 10-Q bounds for every carrier except AA, while the model without
capacity constraints is outside the 10-Q bounds for Delta and AA. The model with exoge-
nous capacity constraints is outside the 10-Q bounds for JetBlue, as well. For the profit
margin estimates, are models are within the 10-Q bounds for every airline.
Table 1.18: Estimated Median Fares
No CC Exog. CC Endog. CC Actual Median
Southwest 396 341 352 432
Delta 518 472 481 489
United 549 509 504 487
JetBlue 462 459 437 450
American 531 509 483 472
Notice, from Table 1.18, that the models with capacity constraints outperform the
model without capacity constraints for most airlines. In particular, for most airlines, the
median fares predicted from the models with capacity constraints are closer to the actual
median than those predicted from the model without capacity constraints. It is difficult
to tell whether the model with endogenous or exogenous capacity constraints performs
better; the model with exogenous capacity constraints is closer for JetBlue, while the
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model with endogenous capacity constraints is closer for all other carriers.
There is a straightforward explanation for the superior model fit obtained by includ-
ing capacity constraints. Notice that the capacity-constraint variable has a negative effect
on costs in the pre-merger world. In other words, links operating closer to their capacity
have a lower marginal cost per passenger. The CPM estimates in the model with capacity
constraints are often lower than their counterparts in the model without capacity con-
straints. If the number or composition of capacity-constrained links dramatically changed
after the merger, the influence of this variable could cause predicted costs to be different
than in a model where we omitted capacity-constraint considerations. In particular, if
the number of capacity-constrained links increased substantially, predicted costs could
be lower in a model that included a capacity-constraint variable in the cost regressions.
Indeed, as outlined in the introduction to this chapter, this is the case.
Having established that there is good model fit, and that the results can easily be
explained with the motivating data, I turn to the analysis of counterfactuals.
1.4.5 Counterfactual: But-For AA-US Merger
The first counterfactual I simulate is a world where there was no AA-US merger, ceteris
paribus. AMR Corporation, the parent company of AA, and US Airways Group, the
parent company of US, merged on December 9, 2013. They continued separate operations,
and it was not until April 8, 2015 that the Federal Aviation Administration granted a
single operating certificate for both carriers.
There are a few things that the merger might do in practice in the short-run. First, the
merger will change ownership structure. In this section, I use 2012Q3 (the “pre-merger
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period”) estimates and construct hypothetical ownership structure in 2015Q3 (the “post-
merger period”), had the merger not occurred, by matching the observable characteristics
of products in the post-merger period to those in the pre-merger period, in a procedure
outlined below.
Second, the merger may affect the cost and perceived quality of products that changed
ownership. For example, when AA acquires US’ PHL-PHX route, they may continue to
fly the route with US’ fleet, pilots, and personnel, and continue to use US’ terminal
areas, at least in the short-run. Alternatively, AA may substitute its own fleet, pilots,
and personnel on the route, and use its own terminal areas in airports where it had
operational overlap with US. If the latter occurs, we may think that AA’s costs would be
higher since, in 2012, AA had a higher cost FE than US. Evidence from estimating the
model in 2015 using 2 dummies for AA’s products suggests that cost fixed-effects were
very similar for AA’s legacy and acquired products in 2015.47 For this reason, throughout
the counterfactual section, I assume that the cost fixed-effects of products that changed
ownership (from US to AA) attain the cost fixed-effects of the pre-merger AA.48
Similarly, when AA acquires US’ routes, those routes may experience an increase or
no change in perceived quality. If AA successfully rebrands these products as its own,
they may be able to attain the higher quality FE of AA over US. If it is not able to (in the
short-run), say, because the routes are still operated with US’ fleet, pilots, and personnel,
or continue to use US’ terminal areas, these acquired products may retain their pre-merger
47See the appendix for complete results; acquired products have a slightly lower cost FE.
48I use pre-merger fixed-effects throughout all simulations of post-merger worlds. The reason I do this
is because I rely on 2012 estimates throughout my counterfactual section. While I do estimate the model
using 2015 data, I cannot mix and match the observed fixed-effects in 2015 with my other estimates in
2012. I prefer to use 2012 estimates over 2015 estimates because it allow me to estimate fixed-effects for
US when it is not merged.
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quality. Evidence from estimating the model in 2015 using 2 dummies for AA’s products
suggests that demand fixed-effects (quality) were higher for AA’s legacy products than for
its acquired products, in 2015.49 For this reason, throughout the counterfactual section,
I report complete results for two specifications: one where the quality of products that
changed ownership (from US to AA) retain their original pre-merger quality FE, and one
where they attain the quality FE of the pre-merger AA.
Finally, the merger may affect the product-specific qualities and costs (ξ and ω). I
assume that these effects are second-order, and give all products that existed in the pre-
merger world their pre-merger ξ and ω. For new products in the post-merger world that
did not exist in the pre-merger world, I integrate over the conditional distribution of ξ
and ω corresponding to that product’s price bin, and whether it is capacity constrained,
as discussed earlier.
Having discussed what the merger might do in practice in the short-run, I turn to
a discussion of how I determine product ownership in the hypothetical but-for merger
(“BFM”) worlds.
Simulating Product Ownership
My goal in this section is to change as little as possible in the post-merger product
space, apart from the ownership of products. In particular, I want to allocate all of AA’s
post-merger products to either (a fictional, independent) US or AA in 2015. Most merger
analysis has proceeded in the opposite direction: mergers are simulated by taking the pre-
merger product space and combining ownership of two carriers’ products into a single,
49See the appendix for complete results; legacy products have an over 50% higher FE.
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unified carrier. The problem I face here is more difficult: given the post-merger world,
which of the unified carrier’s products would have belonged a fictional AA or US but-for
the merger?
There are two main reasons why one might be interested in analyzing mergers ex-
post: to learn whether enforcement has been too permissive or too strict, or to evaluate
and potentially improve economic models used in antitrust enforcement. Indeed, Hosken
et al. [2016] show that ex-post merger evaluation has helped improve methodology and
reinvigorate enforcement towards hospital mergers in the US. In an ex-post environment,
performing merger counterfactuals using only pre-merger data throws away valuable in-
formation about the change in product structure during the merger period (in this case,
2012Q3-2015Q3). For example, two airlines went out of business during this time period,
for reasons likely exogenous to the merger in question. Since this paper abstracts from
entry/exit in the product space (the only endogenous variable is the price of existing
products), using ex-ante data would erroneously keep these two airlines in operation in
the post-merger period. The methods developed in this section provide a robust way to
perform ex-post merger evaluation with models that have exogenous network structure.
As a simplification, I assume all of AA’s products in 2015 would have been operated by
either US, AA or both in the but-for world. To motivate an iterative product-assignment
algorithm, consider the tables below:
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Table 1.19: Intersection of Products
US(2012) AA(2012) US+AA(2012) AA(2015)
US(2012) 81646 0 0 0
AA(2012) 0 55987 0 0
US+AA(2012) 0 0 137633 0
AA(2015) 3111 18220 21331 183761
Recall that, in this paper, products are characterized by their route (including the
origin, destination, and stops), fare bin, and operating carrier on all legs. In the third
quarter of 2012, US had close to 82 thousand products, while AA had close to 56 thousand
products. In the third quarter of 2015, AA had 184 thousand products. Notice that it
does not make much sense to match products at this level: most of the products offered
by US were operated by US, leading to a very low intersection with products operated by
AA in 2015 (only 21 thousand products). Even if we correct for this (labeling US-operated
routes as AA-operated routes), the resulting table is not much better:
Table 1.20: Intersection of Products (Alternate)
US(2012) AA(2012) US+AA(2012) AA(2015)
US(2012) 82584 0 0 0
AA(2012) 550 55987 0 0
US+AA(2012) 0 0 138021 0
AA(2015) 17643 18220 35331 183761
There is a slight increase in the products that US had in 2012, because we are now
distinguishing products operated by US in 2012 from products operated by other non-US
Airways carriers that were also not present in 2015. Doing away with the outdated “US”
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operating-carrier label, there are nearly twice as many product overlaps from 2012 to 2015
(21 vs. 35 thousand out of a total of 184 thousand products in 2015), but this still amounts
to less than a fifth of products in 2015. The reason for this is partly driven by rebranding:
PSA Airlines, previously a subsidiary of US, now flies under the American Eagle brand
for AA, and operates as “Envoy” after 2014. Moreover, Chautauqua Airlines, a regional
airline, and AirTran Airways, a low-cost airline, ceased operations or were acquired by
parent companies and rebranded. Moreover, any differences or dispersions in fares will
lead to a different or augmented product set. Indeed, it makes more sense to go a step
higher, and look at the intersection of routes, instead of products:
Table 1.21: Intersection of Routes
US(2012) AA(2012) US+AA(2012) AA(2015)
US(2012) 11180 0 0 0
AA(2012) 336 8306 0 0
US+AA(2012) 0 0 19150 0
AA(2015) 7579 5685 12955 27341
There is still a 50% increase in routes from the pre-merger to the post-merger world
(19 thousand operated by AA and US together in 2012, to 27 thousand operated by AA
in 2015). To understand this phenomenon, consider the market from Knoxville, TN to
Tulsa, OK. In 2012, US and AA offered two routings for this round-trip market; one
stopped in Chicago, IL on the way to the destination and Dallas, TX on the way back,
while the other stopped in Dallas in both directions. In 2015, AA offered four routings
for this round-trip market: two the same as in 2012; one that stops in Dallas on the way
to the destination and Charlotte, NC on the way back; another that stops in Charlotte
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in both directions. Charlotte used to be a hub for US; the merger allowed AA to double
the amount of routes offered on the Knoxville to Tulsa round-trip market via the addition
of a single hub to its network. This effect is present in many of the routes in the post-
merger world and should help to explain the doubling of routes from the pre-merger to
the post-merger worlds.
Notice that there is very little route overlap between US and AA in 2012, while there
is significant overlap between US in 2012 and AA in 2015, as well as AA in 2012 and AA
in 2015. This tells us that the merged AA combined and kept the routes flown by AA
and US in 2012.
Table 1.22: Intersection of Markets
US(2012) AA(2012) US+AA(2012) AA(2015)
US(2012) 3138 0 0 0
AA(2012) 2085 2977 0 0
US+AA(2012) 0 0 4030 0
AA(2015) 3091 2948 3957 4182
While there are many unassigned routes, there are only a little over 200 unassigned
origin and destinations (“markets”). In particular, US and AA together operated 4030
markets in 2012, of which 3957 coincided with AA’s 4182 markets in 2015. In other words,
we can account for many of the previous “missing” routes, by matching those routes
according to which airline (US or AA) had control of the underlying market. Finally, we
could look at origins only:
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Table 1.23: Intersection of Origins
US(2012) AA(2012) US+AA(2012) AA(2015)
US(2012) 68 0 0 0
AA(2012) 64 65 0 0
US+AA(2012) 0 0 69 0
AA(2015) 68 65 69 69
Out of the 70 possible MSA’s used in our sample (recall that these are MSA’s with
a population exceeding a population of 700,000), AA flew from 65 in 2012 and 69 in
2015. In particular, it added flights from 4 new cities (Allentown, Albany, Bakersfield,
and Sarasota), from which US was already flying in 2012. It is reasonable to assume that
all products originating in these 4 cities should be allocated to US in a world but-for
the merger. On the other hand, US never operated flights from the McAllen-Edinburg-
Mission MSA. It is reasonable to assume that all products operated from this MSA in
2015 by AA would have also been operated by AA in 2015 but-for the merger.
With that exposition in mind, consider the following iterative algorithm. The general
idea is to start at the lowest level (product-level), and match AA’s 2015 products to either
AA in 2012, US in 2012, or both, where possible. Out of the remaining products, go one
level up (e.g. to the route-level, by removing the fare and operating carrier from products)
and match the remaining unassigned products where possible to either AA in 2012, or
US in 2012, or both. At some point (and this point can be adjusted for robustness),
start giving AA “priority”, in the sense that if AA matches with the remaining products
at some level, it gets those products, and US matches with what’s left — as opposed to
giving it to both carriers if they both match (as this creates extra products and we want
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to keep this to a minimum; we know that if we kept this up, both carriers would match
on most of the origins). It also seems reasonable that most of the new routes opened
in the world but-for the merger would have been opened by AA, as it was the surviving
company. If anything, US may have closed some of its routes due to low profitability.
Giving AA “priority” after some point in the iterations attempts to account for this.
Formally, call the set of products that AA offered in 2012 A21. A21 is characterized
by the following characteristics: A21 = {O,D, ST , SB, F, CT , CB}, which stand for the
following:
• O : Origin airport
• D : Destination airport
• ST : Stop to the destination, if any
• SB : Stop back, if any
• F : Fare bin
• CT : Operating carriers on flights to the destination
• CB : Operating carriers on flights back
Similarly, define U21 and A51 for the set of products offered by US in 2012, and AA
in 2015, respectively. Next, define the subsets of A21, U21, and A51 as follows:
• A22 = {O,D, ST , SB, F}
• A23 = {O,D, ST , SB}
• A24 = {O,D}
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• A25 = {O}
The subset A22 is the set of unique products offered by AA in 2012 if we do not keep
track of operating carriers. A23 is the set of unique routes flown by AA in 2012. A24 is
the set of unique markets serviced by AA in 2012. Finally, A25 is the set of unique origins
AA flew from in 2012. Similarly, we define the subsets of U2 and A5. Additionally, let
A5Ri denote the remaining (unassigned) products in A5 at any subset-level i.
Let j be the point at which we start giving “preferential treatment” to AA, in the
sense that at this iteration and all consequent iterations, we first match AA’s products in
the BFM world, and remove those from the remaining products, before matching to US’
products. The algorithm proceeds as follows:
Iterative Route-Assignment Algorithm
1. Initialize i = 1 and A5R1 = A51
2. Find the intersection of products (or subsets of products): A = A2i ∩ A5i and
U = U2i ∩A5i
3. If subsets of products, project A and U to A5 to get all products associated with A
and U . Store.
4. Find the remaining (unassigned) products: A5i = A5i \ (A ∪ U)
5. Project the remaining products onto the next subset: A5Ri+1
6. Repeat steps 2-4 until i ≥ j
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7. Then, find the intersection of subsets: A = A2i ∩A5i
8. Find the intersection of remaining subsets: U = U2i ∩ (A5i \A).
9. Repeat steps 3-5 and 7-8 until i = 5.
The results of the algorithm are displayed below, for j = 3.
Table 1.24: Visualization of Product Allocation (n=183761)
AA US Doubled Remaining
Iteration 1 0 0 0 0
Iteration 2 32956 42948 4428 112285
Iteration 3 27933 42022 2441 44771
Iteration 4 39507 4153 0 1111
Iteration 5 1018 93 0 0
Summary 101414 89216 6869 -
Robustness Check 1
While retaining all the existing products in 2015, the approach detailed above does away
with some products operated in 2012. In particular, we might be inclined to think that,
but-for the merger, US would have continued to operate the products that it operated in
2012. As a first robustness check, I add products corresponding to the 2012 routes of US
to its 2015 BFM products derived via the algorithm above. The reason why I match on
the route-level, as opposed to the product or market-level, is detailed below:
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Table 1.25: Products Remaining from 2012
US(2012) US(2015BFM) Overlap Remaining Remaining Products
Product 82584 89216 17643 64941 64941
Route 11180 9489 7577 3603 9275
Market 3138 2941 2906 232 788
The first row tells us that only 17 thousand of the nearly 88 thousand products assigned
to a hypothetical US in 2015 overlapped exactly with US’ products in 2012. This is not
surprising, given that that we distinguish products by their operating carrier, and is very
similar to the product overlap in Table 16, when we do not distinguish between products
operated by AA or US. The reason for the small difference (17643 vs. 17111) is because
there were some products that AA operated in 2015 that were exactly the same as what it
operated in 2012, and almost the same as what US operated in 2012 (save the operating
carrier being US). I give these products to AA and not both.
If we tried to take set differences at the product level, we would be left with over 65
thousand additional products that US operated in 2012 that were seemingly cut by AA
in 2015. Of course, this is not the case. Apart from changes in operating carriers over
time, there are changes in fares. Removing these two product characteristics, the second
row tells us that were some 3603 routes cut by AA after the merger, which translated to
9275 fewer products. For this robustness check, I match on this level. In other words, I
give the products corresponding to these routes back to a hypothetical US in 2015. This
leads to an extra 9275 US products in estimation in the 2015 BFM world.
The third row of the table tells us that there are very few markets (232) that US flew
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in 2012 that were cut by AA after the merger in 2015. Moreover, these markets only
translated to a few products (788). This lends some credibility to only looking at 2015
products.
Robustness Check 2
As a second robustness check, I calculate counterfactuals in the “traditional” way — i.e.,
I take the 2012 products as the 2015 BFM products for all carriers, and simulate the
effects of joining products (and deleting duplicated products) from a joint AA carrier. I
define a “duplicated product” not necessarily at the product-level. In particular, I want
to remove the fare and operating carrier components for products. The reason for this
is as follows: 1) after the merger, AA will reoptimize prices; I do not want to artificially
increase the product space if AA and US were flying identical products but-for the price
in 2012, and 2) many operating carriers (including US) merged or went bankrupt by 2015;
I do not want to artificially increase the product space if AA and US were flying identical
products but-for the operating carrier in 2012.
Recall from the table above detailing the intersection of routes that there was very little
route overlap between US and AA in 2012, while there was significant overlap between
US in 2012 and AA in 2015, as well as AA in 2012 and AA in 2015. This tells us that
the merged AA likely combined and kept the routes flown by AA and US in 2012. One
approach, then, would be to create new products according to route-level differences.
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Table 1.26: Robustness Check: Merging US and AA in 2012
US(2012) AA(2012) Overlap Difference Added Products
Product 82584 55987 0 82584 82584
Route 11180 8306 336 10844 77407
Market 3138 2977 2085 1053 22257
This approach gives AA an additional 77 thousand products out of a possible 83
thousand products that US operated in 2012. This is similar to the change in number of
products in the first two counterfactual simulations, and I follow it in the next section.
The results are largely robust to the level of matching.
Results
Below, I simulate the model abstracting from any capacity considerations. What I mean by
this is that I simulate the model where the capacity-constrained links do not endogenously
change after the merger (i.e., they remain at their pre-merger level) and there are no
capacity-constraint considerations (i.e., the firm faces an unconstrained maximization
problem). The reason I simulate this model first is that it provides a useful benchmark
for the next section and allows easier comparisons amongst the different robustness checks
outlined in the previous section.50 As discussed before, I use 2012 estimates throughout
this section.
50In the next section, when I introduce capacity considerations, I have to link capacity data from the
T-100. The robustness checks outlined above use 2012 data in addition to 2015 data, which means that
I need to use multiple years of T-100 data and find a way to project capacity from 2012 to 2015. This
clouds the comparability of the robustness checks, since I do not model capacity change. For example,
consider a route operated by Delta in 2012 that doubled in capacity by 2015. R2 would more frequently
have this route capacity constrained, since it relies on 2012 observables, while R1 and R2 would more
frequently have this route operated below capacity. While I do scale for aggregate changes in capacity, I
cannot capture idiosyncratic changes. I leave the endogenous capacity problem for future work.
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In the first column of each table, I present the predicted value of the variable in
question in the post-merger period using the observed data (“Predicted”, i.e., with a
merger). In the second column, I show the percentage change between the post-merger
period, and a hypothetical BFM world. In other words, this column shows the percentage
change in the variable of interest that can be attributed to the merger. In the third and
fourth column, I show the percentage change between the post-merger and but-for world,
where the but-for world has been simulated using robustness check 1 (% Change R1) or
robustness check 2 (% Change R2), respectively.51
First, I present results where only the ownership of products changes. In other words,
I present results where there is no “quality transfer” in the sense that AA’s acquired
products from US attain the same demand FE as AA’s legacy products. Rather, I assign
the AA pre-merger demand FE to AA’s legacy products, and the US pre-merger demand
FE to AA’s acquired products from US. After presenting these results, I will present
results that include quality transfer in addition to the change in ownership of products.
51Note that the values determined via robustness check 2 are not compared to the values in the “Pre-
dicted” column. Rather, to determine the percentage changes under this robustness check, I calculate
different merged values (i.e. in the same vein as the “Predicted” column) and compare them to the
de-merged values under robustness check 2. Refer to the robustness check section for more details.
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No Quality Transfer
Table 1.27: Counterfactual CPM (cents/mile)
Predicted % Change % Change R1 % Change R2
Southwest 9.1 0 0.3 0.1
Delta 8.6 −0.1 −0.2 −0.1
United 9.6 0 0.2 0
American 8 0 −0.7 0.2
US 10 8.9 12 8.4
JetBlue 9.5 −0.1 0.6 0.2
AA+US 8.7 1.4 1.5 4.1
I find that the merger increased CPM for the merged airline (“AA+US”) by 1.4-4.1%. This
is driven by the products that AA inherited from US: those products become significantly
more expensive once they get rebranded as AA products and, as a consequence, acquire
the AA cost FE.52 While the costs for products operated by other carriers do not change,
the relative weight of passengers using those products does, as market shares change
endogenously in response to the merger. As a result, the overall CPM of all carriers
changes slightly.
52If I do not give the AA cost FE to products that AA acquired from US, and instead allow those
products to retain their US cost FE, this phenomenon does not occur, and the combined AA+US airline’s
costs are virtually unchanged because of the merger.
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Table 1.28: Counterfactual Median Fares
Predicted % Change % Change R1 % Change R2
Southwest 396 −0.4 −0.2 −0.3
Delta 518 −0.1 0 −0.1
United 549 −0.2 −0.1 −0.1
American 531 2 2.1 1.7
US 534 7.2 5.9 8.4
JetBlue 462 −0.4 −0.4 −0.4
AA+US 533 4.9 4.3 6.2
Table 1.29: Counterfactual Variable Profit Margin (%)
Predicted % Change % Change R1 % Change R2
Southwest 37 −0.2 0.2 −0.4
Delta 37 −0.3 −0.7 −0.4
United 36 −0.2 0.1 0.4
American 38 3.1 3.2 3.2
US 44 5.5 7.2 2.2
JetBlue 35 −0.4 −2.7 0
AA+US 40 3.4 3.7 2
The merged airline increases fares on its products by an average of 4-6%, but passenger
volume actually decreases for products that were acquired from US. There is a 3% increase
in variable profit margins on the merged airline’s legacy products, and a slightly higher
increase in variable profit margins on the merged airline’s acquired products from US
(2-7%). However, driven partly by the volume drop on acquired products, the resulting
variable profit margins for the merged airline are only 2-4% higher because of the merger.53
53The results in the right-most column are not a typo. While AA’s variable profit margins increased
by 3.2% on its legacy products and 2.2% on its acquired products, AA’s total variable profit margins did
indeed only increase by 2%. This is akin to Simpson’s paradox: the denominators are not the same in
both groups. This number does not report the change in profits because of the merger, but the change in
profit margins. This phenomenon happens in some of the other variable profit margin tables that follow,
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When I include quality transfer, in the next section, variable profit margins for the merged
airline will increase.
Table 1.30: Counterfactual Summary of Merger: All Carriers
Predicted % Change % Change R1 % Change R2
Median Fares 498 1.6 1.3 1.5
Passengers (000s) 1770 −1 −3.1 −1.4
RPM (cents/mile) 12.9 1.1 1.5 1.4
CPM (cents/mile) 8 0.4 0.8 1.1
Variable Profit Margin (%) 38 1.1 1.2 0.5
Products (000s) 648 −0.8 −2.2 −0.9
Consumer Surplus 0 −2.2 −4.5 1.2
The table above tells us that the merger may have hurt or harmed consumers: con-
sumers surplus was between 1.2% higher to 4.5% lower because of the merger. At the
same time, it increased average variable profit margins by 0.5-1.2%. Put another way,
the AA-US merger likely hurt consumers but helped airlines — specifically the merging
airline, whose variable profit margins increased by 2-4%.
as well as one of the median fare tables. The reason for the phenomenon in the latter is different from the
reasons here; it is due to the nature of the median function.
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Quality Transfer
Table 1.31: Counterfactual CPM (cents/mile), Quality Transfer
% Change % Change R1 % Change R2
Southwest −0.2 0.1 −0.2
Delta −0.4 −0.5 −0.2
United −0.1 0.1 −0.1
American 0.1 −0.6 0.7
US 7.3 10.4 6.7
JetBlue −0.3 0.5 −0.1
AA+US 3.5 3.5 3.5
When I allow for quality transfer, the merger increased CPM for the merged airline by
3.5%. This is again driven by the products that AA inherited from US: those products
become significantly more expensive once they get rebranded as AA products and, as a
consequence, acquire the AA cost FE. The reason these numbers differ from those where
is no quality transfer is because of a change in the relative weight of passengers that
use products. For example, when there is quality transfer, US products have a smaller
increase in costs because of the merger (7-10% vs. 8-12%). This implies that quality
transfer causes the relative weight of passengers to shift to lower-cost US products.
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Table 1.32: Counterfactual Median Fares, Quality Transfer
% Change % Change R1 % Change R2
Southwest −1.1 −0.9 −1.1
Delta −0.7 −0.5 −0.8
United −0.4 −0.3 −0.5
American 2.6 2.7 2.6
US 9.7 8.4 10.8
JetBlue −1.4 −1.3 −0.6
AA+US 6.6 6.1 7.6
Table 1.33: Counterfactual Variable Profit Margin (%), Quality Transfer
% Change % Change R1 % Change R2
Southwest −1.1 −0.7 −1.5
Delta −1.4 −1.8 −1.3
United −0.6 −0.3 −0.2
American 3.7 3.8 4.1
US 6.6 8.3 5.4
JetBlue −1.1 −3.4 −0.2
AA+US 5.7 6.1 5
The merger caused variable profit margins for the merged airline to increase by 5-
6%. This number is more consistent with reality: AA’s third quarter 2015 report claims
that: “The Company’s third quarter 2015 pretax margin excluding net special charges
was [...] up 6.7 percentage points from the same period last year.” This result is driven
partially by giving products acquired from US the same demand FE (quality transfer) as
AA products.54
To understand the mechanism, consider what happens when there is a quality transfer.
In this case, products previously operated by US experience a large increase in passenger
54Recall that US had a lower demand FE than AA.
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volume after the merger (10-23%), driven by higher demand by rebranding these as AA
products. This allows the merged airline to increase fares on products acquired by US by
8-11%, and enjoy higher variable profit margins on these products by 5-8%. By virtue
of being a larger airline with more market power, AA is also able to increase fares on its
legacy products (2.7%) and enjoy higher variable profit margins on its legacy products
(3-4%). Overall, the merged airline enjoys 5-6% higher variable profit margins as a result
of the merger.
Table 1.34: Counterfactual Summary of Merger: All Carriers, Quality Transfer
% Change % Change R1 % Change R2
Median Fares 1.9 1.6 1.4
Passengers (000s) 3.7 1.7 3.2
RPM (cents/mile) 2.6 2.9 2.4
CPM (cents/mile) 1.4 1.7 1.9
Variable Profit Margin (%) 1.9 2 0.7
Products (000s) −0.8 −2.2 −0.9
Consumer Surplus 5.1 2.9 2.7
The table above tells us that the merger increased consumer surplus by 3-5%. At the
same time, it increased average variable profit margins by 1-2%. Put another way, the AA-
US merger helped both consumers and airlines — specifically the merging airline, whose
variable profit margins increased by 5-6%. In other words, welfare gains due to the merger
can be attributed to quality transfer driven by the positive rebranding of US products to
AA products. In the next section, I show that the positive welfare effects of the merger
can persist even absent this quality transfer, if we allow for capacity constraints.
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Effect of Capacity Constraints
Next, I simulate the full model to incorporate and highlight the role of capacity con-
straints. Throughout the results below, I use 2012Q3 estimates and the observed product
structure in 2015. As discussed earlier, I predict costs and demand for products in 2015
that were not in 2012 by integrating over the conditional distribution of ξ and ω. To
simulate the but-for world, I rely on the benchmark iterative route-assignment algorithm
outlined in the counterfactual section that split AA’s 2015 products between a hypothet-
ical, de-merged AA and US in 2015. In this section, I introduce capacity in two distinct
ways: 1) I allow marginal costs to be endogenous, allowing airlines to strategically cap-
ture economies of scale if demand exceeds κ times capacity, and 2) I do not allow flow to
exceed capacity, forcing airlines to satisfy their capacity constraints. As discussed in the
prediction section, simulating the model in this case involves finding a fixed point where
all constraints are satisfied.
In the first table, I show the CPM of all carriers in two BFM worlds. The first
column is the complete model using 2012 data, where marginal costs are endogenously
determined in simulation, and there are capacity constraints. The second column is the
partial model, without capacity constraints. All models are compared to the actual 2015
world where there is no merger.55 In essence, the second BF world attempts to capture
a model with economies of scale: airlines reoptimize their routes such that many are
capacity constrained and operated at a lower marginal cost. The full model (the first BF
world) limits the extent to which airlines can do this: there is a trade-off with increasing
55I have allowed capacity constraints to be different in the actual 2015 world than what was observed
in order for results to be comparable.
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flows on routes, since it may cause the capacity constraint to bind.
First, I present results where only the ownership of products changes. In other words,
I present results where there is no “quality transfer” in the sense that AA’s acquired
products from US attain the same demand FE as AA’s legacy products. Rather, I assign
the AA pre-merger demand FE to AA’s legacy products, and the US pre-merger demand
FE to AA’s acquired products from US. After presenting these results, I will present
results that include quality transfer in addition to the change in ownership of products.
No Quality Transfer
Table 1.35: Counterfactual CPM (cents/mile), Full Model
Predicted % Change 2012 % Change 2012 (EoS)
Southwest 6.9 0.3 −0.1
Delta 10.9 6.9 4.9
United 12.4 0.8 0.8
American 9.2 −5.1 −6.4
US 5.9 1.2 2.2
JetBlue 8.1 −1.8 0
AA+US 7.9 −1.4 −1.6
Table 1.36: Counterfactual Capacity Constrained Links, Full Model
Predicted % Change 2012 % Change 2012 (EoS)
Southwest 400.8 −1 0.1
Delta 100 −17.3 −10.3
United 26.5 −2.3 0.1
American 51.8 20.8 20
US 83 4.9 −1.8
JetBlue 13.6 4.6 0
AA+US 134.8 11.4 7.2
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In general, CPM is driven by changes in the number of capacity constrained links be-
fore/after the merger (the “EoS” effect). In particular, notice that Delta loses 10-17%
of its capacity constrained links because of the merger — this translates into a cost in-
crease of 5-7%. On the other hand, AA’s legacy products become 20-21% more capacity
constrained because of the merger — this translates into a cost decrease of 5-6%. It is
likely that the merged airline competes most directly with Delta; Southwest and United
also have a decrease in number of capacity constrained links, but much less than Delta
(1-2%).
Table 1.37: Counterfactual Median Fares, Full Model
Predicted % Change 2012 % Change 2012 (EoS)
Southwest 352 0.1 −0.5
Delta 481 1.2 0.8
United 504 0.3 0
American 483 0.4 −0.1
US 475 4.2 4.3
JetBlue 437 −4.9 0
AA+US 479 2.4 2.1
The difference in cost predictions between the two BFM worlds translates to different
median fares, as well. In particular, when CPM is lower (in the model with just EoS),
airlines price their fares lower. This is, of course, endogenous. At the same time, when
fares are lower (in the model with just EoS), flow increases, possibly causing more links
to become capacity constrained,56 and driving CPM lower.
56I say possibly, because due to substitution between products, it is possible that lower prices on product
A may cause consumers to stop purchasing a product B that was previously capacity constrained.
86
Table 1.38: Counterfactual Variable Profit Margin (%), Full Model
Predicted % Change 2012 % Change 2012 (EoS)
Southwest 61 −0.1 −0.1
Delta 45 −2.7 −2.3
United 36 0.3 0.5
American 40 3.3 3.3
US 55 3.7 3.6
JetBlue 52 −0.5 0
AA+US 46 2.5 2.5
In general, profits margins are lower under the full model than under the model with
just economies of scale. Under the full model, the airlines face a constrained maximization
problem, while in the simpler model, they face an unconstrained maximization problem.
That said, there are secondary effects due to the competitive nature of airlines’ pricing
decisions. I find that these do not overcome the primary effects of constraints: fares are
lower in the unconstrained model than the constrained model, for all airlines but US (i.e.
AA’s acquired products from US). In other words, when facing constraints, airlines are
forced to increase average prices on their routes in order to lower demand and prevent it
from exceeding capacity.
I find that the merger increases variable profit margins for the merged airline by 2.5%.
This is driven partly by its legacy products (3.3% increase) and partly by its acquired
products from US (3.7% increase). Because of its increase in costs, Delta is hurt most by
the merger: its variable profit margins decrease by 2-3%.
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Table 1.39: Counterfactual Summary of Merger: All Carriers, Full Model
Predicted % Change 2012 % Change 2012 (EoS)
Median Fares 485 1.2 0.6
Passengers (000s) 2205 −0.6 −0.4
RPM (cents/mile) 11.2 0.9 0.9
CPM (cents/mile) 5.7 0.8 0.7
Variable Profit Margin (%) 98 0.3 0.4
Products (000s) 648 −0.8 −0.8
Consumer Surplus 0 1.5 1.7
Ultimately, a model with capacity constraints can demonstrate the welfare-enhancing
effects of the AA-US merger without relying on quality transfer. In particular, I find that
the merger increased consumer welfare by 1.5-1.7% absent any positive welfare effects of
rebranding (i.e. without transferring the AA demand FE to routes acquired from US).
In short, the merger benefits consumers by increasing load factors, causing airlines’
costs to go down and allowing them to price lower and attract more passengers. Moreover,
it removes a relatively unattractive airline from the industry (US). To expand on this: if,
overnight, all US flights had been rebranded as AA flights, we expect consumer welfare to
increase. This is driven by our demand estimates: individuals are willing to pay more to
travel with AA than US (in particular, 11% more for nonbusiness travelers and 27% more
for business travelers). Indeed, if I allow for this quality transfer in the complete model, I
find that welfare may increase by over 20% because of the merger. I present these results
next.
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Quality Transfer
Table 1.40: Counterfactual CPM (cents/mile), Full Model and Quality Transfer
% Change 2012 % Change 2012 (EoS)
Southwest −0.2 −0.3
Delta 11.4 3
United 2.5 2.8
American −6.5 −9.8
US −30.3 −34.6
JetBlue −1.3 0
AA+US −19.5 −23.8
Table 1.41: Counterfactual Capacity Constrained Links, Full Model and Quality Transfer
% Change 2012 % Change 2012 (EoS)
Southwest −0.1 −0.1
Delta −33.8 −12.5
United −17.5 −20.6
American 30 36.2
US 92.5 92.9
JetBlue 2.4 0.3
AA+US 65.3 68.4
The effects of quality transfer are amplified in a model with endogenous economies of
scale. CPM is almost entirely driven by changes in the number of capacity constrained
links before/after the merger (the EoS effect). In particular, once AA’s acquired products
acquire the AA quality, their demand explodes, and the number of those products that
are capacity constrained nearly doubles (93% increase). This causes the costs of AA’s
acquired products to decrease by 30-35%. Notice also that Delta loses 12-34% of its
capacity constrained links because of the merger — this translates into a cost increase of 3-
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11%. On the other hand, AA’s legacy products become 30-36% more capacity constrained
because of the merger — this translates into a cost decrease of 6-10%. It is likely that
the merged airline does not compete much with Southwest, as it barely loses any of its
capacity constrained links (0.2%).
Table 1.42: Counterfactual Median Fares, Full Model and Quality Transfer
% Change 2012 % Change 2012 (EoS)
Southwest −1 −1.6
Delta 1.8 0.7
United 0 0.6
American 0 −1.1
US 0.4 −1.1
JetBlue −2.4 −1.5
AA+US 1.6 0.5
Table 1.43: Counterfactual Variable Profit Margin (%), Full Model and Quality Transfer
% Change 2012 % Change 2012 (EoS)
Southwest −1 −1.5
Delta −7.4 −4.4
United −1.1 −1.3
American 4.8 5.1
US 18.1 18.4
JetBlue −1.1 −1.4
AA+US 11.2 11.5
There are not many changes in median fares because of the merger.57 However, there
are large changes in variable profit margins, driven by the decrease in AA’s costs as a
57The results in the right-most column are not a typo. While AA’s median fares decreased on its both
its legacy and acquired products (1.1%), overall, AA’s median fares increased (0.5%). This is due to
the nature of the median function: after the merger, there were more fares on legacy products that fell
between the medians of AA’s acquired and legacy products. Since the median of its acquired products
is lower, this causes the median of legacy products to fall while raising the median of all products, when
grouped together.
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result of the merger. In particular, I find that the merger increases variable profit margins
for the merged airline by 11%. This is driven partly by its legacy products (5% increase
in variable profit margins) but mostly by its acquired products from US (18% increase
in variable profit margins). Because of its increase in costs, Delta is hurt most by the
merger: its variable profit margins decrease by 4-7%.
Table 1.44: Counterfactual Summary of Merger: All Carriers, Full Model and Quality
Transfer
% Change 2012 % Change 2012 (EoS)
Median Fares 0.7 −0.2
Passengers (000s) 9.5 11.6
RPM (cents/mile) 0.4 −1.1
CPM (cents/mile) −1.1 −2.6
Variable Profit Margin (%) 2.9 3
Products (000s) −0.8 −0.8
Consumer Surplus 18.2 22.4
Ultimately, a model with capacity constraints can demonstrate the welfare-enhancing
effects of the AA-US merger without relying on quality transfer. If I include quality
transfer, in addition, I find that the merger increased consumer welfare by 18-22%. This is
driven by a drastic reduction in costs of AA’s acquired products as they capture economies
of scale, caused by their increased demand arising from rebranding and quality transfer.
1.5 Conclusion
In summary, this chapter contributes to the large literature on the estimation of models
of airline competition with differentiated products using aggregate data by introducing
capacity-constraint considerations on the supply-side, the estimates of which are shown
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to be superior to benchmark models in predicting out-of-sample data. I develop a robust
approach for ex-post merger evaluation that could be used for future antitrust work and
use it to perform a welfare analysis on the AA-US merger.
I find that the merger increased consumer surplus by 1.5-1.7%. Ignoring capacity
constraints and economies of scale, the same analysis could have yielded a decrease in
consumer surplus by as much as 4.5%. The difference between these numbers is driven by
two competing factors. On the one hand, due to economies of scale, airlines want to keep
flights operating at or close to capacity, so they lower prices of different routes. This lowers
marginal costs, and allows them to price even lower, increasing consumer surplus. On the
other hand, due to capacity constraints, airlines want to leave some empty room on flights
to allow them greater flexibility on pricing the routes in their network. In other words, I
find that the AA-US merger benefited consumers and airlines — specifically AA, which
enjoyed nearly 2.5% higher profit margins directly as a result of the merger. Benchmark
models could lead regulators to erroneously believe this merger harmed consumers.
I also find that there are significant economies of scale in airlines’ operations: flights
operated at or near capacity had lower marginal costs per passenger by $128 in 2012
and $57 in 2015. On the demand-side, I am able to construct a previously unidentified
“stopover” variable, and find that the discount consumers require for flights with stopovers
is, on average, 3-5 times lower than the discount consumers require for flights with a
layover. This suggests that airlines could benefit from turning flights with layovers into
flights with stopovers.58
58Flights with stopovers are still called direct flights and appear as a single flight on an itinerary. This
may confuse some passengers, and be responsible for their lower than expected discount, relative to flights
with layovers.
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A limitation of my model is that the full structural model cannot be estimated: ca-
pacity constraints never bind empirically. For this reason, a reduced-form model is used
for estimation, while the full model is used for the counterfactuals. Moreover, this paper
abstracts from strategic capacity considerations and dynamic pricing: network structure
is assumed to be fixed, and pricing decisions, static. I leave such considerations for future
work.
Extensions to this paper are discussed more completely in the appendix. One idea
would be to include other network constraints, such as pricing constraints. The intuition
for this is that airlines are limited in their ability to price routes in their network not
only due to capacity considerations, but due to the ability of consumers to “arbitrage”
different one-way flights in constructing their itinerary. Other ideas include: making the
determinants of marginal cost link instead of product-specific; using additional data from
the BTS (the “On-Time Performance” database) to map the routing of individual planes
and disaggregate the T-100 capacity data; exploring the effect of multimarket contact in
a constrained network; or endogenizing the firm’s choice of capacity. Moreover, one could
apply the theory developed here to other observable networks in our economy. I leave
this for future work.
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2 Efficiency Wages with Health Insurance
2.1 Introduction
The following two chapters are motivated by the hump-shaped lifecycle profile of job
search59 identified by Aguiar et al. [2013]. Using the American Time Use Survey (“ATUS”),
Aguiar et al. [2013] found that this hump-shaped profile persists even after controlling for
a host of characteristics, such as education, gender, and family status. This finding was
counterintuitive with standard consumption-savings models. In particular, the standard
model would predict a decreasing lifecycle profile of job search, driven by the decreasing
cost of joblessness over the lifecycle.60 Let us call this the Wealth Effect.
59This is measured by time spent searching for a job.
60This is driven by asset accumulation: as individuals age, they become wealthier, and are able to insure
themselves against temporary bouts of unemployment while searching for a better job.
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Figure 2.1: Job Search over the Lifecycle - USA (Source: Aguiar et al. [2013])
Moreover, this phenomenon did not extend to other OECD countries. The United
Kingdom, Germany, France, and Spain all had the expected decreasing lifecycle profile
of job search. There appeared to be some institutional feature specific to the US that
caused higher than expected job search in middle age and later life.
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Figure 2.2: Job Search over the Lifecycle - OECD Countries (Source: Aguiar et al. [2013])
One thing that sets the US apart from other OECD countries is its healthcare system,
and in particular, its close relationship between health insurance and employment. The
majority of Americans are insured by their employer, and this percentage grows over the
lifecycle. At the same time, from the mid/late 20’s, health expenditures increase over the
lifecycle. This lends credence to the following explanation: perhaps the cost of joblessness
is higher in middle/old age in the US than in other OECD countries because being jobless
often means being uninsured, leading to an increasing lifecycle profile of job search as the
cost of being uninsured rises over the lifecycle. Let us call this the Health Effect.61
61Of course, there are other reasons one could think of to explain this phenomenon. For example, one
might argue that more experience over the lifecycle increases the opportunity cost of joblessness, raising
search effort.
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Figure 2.3: Supporting Data from CPS and MEPS
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Indeed, with a combination of these two effects (the Wealth Effect and the Health
Effect), I am able to generate a lifecycle profile of job search that very closely matches
that identified in the ATUS data by Aguiar et al. [2013]. I leave the details of this simple
model, the data used, and the simulation results to the appendix.
These findings motivate the next two chapters of this dissertation via the following
take-away messages. First, it is clear that employer-sponsored health insurance may
play a significant role in providing incentives for employment; this could be dramatically
changed by the introduction of the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”). Second, job search
is non-constant and endogenous; any theory of optimal taxation must take secondary
effects on job search into account. Combining employer-provided health insurance with
job search is not novel; Dey and Flinn [2005] do exactly this in their seminal paper.
63In generating a lifecycle profile of job search that very closely matches the ATUS data, I also pooled
data from the Current Population Survey (“CPS”) to get unemployment rates and unemployment tran-
sitions over many years (as in Choi et al. [2015]).
63To generate this plot, I used data from the 2011-2012, round 16 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey
(“MEPS”). In generating a lifecycle profile of job search that very closely matches the ATUS data, I
also divided individuals into age bins and self-reported health status. Then, I obtained a distribution of
medical health expenditures for these bins, and estimated a health transition matrix using the panel data.
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In this chapter, I extend the basic model of efficiency wages (Shapiro and Stiglitz
[1984]) to incorporate employer-sponsored health insurance. I show how the ACA reform
will affect market wages in a simple economy with imperfect monitoring and a cost-of-
effort. Shapiro and Stiglitz [1984] showed that the market equilibrium is not efficient, and
that there are circumstances in which the government should intervene in the market by
supplying unemployment insurance; I ask whether the same applies to supplying health
insurance. To distinguish the individual mandates of the ACA from simply increasing
unemployment insurance (now that workers have health insurance even if they get fired,
the threat of being fired is lower, akin to increasing unemployment insurance), I introduce
worker heterogeneity in the form of health status. Unhealthy workers have higher medical
costs and are less productive.
There is a large literature on the role of health insurance on the labor market. See, for
example, Currie and Madrian [1999], Li et al. [2013], and Aizawa and Fang [2013]. While
Li et al. [2013] attempt to bridge health insurance and efficiency wage theory, they fall
short in describing what it is about health insurance that provides utility. I delve inside
this “black box” using an empirical framework developed by Aizawa and Fang [2013].
I develop a few theorems, including sufficient conditions under which the Affordable
Care Act increases efficiency wages. In particular, if the ACA succeeds, at least in part, in
inducing employers to provide health insurance and individuals to self-insure, then wages
will rise after its implementation. I suggest that the ACA may provide efficiency wage
subsidies towards the socially optimal wage level, and numerically show the existence of
regions where this is the case. The intuition for this result is as follows: as subsidies
increase, employers are more inclined to offer health insurance to their workers. In turn,
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this changes the composition of health status of individuals using the insurance exchanges,
driving premiums down. As a result, the relative cost of unemployment goes down, forcing
firms to increase wages in order to induce good (no-shirk) behavior.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the benchmark economic
model, designed to capture the environment of firm and worker health insurance deci-
sions prior to the introduction of the ACA. Section 3 introduces the ACA into the bench-
mark model. Section 4 compares the two, and develops the “Efficiency Wage Theorems”.
Section 5 concludes.
2.2 Benchmark Model (Pre-ACA)
2.2.1 Worker’s Problem
Consider an infinite horizon model where individuals choose their level of effort on the job
(i.e., whether to shirk, or whether to not shirk), and whether to purchase health insurance
if it is not provided to them by their employer or if they are unemployed. An individual
can be of either good (g) or bad (b) health. Let y denote her income, T (y) denote her
after-tax income, and x denote her health insurance (“HI”) status, where:
x = 0 ⇒ worker is uninsured (2.2.1)
x = 1 ⇒ worker receives HI from her employer (2.2.2)
x = 2 ⇒ worker purchases HI from the market (2.2.3)
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Then, each period, the individual’s expected flow utility vh(y, x) is given by:
vh(y, x) =

Em˜hu(T (y)− m˜h), if x = 0
u(T (y)), if x = 1
u(T (y)−Rh), if x = 2
(2.2.4)
Where the subscript h denotes the individual’s health status (it can take on the values
b or g). Notice that in this simple model, health status only affects the individual through
her realization of the medical expenditure shock m˜h and, as a consequence, health insur-
ance premium Rh. Letting m¯h = Em˜h, and assuming that m˜b first order stochastically
dominates m˜g, I have that m¯b > m¯g and that Em˜gu(T (y) − m˜g) > Em˜bu(T (y) − m˜b).
In other words, an unhealthy worker gets, on average, larger medical expenditure shocks
than a healthy worker, and workers prefer to be healthy.
Each period, the individual can be either employed or unemployed. While employed,
the worker can either exert effort (not shirk) or be lazy (shirk). If the worker does not
shirk, she will incur a cost of effort e and get laid off at the exogenous rate of δ. If the
worker shirks, on the other hand, she will incur no cost of effort, but may be “discovered”
shirking and consequently fired. This happens with probability q, thus increasing her rate
of separation to δ + q. Note that q is exogenous in this simple model but can later be
made endogenous.
Let V Hh (x) denote the value function of an employed individual with health status h
and health insurance status x, who decides not to shirk (or exert High effort, H). Similarly,
Let V Lh (x) denote the value function of an employed individual with health status h and
100
health insurance status x, who decides to shirk (or exert Low effort, L). I can write the
value functions as:
rV Hh (x) = vh(y, x)− e+ δ(Uh(xˆh)−max{V Hh (x), V Lh (x)}) (2.2.5)
rV Lh (x) = vh(y, x) + (δ + q)(Uh(xˆh)−max{V Hh (x), V Lh (x)}) (2.2.6)
Now, Uh(x) is the value function of an unemployed individual with health status h
and health insurance status x (to be defined explicitly below), and xˆh is the individ-
ual’s health insurance status immediately after being laid off (also to be defined explicitly
below). In the US, under the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985
(“COBRA”), employers are strongly encouraged (via tax deductions) to extend employer-
provided health insurance for a period of time after an involuntary separation (provided
“gross misconduct” did not occur). Since separations in my model are involuntary, I
extend employer-provided health insurance for a single period after an exogenous sepa-
ration. Notice, however, that if the worker chose to self-insure herself while employed,
she is not required to continue with that coverage. Indeed, it may be optimal for her to
terminate her coverage (or begin covering herself, if she previously had not), given that
her income will have changed from y to b.64
In other words, an individual’s health insurance status immediately after being laid
off is given by:
xˆh =

x, if x = 1
x∗h, otherwise
(2.2.7)
64Possible extension: if discovered shirking, consider this a “gross misconduct” and prevent COBRA
continuation payments in that case.
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Where x∗h = arg maxx′∈{0,2} Uh(x
′) = arg maxx′∈{0,2} vh(b, x′). Next, let us write the value
function of an unemployed individual with health status h and health insurance status
x ∈ {0, 2}:
(1 + r)Uh(x) = vh(b, x) + αmax{V Hh (y, xˆh), V Lh (y, xˆh)}+ (1− α)Uh(x∗h) (2.2.8)
Where
xˆh =

1, if HI offered
x∗∗h , otherwise
(2.2.9)
And x∗∗h , the optimal choice of whether to purchase HI while employed when the
employer does not offer HI, satisfies: x∗∗h = arg maxx′∈{0,2} vh(y, x
′).65
Notice that the individual will always accept the (y, x) offer, provided y > b, since she
can always shirk on the job and earn the wage of y at no additional cost to herself. In
other words, being employed and shirking is strictly better than being unemployed. The
workers only choices, then, are:
1) x∗h : whether to purchase HI when employed, if employers do not offer HI.
2) x∗∗h : whether to purchase HI when unemployed, after COBRA continuation ends,
or if employers did not provide HI.
Since the individual’s problem is stationary (health status does not change), if the
worker shirked today, she will necessarily shirk again tomorrow (the same goes for exerting
effort). In other words, “once a shirker always a shirker”. I can get rid of the max operator
65This follows from equations (2.2.12) and (2.2.13). Note that x∗ may not equal x∗∗, since the flow
utility vh(y, x) at x = 2 depends on income, which differs when employed (y) or unemployed (b).
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in the value functions while employed:
rV Hh (x) = vh(y, x)− e+ δ(Uh(xˆh)− V Hh (x)) (2.2.10)
rV Lh (x) = vh(y, x) + (δ + q)(Uh(xˆh)− V Lh (x)) (2.2.11)
Solving, I get:
V Hh (x) =
vh(y, x)− e+ δUh(xˆh)
r + δ
(2.2.12)
V Lh (x) =
vh(y, x) + (δ + q)Uh(xˆh)
r + δ + q
(2.2.13)
Then, I have two No-Shirk-Conditions (“NSC’s”): V Hh (xˆh) > V
L
h (xˆh) for h = b, g.
From the previous value function expressions, I can re-write the NSC’s as:
vh(y, xˆh) > rUh(xˆh) + (r + δ + q)e/q ≡ vˆh(xˆh) (2.2.14)
Notice immediately that offering health insurance is a “double-edged sword” (recall
that if the firm offers HI, xˆh = xˆh = 1). On one hand, it raises vh(y, x) and adds to the
efficiency wage compensation required to get workers not to shirk, but on the other hand
it increases the value of unemployment for workers, since after termination they get to
continue with their health insurance coverage for a few months,66 raising vˆh(xˆh).
66In my model, this continues until the next period, which is defined as the average length of COBRA
continuation.
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2.2.2 Health Insurance Purchase Decision
If individuals choose to purchase health insurance (either while unemployed after the
completion of COBRA continuation, or while employed if their employer does not offer
HI), they will be charged a premium proportional to their average medical expenditure,
given by:
Rh = (1 + ξh)m¯h (2.2.15)
Where m¯h is the average medical expenditure for individuals of type h health status,
and ξh > 0 is a loading factor for the health insurance market, which I allow to be
health-type specific. I bound ξh by assuming that Rg > Rb.
Let us characterize the individual’s Purchase/No Purchase HI decision. Doing so
requires assumptions on the function form of the utility function. Consider first the case
when my utility function exhibits constant absolute risk aversion (“CARA”),67 i.e., u(x) =
−e−γx. Then, if I assume that medical expenditure shocks are normally distributed, I can
express the certainty equivalent of the no-HI gamble by:68
CE(x = 0) = µ− 1
2
γσ2 (2.2.16)
Where, in my example, µ = T (y)− m¯h and σ2 = V ar(m˜h). In other words:
Em˜hu(T (y)− m˜h) = u(T (y)− m¯h −
1
2
γV ar(m˜h)) (2.2.17)
67This allows me to handle negative consumption in the case of a particularly bad medical expenditure
shock.
68For a complete derivation, refer to the appendix, section B.2.1.
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Under this functional form assumption (CARA utility), I can find necessary and sufficient
conditions for when an individual elects to purchase health insurance from the market:
Theorem 1. If u exhibits CARA,
x∗h = 2 ⇐⇒ x∗∗h = 2 ⇐⇒ Rh < 1γ log
∫
eγxfh(x)dx ⇐⇒ ξh < 1γm¯h log
∫
eγxfh(x)dx− 1
Moreover, if medical expenditure shocks are normally distributed,
x∗h = 2 ⇐⇒ x∗∗h = 2 ⇐⇒ Rh < m¯h + 12γV ar(m˜h) ⇐⇒ ξh < 12γ V ar(m˜h)m¯h
Proof. In appendix.
Next, I relax the assumption of constant absolute risk aversion to the class of utility
functions that exhibit decreasing absolute risk aversion (“DARA”). I can find sufficient
conditions for when an employed individual not getting health insurance from his employer
elects to purchase health insurance from the market:
Theorem 2. If u exhibits DARA, x∗∗h = 2⇒ x∗h = 2
Proof. In appendix.
As a corollary, I can also find sufficient conditions for when an unemployed individual
elects to remain uninsured:
Corollary 1. If u exhibits DARA, x∗h = 0⇒ x∗∗h = 0
Finally, I can find analogs of the sufficent conditions above for the special case of
utility exhibiting increasing absolute risk aversion (“IARA”):
Corollary 2. If u exhibits IARA, x∗h = 2⇒ x∗∗h = 2 and x∗∗h = 0⇒ x∗h = 0
105
2.2.3 Employer’s Problem
The representative firm gets nothing if it hires a worker who shirks, p units of labor if it
hires a healthy worker who does not shirk, and pd units of labor if it hires an unhealthy
worker who does not shirk, where d < 1 denotes the loss of productivity due to bad health
(this includes time spent not working due to sickness, as well as lower productivity while
on the job).
If the firm offers HI to its workers, it incurs a variable cost equal to those workers’
average medical expenditures, m¯h, in addition to a fixed administrative cost of offering
health insurance, C. This means that the representative firm has 6 possible strategies (in
addition to a shutdown option):
Strategy 1: Do not offer HI, set wage to ensure NSC holds for workers of both good
and bad health, y0all, and earn corresponding profits equal to pi
0
all.
Strategies 2 and 3: Do not offer HI, set wage to ensure NSC holds for only one type
of worker, y0b or y
0
g , and earn corresponding profits equal to pi
0
b or pi
0
g , respectively.
Strategy 4: Offer HI, set wage to ensure NSC holds for workers of both good and
bad health, y1all, and earn corresponding profits equal to pi
1
all.
Strategies 5 and 6: Offer HI, set wage to ensure NSC holds for only one type of
worker, y1b or y
1
g , and earn corresponding profits equal to pi
1
b or pi
1
g , respectively.
Then, the firm solves:
max{pi0all, pi0b , pi0g , pi1all, pi1b , pi1g , 0} (2.2.18)
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where
pi0all = (pd− y0all)nb(y0all, 0) + (p− y0all)ng(y0all, 0)
pi0b = (pd− y0b )nb(y0b , 0) + (0− y0b )ng(y0b , 0)
pi0g = (0− y0g)nb(y0g , 0) + (p− y0g)ng(y0g , 0)
pi1all = (pd− y1all − m¯b)nb(y1all, 1) + (p− y1all − m¯g)ng(y1all, 1)− C
pi1b = (pd− y1b − m¯b)nb(y1b , 1) + (0− y1b − m¯g)ng(y1b , 1)− C
pi1g = (0− y1g − m¯b)nb(y1g , 1) + (p− y1g − m¯g)ng(y1g , 1)− C
where nh(y, x) is the steady-state level of employment of workers of health status h at
the wage and health insurance offer (y, x). Notice that (y0all, y
0
b , y
0
g , y
1
all, y
1
b , y
1
g) are given
implicitly by the equations:
vh(y
x
h, xˆh) = rUh(xˆh) + (r + δ + q)e/q (2.2.19)
yxall = max{yxb , yxg} (2.2.20)
Next, notice that the steady-state levels of employment are very easy to derive. Given
G workers of good health and B workers of bad health, the steady-state levels of employ-
ment are given by:
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ng(y
0
g , 0) = ng(y
1
g , 1) = ng(y
0
all, 0) = ng(y
1
all, 1) =
αG
α+ δ
(2.2.21)
nb(y
0
b , 0) = nb(y
1
b , 1) = nb(y
0
all, 0) = nb(y
1
all, 1) =
αB
α+ δ
(2.2.22)
ng(y
0
b , 0) = ng(y
1
b , 1) =
αG
α+ δ + q
(2.2.23)
nb(y
0
g , 0) = nb(y
1
g , 1) =
αB
α+ δ + q
(2.2.24)
This follows from the fact that at y0g and y
1
g , all good health workers are taking every
job that comes to them and not shirking, while at y0b and y
1
b , they are still taking every
job that comes to them but shirking. In the steady state, the flow in must equal the flow
out, so α(G − ng(yg)) = δng(yg) ⇒ ng(yg) = αGα+δ , and α(G − ng(yb)) = (δ + q)ng(yb) ⇒
ng(yb) =
αG
α+δ+q . The same exercise can be repeated for the workers of bad health status.
2.2.4 Solving for No-Shirk-Conditions
It will be convenient to re-write the value function of unemployment in a way that takes
advantage of the nature of COBRA continuation and the static benefit of health insurance
in my model. Since COBRA continuation only extends employer-sponsored health insur-
ance for one period after lay-off, and since the benefits of health insurance come about
only from changing vh, I can re-write the value function of unemployment for a type h
health status worker facing the equilibrium wage offer y as:69
69I will omit specifying x explicitly, since I can write any y as yji where i captures whose no-shirk
constraints are satisfied, and j captures whether health insurance is offered or not, in order to minimize
notation.
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Uyh (x) =
1
1 + r
[vh(b, x) + U
y
h ] (2.2.25)
where Uyh does not depend on x:
Uyh = (1− α)[Uyh (x∗h)] + α

V Hh (y, 1), if HI offered and NSC holds
V Lh (y, 1), if HI offered and NSC does not hold
V Hh (y, x
∗∗), if HI not offered and NSC holds
V Lh (y, x
∗∗), if HI not offered and NSC does not hold
Solving explicitly (derivation is in the appendix), I get:
Uyh =

(1+r)(r+δ)( 1−α
α
)vh(b,x
∗)+(1+r)(vh(y,1)−e)+δvh(b,1)
r(1+δ+r) , if HI and NSC
(1+r)(r+δ+q)( 1−α
α
)vh(b,x
∗)+(1+r)(vh(y,1))+(δ+q)vh(b,1)
r(1+δ+r+q) , if HI and no NSC
(1+r)(r+δ)( 1−α
α
)vh(b,x
∗)+(1+r)(vh(y,x∗∗)−e)+δvh(b,x∗)
r(1+δ+r) , if no HI but NSC
(1+r)(r+δ+q)( 1−α
α
)vh(b,x
∗)+(1+r)(vh(y,x∗∗)−e)+(δ+q)vh(b,x∗)
r(1+δ+r+q) , if no HI and no NSC
Notice that since I am defining separate value functions of unemployment based on
“Shirk Status”, my no-shirk condition will need to be slightly changed to reflect this. In
particular I must treat the Uh in the value function for a non-shirker differently from the
Uh in the value function for a shirker, as written above.
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Case 1: Firm offers HI
In particular, the no-shirk condition in the world where the representative firm offers
health insurance pins down the equilibrium y:
V Hh (1) = V
L
h (1)
vh(y, 1)− e+ δUy
1
h
h (1)
r + δ
=
vh(y, 1) + (δ + q)U
y16h
h (1)
r + δ + q
Since U
y1h
h (1) =
1
1+r [vh(b, 1) + U
y
h ], I can solve explicitly for v(y, 1) to get (full derivation
in appendix):
⇒ v(y, 1) = v(b, 1) + (1− α
α
)vh(b, x
∗) + (1 + δ + q + r)e/q (2.2.26)
In other words, the firm will set y such that the worker is indifferent between shirking
and not shirking (in which case he will not shirk). Notice that since the firm offers health
insurance in equilibrium in this case, the wage y it must offer to achieve no-shirking is
higher-since v(b, 1) > v(b, 0) and v(b, 1) > v(b, 2). This again illustrates the “double-edged
sword” nature of offering in health insurance.
Next, notice that since only v(b, x∗) depends on health status in the above equality
(since the firm offers health insurance), and vg(b, x
∗) ≥ vb(b, x∗), it is necessarily the case
that the NSC of the good-health status worker will be binding: y1g ≥ y1b . This motivates
the following theorem:
Theorem 3. When the firm offers health insurance, the NSC of the good-health status
worker will be binding: y1all = y
1
g ≥ y1b .
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Proof. By contradiction. Consider if y1b > y
1
g . Then at y
1
b , both NSC conditions are
satisfied. In particular, the NSC is satisfied with equality for the bad-health status worker.
Since Rg ≤ Rb, I have that vg(b, x∗) ≥ vb(b, x∗), so the right-hand side is at least as
large for the good-health status worker (while the left-hand side is independent of health
status). Then, if vg(b, x
∗) > vb(b, x∗), the good-health status worker would find it optimal
to shirk. On the other hand, if vg(b, x
∗) = vb(b, x∗), the right-hand side would also be
independent of health status, so I must have that y1b = y
1
g . Both cases lead to the desired
contradiction.
Case 2: Firm does not offer HI
Now, the NSC is determined by:
V Hh (0) = V
L
h (0)
vh(y, x
∗∗)− e+ δUy0hh (x∗)
r + δ
=
vh(y, x
∗∗) + (δ + q)U
y06h
h (x
∗)
r + δ + q
Since U
y0h
h (x
∗) = 11+r [vh(b, x
∗) +Uyh ], I can solve explicitly for v(y, x
∗∗) to get (full deriva-
tion in appendix):
⇒ vh(y, x∗∗) = 1
α
vh(b, x
∗) + (1 + δ + q + r)e/q (2.2.27)
In other words, the firm will set y such that the worker is indifferent between shirking
and not shirking (in which case he will not shirk).
I next present the analog of Theorem 3 for the case where the firm does not offer HI:
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Theorem 4. When the firm does not offer health insurance and u exhibits CARA, the
NSC of the good-health status worker will be binding: y0all = y
0
g > y
0
b .
Proof. In appendix.
Combining Cases:
Next, I compare the NSC condition when the firm offers HI to when the firm does not
offer HI. In other words, I compare (2.2.26) to (2.2.27).
From (2.2.26), I have that:
v(y, 1) = v(b, 1) + (
1− α
α
)vh(b, x
∗) + (1 + δ + q + r)e/q
=
1
α
vh(b, x
∗) + [v(b, 1)− vh(b, x∗)] + (1 + δ + q + r)e/q
Subtracting (2.2.27) from this expression, I get:
v(y1, 1)− vh(y0, x∗∗) = v(b, 1)− vh(b, x∗) (2.2.28)
⇒ u(y1)−max{u(y0 −Rh),Eu(y0 − m˜h)} = u(b)−max{u(b−Rh),Eu(b− m˜h)}
Theorem 5. When u exhibits CARA, y1 > y0.
Proof. In appendix.
As before, let us relax the CARA assumption to the class of DARA utility functions:
Theorem 6. When u exhibits DARA, y1 > y0.
Proof. In appendix.
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Let us provide some intuition for this counter-intuitive result. Notice that I can write
the two NSC conditions as follows:
v(y1, 1) =
1
α
v(b, x∗) +K + v(b, 1)− v(b, x∗) (2.2.29)
v(y0, x∗∗) =
1
α
v(b, x∗) +K
When the firm offer health insurance, it increases the benefit of shirking by v(b, 1) −
v(b, x∗), since now if the worker shirks, he will get free health insurance while unemployed,
as opposed to paying for it or being uninsured (x∗). At the same time, though, it increases
the benefit of not shirking by v(y, 1)−v(y, x∗∗), since now if the worker does not shirk, he is
more likely to stay employed and get health insurance, instead of paying for it or remaining
uninsured (x∗∗). This is the trade-off the firm must evaluate when it decides whether
or not to offer health insurance. Absent subsidies or penalties, though, since utility is
concave, additional consumption at lower wealth is more valuable. Since x∗ ⇐⇒ x∗∗, the
individual is getting the same “additional unit of consumption” by shirking and by not
shirking, but this additional unit is more valuable at his lower wealth level, b, increasing
the motivation to shirk. To compensate for this phenomenon, the firm must offer a greater
wage compensation package when it offers health insurance. I am now ready to present
my impossibility theorem for the benchmark model:
Theorem 7 (Impossibility Result). If u exhibits CARA or DARA, the firm will never
find it optimal to offer health insurance (absent government intervention).
Proof. Follows from Theorems 5 and 6. Since y1 > y0, given y, the firm attracts no more
workers by offering health insurance, and offering health insurance is costly. In other
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words, there is no reason to offer health insurance in my benchmark model, given CARA
or DARA utility.
I note that if u exhibits IARA, the firm may find it optimal to offer health insurance
absent government intervention, since now the lower value of an additional unit of con-
sumption at higher wealth is offset by the increased aversion of risk at that higher wealth.
However, there is little empirical support for IARA in the real-world.70
2.2.5 Solving for Equilibrium Wage
Knowing this, I can easily solve for the equilibrium wage directly. From theorem 4, I have
that if u exhibits CARA, the NSC of the good-health status worker will be binding. If
this is the case, then the firm has two options:
1) Set y = y0g , earn pi = (pd− y) αBα+δ + (p− y) αGα+δ
2) Set y = y0b , earn pi = (pd− y) αBα+δ + (0− y) αGα+δ+q
Moreover, I can solve for y0g and y
0
b via v(y, x
∗∗) = 1αv(b, x
∗) + (1 + δ + q + r)e/q.
If u exhibits CARA, theorem 2.1 tells us that x∗h = 2 ⇐⇒ x∗∗h = 2. This leaves us
with only 2 cases to consider:
70Other ways to remedy this impossibility result are by: 1) stopping COBRA continuation after an
employee is caught shirking, or 2) introducing a direct benefit of HI to employee productivity.
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Case 1: x∗h = x
∗∗
h = 2. Then, letting (1 + δ + q + r)e/q = Q, the NSC reduces to:
v(y, 2) =
1
α
v(b, 2) + (1 + δ + q + r)e/q
u(T (y)− (1 + ξh)m¯h) = 1
α
u(T (b)− (1 + ξh)m¯h) +Q
−αe−γ[T (y)−(1+ξh)m¯h] = −e−γ[T (b)−(1+ξh)m¯h] + αQ
αe−γT (y) = e−γT (b) − αQe−γ(1+ξh)m¯h
log(α)− γT (y) = log(e−γT (b) − αQe−γ(1+ξh)m¯h)
T (y0h) =
1
γ
log(
α
e−γT (b) − αQe−γ(1+ξh)m¯h )
Case 2: x∗h = x
∗∗
h = 0. Then, letting (1 + δ + q + r)e/q = Q, the NSC reduces to:
v(y, 0) =
1
α
v(b, 0) + (1 + δ + q + r)e/q
u(T (y)− m¯h − 1
2
γV ar(m˜h)) =
1
α
u(T (b)− m¯h − 1
2
γV ar(m˜h)) +Q
−αe−γ[T (y)−m¯h− 12γV ar(m˜h)] = −e−γ[T (b)−m¯h− 12γV ar(m˜h)] + αQ
αe−γT (y) = e−γT (b) − αQe−γ[m¯h+ 12γV ar(m˜h)]
log(α)− γT (y) = log(e−γT (b) − αQe−γ[m¯h+ 12γV ar(m˜h)])
T (y0h) =
1
γ
log(
α
e−γT (b) − αQe−γ[m¯h+ 12γV ar(m˜h)]
)
It follows then that if e−γ[m¯h+
1
2
γV ar(m˜h)] > e−γ(1+ξh)m¯h , that y|(x∗h = 0) > y|(x∗h = 2).
Or, if m¯h +
1
2γV ar(m˜h) < (1 + ξh)m¯h. But notice that this is exactly the condition I had
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to ensure that x∗h = x
∗∗
h = 0.
Then, I can evaluate profits from the firm’s two options to determine whether the
firm will only ensure that the NSC of the bad-health status worker will hold, or whether
it will ensure that both hold. The firm will ensure that all NSC’s hold if and only if
p αGα+δ > (yg − yb) αBα+δ + yg αGα+δ − yb αBα+δ+q . The results above completely characterize the
benchmark model for CARA utility. Simulation can be used to characterize the model
for other utility functions, like DARA utility.
2.3 Affordable Care Act
In early 2010, President Barack Obama signed the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act (PPACA), commonly called the Affordable Care Act (ACA) or “Obamacare”
into law. Amongst other things, the ACA stipulated that there be:
Guaranteed issue, which prohibits insurers from denying coverage to individuals due
to pre-existing conditions, and a partial community rating requires insurers to offer the
same premium price to all applicants of the same age and geographical location without
regard to gender or most pre-existing conditions.
Health insurance exchanges that commence operation in every state. Each ex-
change will serve as an online marketplace where individuals and small businesses can
compare policies and buy insurance (with a government subsidy if eligible).
An individual mandate, which requires all individuals not covered by an employer
sponsored health plan, Medicaid, Medicare or other public insurance programs (such as
Tricare) to secure an approved private-insurance policy or pay a penalty.
An employer mandate, which requires that businesses which employ 50 or more
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people but do not offer health insurance to their full-time employees to pay a tax penalty
if the government has subsidized a full-time employee’s healthcare through tax deductions
or other means.
In this paper, I model the guaranteed issue and health insurance exchanges pro-
visions by introducing a health insurance exchange that can only charge a single insurance
premium, REX , and cannot deny coverage, to both good and bad health individuals. I
allow the potential government subsidy to depend on both income and REX and denote
it by S(y,REX).
I model the individual mandate by introducing a penalty when health insurance is
not purchased, as a function of income: PW (y), where the subscript W denotes “worker”.
I model the employer mandate by introducing a penalty when health insurance is
not offered by the employer, as a function of the number of employed workers: PE(n),
where the subscript E denotes “employer”.
In other words, the world under the ACA differs from the pre-ACA, benchmark model
in the following ways:
1) Existence of Insurance Exchange: insurance rates will be the same for good and
bad health individuals, since discrimination on medical history and preexisting conditions
is not allowed.
2) Implementation of Penalties and Subsidies: for both individuals and employers.
I now proceed to characterize the ACA model.
2.3.1 Worker’s Problem
Following Aizawa and Fang [2013], the expected flow utility vh(y, x) can be re-written as:
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vh(y, x) =

Em˜hu(T (y)− m˜h − PW (y)), if x = 0
u(T (y)), if x = 1
u(T (y) + S(y,REX)−REX), if x = 2
(2.3.1)
Recall Theorem (1). Analogously, in the world where the ACA exists, I get the
following theorem:
Theorem 8. If u exhibits CARA,
x∗h = 2 ⇐⇒ REX <
1
γ
log
∫
eγxfh(x)dx+ S(b) + P (b)
x∗∗h = 2 ⇐⇒ REX <
1
γ
log
∫
eγxfh(x)dx+ S(y) + P (y)
Moreover, if medical expenditure shocks are normally distributed,
x∗h = 2 ⇐⇒ REX < S(b, REX) + m¯h +
1
2
γV ar(m˜h) + PW (b) (2.3.2)
x∗∗h = 2 ⇐⇒ REX < S(y,REX) + m¯h +
1
2
γV ar(m˜h) + PW (y) (2.3.3)
Furthermore, if S(y,REX) and PW (y) take the functional forms:
PW (y) = k1y
S(y,REX) = k2R
EX − k3y
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And S(y,REX) ≥ 0, then:
k1 > k3 ⇒ (x∗h = 2⇒ x∗∗h = 2) (2.3.4)
k1 < k3 ⇒ (x∗h = 2⇐ x∗∗h = 2) (2.3.5)
k1 = k3 ⇒ (x∗h = 2 ⇐⇒ x∗∗h = 2) (2.3.6)
Proof. If u is CARA, then it must necessarily be of the exponential form u(x) = −e−γx.
Then,
x∗∗h = 2 ⇐⇒ −e−γ[T (y)−R+S(y)] >
∫
−e−γ[T (y)−P (y)−x]f(x)dx
⇐⇒ −e−γ[T (y)−R+S(y)] > −e−γ[T (y)−P (y)]
∫
eγxf(x)dx
⇐⇒ e−γ[T (y)−R+S(y)]+γ[T (y)−P (y)] <
∫
eγxf(x)dx
⇐⇒ eγ[R−S(y)−P (y)] <
∫
eγxf(x)dx
⇐⇒ R < 1
γ
log
∫
eγxf(x)dx+ S(y) + P (y)
Similarly,
x∗h = 2 ⇐⇒ R <
1
γ
log
∫
eγxf(x)dx+ S(b) + P (b)
The second part follows from: Em˜hu(T (y)− m˜h − PW (y)) = u(T (y)− m¯h − PW (y)−
1
2γV ar(m˜h)). The third part follows from noticing that the right-hand side of the first
two if and only if expressions above changes by −k3(y − b) + k1(y − b) as we move from
the unemployed to employed world. If k1 ≥ k3, this net change is non-negative, so if the
individual purchased health insurance while unemployed, he will surely want to purchase
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it now that he is employed. The converse holds if k1 ≤ k3.
2.3.2 Employer’s Problem
The employer’s problem remains unchanged except for the imposition of a penalty term
if the firm does not offer health insurance to its workers, which is a function of the size
of the firm: PE(n). Profits when the firm does not offer health insurance change to the
following:
pi0all = (pd− y0all)nb(y0all, 0) + (p− y0all)ng(y0all, 0)− PE(n(y0all, 0)) (2.3.7)
pi0b = (pd− y0b )nb(y0b , 0) + (0− y0b )ng(y0b , 0)− PE(n(y0b , 0)) (2.3.8)
pi0g = (0− y0g)nb(y0g , 0) + (p− y0g)ng(y0g , 0)− PE(n(y0g , 0)) (2.3.9)
Where n(y, 0) = ng(y, 0) +nb(y, 0). Recall that the employer’s choice of wage offer, y,
is such that some of the NSC conditions just bind:
vh(y
x
h, xˆh) = rUh(xˆh) + (r + δ + q)e/q (2.3.10)
yxall = max{yxb , yxg} (2.3.11)
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Explicitly,
vh(y
1
h, 1) = u(T (y
1
h)) = rUh(1) + (r + δ + q)e/q (2.3.12)
vh(y
0
h, x
∗∗
h ) = rUh(x
∗
h) + (r + δ + q)e/q (2.3.13)
x∗∗h = arg max
x′∈{0,2}
vh(y
0
h, x
′) (2.3.14)
x∗h = arg max
x′∈{0,2}
vh(b, x
′) (2.3.15)
Now, vb(y, 2) = vg(y, 2) ∀y, since the health insurance exchange cannot discriminate
on pre-existing conditions (i.e., bad health). This implies that when the employer offer
health insurance, if both good and bad health workers choose to insure themselves when
unemployed, i.e., x∗ = 2, I get that Ug(1) = Ub(1), so y1b = y
1
g = y
1
all = y
1.
Similarly, if the employer does not offer health insurance, and both good and bad
health workers choose to insure themselves when unemployed and when employed, i.e.,
x∗∗b = x
∗∗
g = x
∗
b = x
∗
g = 2, in order to get that Ub(2) = Ug(2) I have that y
0
b = y
0
g = y
0
all =
y0. This motivates the following theorem:
Theorem 9. If individuals have complete insurance from health shocks, and the firm
earns non-negative profits, then no workers will shirk.
Proof. Proved above; non-negative profit condition required to ensure that the firm does
not shut down.
2.3.3 Insurance Exchange
The premium in the insurance exchange, REX , is determined based on the average medical
expenditures of all participants in the exchange, multiplied by 1 + ξ, where ξ > 0 is a
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loading factor for the health insurance exchange. Participants in the exchange may consist
of both employed workers who are not provided health insurance by their employers, and
unemployed workers. In other words:
REX = (1 + ξ)(
m¯gn
EX
g + m¯bn
EX
b
nEXg + n
EX
b
) (2.3.16)
where m¯h is the average medical expenditure for people of type h health status (the
insurers are risk neutral, do not care about the distribution of medical expenditure shocks,
whereas individuals do), and nEXh is the number of participants of type h health status
in the exchange.
Notice that choosing to purchase health insurance or remaining unemployed is a static
decision: it only affects the realization of medical risk for one period after purchase. In
other words, an unemployed individual of health status h will want to buy health insurance
(x∗h = 2) if and only if:
vh(b, 2) > vh(b, 0) ⇐⇒ u(T (b) + S(b, REX)−REX) > Em˜h(u(T (b)− m˜h − PW (b))
(2.3.17)
Similarly, an employed individual of health status h not offered health insurance by
his employer will want to buy health insurance (x∗∗h = 2) if and only if:
vh(yeq, 2) > vh(yeq, 0) ⇐⇒ u(T (yeq)+S(yeq, REX)−REX) > Em˜h(u(T (yeq)−m˜h−PW (yeq))
(2.3.18)
Then, I can develop sufficient conditions for when individuals with bad health elect to
purchase health insurance from the market. This result is unique to the world after the
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introduction of the ACA:
Theorem 10. x∗g = 2⇒ x∗b = 2 and x∗∗g = 2⇒ x∗∗b = 2
Proof. Follows from the fact that vg(y, 2) = vb(y, 2) = u(T (y) + S(y,R
EX) − REX) and
Em˜g(u(T (y)− m˜g − PW (b)) > Em˜b(u(T (y)− m˜b − PW (b)). Since this holds for all y, the
proof is complete.
Intuitively, this result is driven from the fact that discrimination on pre-existing con-
ditions is non-existent in my model. In other words, the cost of obtaining health insurance
is the same for individuals of good and bad health, but the benefits are much larger to
individuals with bad health. This theorem states that if individuals with good health
elect to purchase health insurance, individuals with bad health will too.
I present the following table to illustrate the different possible values of nEXh when the
wage y0all is offered in equilibrium:
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Table 2.1: Some Possible Values of nEXh
Case Equilibrium Wage Health Status, h x∗h x
∗∗
h n
EX
h
b 2 2 B
1.1 y0all g 2 2 G
b 2 2 B
1.2 y0all g 2 0 δGα+δ
b 2 0 δBα+δ1.3 y0all g 2 0 δGα+δ
b 2 2 B
1.4 y0all g 0 2 αGα+δ
b 2 2 B
1.5 y0all g 0 0 0
b 2 0 δBα+δ1.6 y0all g 0 0 0
b 0 2 αBα+δ1.7 y0all g 0 2 αGα+δ
b 0 2 αBα+δ1.8 y0all g 0 0 0
b 0 0 0
1.9 y0all g 0 0 0
Moreover, when health insurance is part of the optimal contract offered by the firm,
i.e., y1 is offered, then the value of x∗∗h becomes meaningless since individuals never
demand private health insurance while employed. This cuts down the number of cases
when employers offer HI to three, and means I have a total of 3 ∗ 9 + 3 ∗ 3 = 36 possible
cases to consider.
When the equilibrium wage leads to shirking by some individuals, i.e., I have yg or
yb, the only change will be that nh, the steady-state level of employment of type h health
status workers, will change. In other words, my table would be altered by replacing αhα+δ
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with αhα+δ+q and replacing
δh
α+δ with
(δ+q)h
α+δ+q , where h ∈ {B,G} and h corresponds to the
health-status of workers allowed to shirk.
2.3.4 Solving for No-Shirk-Conditions
The no-shirk conditions after the introduction of the ACA take the same form as the
no-shirk conditions prior to the introduction of the ACA. In other words, I get the same
no-shirk conditions as in section 2.2.4, the derivation of which is in the appendix.
Case 1: Firm offers HI
Recall the equation from the benchmark model.
v(y, 1) = v(b, 1) + (
1− α
α
)vh(b, x
∗) + (1 + δ + q + r)e/q
Now, notice that there is a hidden effect from offering health insurance: doing so will
change the composition of individuals in the health insurance exchange, thus changing
the price of health insurance in equilibrium, REX , and affecting x∗.
Again, notice that since only v(b, x∗) depends on health status in the above equality,
and vg(b, x
∗) ≥ vb(b, x∗), it is necessarily the case that the NSC of the good-health status
worker will be binding: y1g ≥ y1b . This motivates the following theorem:
Theorem 11. When the firm offers health insurance, the NSC of the good-health status
worker will be binding: y1all = y
1
g ≥ y1b .
Proof. By contradiction, as in Theorem 3.
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I first proceed by solving this simpler problem, where the firm is “forced” to provide
health insurance, in order to characterize the workers’ purchase/do not purchase HI while
unemployed decision, and relate it to equilibrium wage offer and firm profit. This leads
us to the following theorem:
Theorem 12. When the firm offers HI, there exist parametric regions where x∗g = x∗b = 0:
(Case 1), x∗g = 0 and x∗b = 2: (Case 2), and x
∗
g = x
∗
b = 2: (Case 3). Moreover, there
exist parametric regions where both Case 2 and Case 3 can be supported as equilibria. In
those cases, the firm will choose the smaller y, which corresponds to (Case 2). I refer
to this as the “bad” equilibrium, since the good-health workers remain uninsured and do
not want to purchase HI since the market is “polluted” with only bad-health individuals.
Proof. Simulation shows the regions (figures 1 and 2 in the appendix). Letting the sub-
script denote the case number, I must have that REX2 > R
EX
3 , since m¯b > m¯g and
nEXg 6= 0. This implies that v2(b, x∗) ≤ v3(b, x∗), which drives down the right-hand side
of (2.2.26) which, consequently, means that y2 ≤ y3. Since the firm’s only goal is to
maximize profit, I have that y2 and, hence, Case 2, arises in equilibrium when both Case
2 and Case 3 can be supported.
Case 2: Firm does not offer HI
Recall the equation from the benchmark model:
v(y, x∗∗) =
1
α
v(b, x∗) + (1 + δ + q + r)e/q
Note that again there is a hidden effect from offering health insurance: doing so will
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change the composition of individuals in the health insurance exchange, thus changing
the price of health insurance in equilibrium, REX , and affecting x∗ and x∗∗.
Again, notice that since only v(y, x∗∗) and v(b, x∗) depend on health status in the
above equality, and vg(b, x
∗) ≥ vb(b, x∗), it is necessarily the case that if x∗∗ = 2, in
which case vh(y, x
∗∗) = vg(y, x∗∗), that the NSC of the good-health status worker will be
binding: y1g ≥ y1b . This motivates the following theorem, which is the analog of Theorem
11 for the case where the firm does not offer HI:
Theorem 13. When the firm does not offer health insurance, but the worker self-insures
himself while employed (x∗∗ = 2), the NSC of the good-health status worker will be binding:
y0all = y
0
g ≥ y0b .
Proof. By contradiction, as in Theorem 3.
Combining Cases
v(y1, 1)− v(y0, x∗∗) = v(b, 1)− v(b, x∗) (2.3.19)
If individuals always choose to self-insure, (2.3.19) becomes:
u(y1)− u(y0 + S(y0)−R) = u(b)− u(b+ S(b)−R) (2.3.20)
Since y > b ⇒ S(y) < S(b) (by assumption) ⇒ R − S(y) > R − S(b). Since u is
concave, it is unclear which of y1 or y0 is larger. Notice, however, that if u was linear, I
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would get:
y1 − y0 + (R− S(y0)) = R− S(b)
⇒ y1 < y0 (2.3.21)
Intuitively, this result tells us that if individuals are risk-neutral, the firm must offer
a higher equilibrium wage to get the same no-shirk behavior as when it offered HI, since
now the “efficiency wage” has essentially decreased. I can even extend this special case
of risk-neutrality to any choice of x∗ and x∗∗.
Theorem 14. If individuals are risk-neutral, then y0 > y1.
Proof. In appendix.
To understand why I am getting an ambiguous result when individuals are risk-averse,
consider again the “double-edged sword” nature of offering HI. While offering HI increases
utility from not shirking, it also increases utility from shirking. This is because individ-
uals get health insurance for a period after being fired.71 Since this health insurance
continuation comes when the individual receives a low income equal to his unemploy-
ment insurance benefits, concavity of u implies this health insurance is “worth” more to
him (in terms of utility) than before. The reason the effect is unclear is because at this
lower income, subsidies to purchase health insurance are also higher, making COBRA
continuation less important.
71As mentioned earlier, I can assume this away by stipulating that if caught shirking, it is a case of
“gross misconduct” and, hence, COBRA continuation payments cease.
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2.4 Benchmark/ACA Comparison
I begin with a central assumption that motivates the consequent results:
Assumption: RACA ≥ RBg and RACA ≤ RBb , where the superscript B stands for
benchmark. What this says is that after the introduction of the ACA, for the same
parameter values, good health workers will be charged at least as high a premium as
they were paying before (now that they are grouped together in a pool with bad health
workers), while bad health workers will be charged no more than they were before (now
that they are grouped together in a pool with good health workers).
Then, comparing theorems 1 and 8, I can show the following:
Theorem 15. If u exhibits CARA,
x∗Bb = 2 ∪ x∗∗Bb = 2 ⇒ x∗ACAb = x∗∗ACAb = 2
x∗ACAb = 0 ⇒ x∗Bb = x∗∗Bb = 0 ∩ x∗ACAg = 0
x∗∗ACAb = 0 ⇒ x∗Bb = x∗∗Bb = 0 ∩ x∗∗ACAg = 0
Proof. In appendix.
2.4.1 Case 1: Firm offers HI after ACA
If the firm is induced to offer HI after the introduction of the ACA, when previously it
had not (this is necessarily the case for CARA or DARA utility), the following must hold
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(follows from Equations 2.2.26 and 2.2.27):
vACA(yACA, 1)−vB(yB , xB∗∗) = 1
α
vACA(b, xACA∗)− 1
α
vB(b, xB∗)+vACA(b, 1)−vACA(b, xACA∗)
(2.4.1)
Subcase 1: x∗ACA = 2, x∗B = x∗∗B = 0
Theorem 16 (Efficiency Wage Theorem 1). If u exhibits CARA or DARA, R − S(b) <
b − CE(b, m˜h)∀h, and the ACA induces the firm to offer HI and individuals to self-
insure, whereas this had not previously been the case, then wages will be higher after the
implementation of the ACA. (This is somewhat like increasing unemployment benefits in
Shapiro and Stiglitz).
If R−S(b) < b−CE(b, m˜b) only, then I require the additional condition that the firm
did not offer yBg in the benchmark.
If u exhibits CARA and shocks are normally distributed, the above certainty equivalent
conditions reduce to RACA − S(b) < m¯h + 12γV ar(m˜h).
Proof. Now, if individuals only begin insuring themselves after the implementation of the
ACA, and employers offer HI, I must have that:
vACA(yACAh′ , 1)− vBh (yBh , 0) =
1
α
vACA(b, 2)− 1
α
vBh (b, 0) + v
ACA(b, 1)− vACA(b, 2)
Notice the distinction between h and h′ above. Since α < 1 and vACA(b, 2) > vBh (b, 0)
(since, by assumption, b−R+S(b) > CE(b, m˜h)), I must have that vACA(b, 2)−vBh (b, 0) <
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1
α [v
ACA(b, 2)− vBh (b, 0)]. Then, I get:
vACA(yACAh′ , 1)− vB(yBh , 0) =
1
α
vACA(b, 2)− 1
α
vB(b, 0) + vACA(b, 1)− vACA(b, 2)
> vACA(b, 2)− vBh (b, 0) + vACA(b, 1)− vACA(b, 2)
> vACA(b, 1)− vBh (b, 0)
⇒ u(yACAh′ )− Eu(yBh − m˜h) > u(b)− Eu(b− m˜h)
⇒ yACAh′ > yBh
Where the last line follows from concavity of u and CARA or DARA, and mirrors
Theorem 6. (If DARA, yB − CE(yB, m˜) < b− CE(b, m˜) and I can construct a proof by
contradiction as before). Notice that the above result holds for any h′, and for the h that
the appropriate assumption was made to ensure that vACA(b, 2) > vBh (b, 0). If I assume it
for h = g, I am done, since vBg (b, 0) > v
B
b (b, 0) implies that v
ACA(b, 2) > vBb (b, 0), which
is the condition required to make the proof hold for h = b. If I want to make the weaker
assumption for h = b only, then I need to make the following more long-winded argument:
So long as the firm sets yB = yBb in the benchmark, I will necessarily have that
yACA > yB (I am ruling out the case where the firm offers yBg in the benchmark since
it could, in theory, be larger than the ACA wage offer). A stronger (but more readily
observable) condition to ensure this is that good-health workers shirk.
With CARA utility, the condition to ensure that vACA(b, 2) > vBh (b, 0) reduces to:
RACA − S(b) < m¯h + 12γV ar(m˜h).
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Subcase 2: x∗ACA = 2, x∗B = 2
Notice that if xB∗ = 2, all else the same (this can only happen with non-CARA utility, like
DARA utility, otherwise I would violate Theorem 1), and vACA(b, 2) > vB(b, 2) (which
occurs when the effective premium under the ACA when unemployed is lower than the
premium in the benchmark: RACA−S(b) < Rh, and is always true (without assumption)
for the bad-health worker), then the same proof holds:
vACA(yACAh′ , 1)− vBh (yBh , 0) =
1
α
vACA(b, 2)− 1
α
vBh (b, 2) + v
ACA(b, 1)− vACA(b, 2)
> vACA(b, 2)− vBh (b, 2) + vACA(b, 1)− vACA(b, 2)
> vACA(b, 1)− vBh (b, 2)
⇒ u(yACAh′ )− Eu(yB − m˜h) > u(b)− u(b−Rh)
⇒ u(yACAh′ )− u(yBh −Rh) > u(b)− u(b−Rh)
⇒ yACAh′ > yBh
Where the fifth line follows from xB∗∗ = 0⇒ Eu(yB − m˜) > u(yB −Rh) and the last
line follows from concavity of u.
Notice, moreover, that if xB∗∗ = 2 as well (this will necessarily be the case with CARA
utility), the proof is identical, with the fourth line omitted. These results motivate the
following theorem:
Theorem 17 (Efficiency Wage Theorem 2). For any concave utility function if, after the
implementation of the ACA, firms offer HI, individuals always self-insure (and in they
benchmark they insured while unemployed), and effective premiums when unemployed are
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lower for the good-health individual (RACA − S(b) < Rg), then wages will be higher after
the implementation of the ACA.
If effective premiums when unemployed are not lower for the good-health individual,
then wages will still be higher after the implementation of the ACA provided that the firm
did not offer yBg in the benchmark (again, a stronger condition that ensures this is that
good-health workers shirked in the benchmark).
Proof. Same as before.
2.4.2 Case 2: Firm does not offer HI
Next, similar to what I did in the benchmark case, I can derive, explicitly, the wage that
will cause the NSC to bind conditional on the health insurance decision of the workers, and
the health insurance offer decision of the firm, after the implementation of the ACA. Then,
I can compare the wages before and after the implementation of the ACA to determine
how efficiency wages will change as a result of the ACA.
The following theorems are proved exclusively for utility that exhibits CARA.
Recall the NSC when the firm does not offer health insurance: v(y, x∗∗) = 1αv(b, x
∗) +
(1 + δ+ q+ r)e/q. Let us use this to solve for y0g and y
0
b , as before. I will henceforth omit
the superscript ACA and refer to the wages under the ACA as y0h or y
1
h, and refer to the
wages under the benchmark as yBh (since the firm will never offer health insurance in the
benchmark).
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Subcase 1: x∗ACAh = x
∗∗ACA
h = 2
Then, letting (1 + δ + q + r)e/q = Q, as before, the NSC reduces to:
v(y, 2) =
1
α
v(b, 2) + (1 + δ + q + r)e/q
u(T (y)−R+ S(y)) = 1
α
u(T (b)−R+ S(b)) +Q
−αe−γ[T (y)−R+S(y)] = −e−γ[T (b)−R+S(b)] + αQ
αe−γ[T (y)+S(y)] = e−γ[T (b)+S(b)] − αQe−γR
log(α)− γ[T (y) + S(y)] = log(e−γ[T (b)+S(b)] − αQe−γR)
T (y0h) =
1
γ
log(
α
e−γ[T (b)+S(b)] − αQe−γR )− S(y
0
h)
=
1
γ
log(eγS(b)
α
e−γ[T (b] − αQe−γReγS(b) )− S(y
0
h)
=
1
γ
log(
α
e−γT (b) − αQe−γ[R−S(b)] ) + [S(b)− S(y
0
h)]
Recall that in the benchmark model, when individuals chose to self-insure at income b
and y (i.e., when x∗h = x
∗∗
h = 2), I had that:
T (yBh ) =
1
γ
log(
α
e−γT (b) − αQe−γRh )
Since y0h > b, I have that S(b)− S(y0h) > 0. This motivates the following theorem:
Theorem 18. Given CARA utility, if the firm does not offer HI, individuals always self-
insure, and RACA − S(b) ≤ RBg , then yACA > yB. If RACA − S(b) > RBg , but the firm
does not set yBg in the benchmark, then y
ACA > yB.
Proof. Theorems 4 and 9 tell us that, in this situation, the NSC of the good health worker
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will be binding in the benchmark, i.e., yBg > y
B
b and the NSC’s will be identical under the
ACA, i.e., y0g = y
0
b . Since R
ACA ≤ RBb by assumption, I have that RACA − S(b) ≤ RBb ,
so T (y0h) > T (y
B
b ) for h ∈ {g, b}. This implies that y0b > yBb and y0g > yBb . So if the firm
did not set yBg in the benchmark (or, alternatively, if the firm allowed the good-health
workers to shirk in the benchmark), the equilibrium wage after the implementation of
the ACA, given by either y0b or y
0
g , will be strictly greater than what it was before the
implementation of the ACA, yBb .
If, on the other hand, I also have that the effective premium paid by the good-health
workers is lower under the ACA, or RACA−S(b) ≤ RBg , then I will also have that y0g > yBg
and y0b > y
B
g , so no matter which NSC’s hold, the equilibrium wage will be higher than
in the world without the ACA.
If individuals always self-insure, this theorem tells us that if, in the world with the
ACA, the effective premium that individuals of health status g have to pay when un-
employed (premium minus subsidies) is no larger than what they had to pay before the
ACA, the equilibrium wage will increase.
If the effective premium is larger, but the firm only ensured the NSC of the bad-health
workers held in the benchmark (i.e., it allowed the good health workers to shirk), then
the equilibrium wage will also increase under the ACA.
Corollary 3. If RACA − S(b)− P (b) ≤ RBg , then (x∗Bg = 2 ∪ x∗∗Bg = 2)⇒ x∗ACAg = 2
If RACA − S(y)− P (y) ≤ RBg , then (x∗Bg = 2 ∪ x∗∗Bg = 2)⇒ x∗∗ACAg = 2
If RACA − S(y) ≤ RBg , then (x∗Bg = 2 ∪ x∗∗Bg = 2)⇒ x∗ACAg = x∗∗ACAg = 2
Proof. For a proof by contradiction, consider RACA−S(b)−P (b) ≤ RBg and x∗Bg = 2 but
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x∗ACAg = 0. Then, from Theorem 1, I have that:
x∗Bg = 2 ⇐⇒ x∗∗Bg = 2 ⇐⇒ RBg <
1
γ
log
∫
eγxfg(x)dx
And from Theorem 8, I have that:
x∗ACAg = 0 ⇐⇒ RACA >
1
γ
log
∫
eγxfg(x)dx+ S(b) + P (b)
⇒ RBg ≥ RACA − S(b)− P (b) >
1
γ
log
∫
eγxfg(x)dx
⇒ RBg >
1
γ
log
∫
eγxfg(x)dx
⇒ x∗Bg = 0
Which yields the desired contradiction. Repeat for income of y to get the second result.
The final result follows since RACA−S(b)−P (b) ≤ RACA−S(y) and RACA−S(y)−P (y) ≤
RACA − S(y).
Putting all these theorems together, I can present the third Efficiency Wage Theorem:
Theorem 19 (Efficiency Wage Theorem 3). If the firm does not offer HI, individuals
self-insured before the introduction of the ACA (ξh <
1
γm¯h
log
∫
eγxfh(x)dx − 1), and the
effective premium is lower under the ACA for the good-health worker when employed
(RACA − S(y) ≤ RBg ),72 then wages are higher after the implementation of the ACA.
If the effective premium is higher under the ACA for the good-health workers, but they
still always self-insure, and the NSC of the good-health workers does not hold (y < yg),
72I actually only require the weaker (but less intuitive) conditions that RACA − S(y)− P (y) ≤ RBg and
RACA − S(b) ≤ RBg .
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at least in the benchmark, then wages will still be higher after the implementation of the
ACA.
Proof. Since individuals self-insured before the introduction of the ACA (i.e., xB∗h =
x∗∗Bh = 2), Theorem 15 tells us that x
∗ACA
b = x
∗∗ACA
b = 2. Moreover, since the effective
premium is lower under the ACA for the good health worker when employed, it follows
from Corollary 3 that x∗ACAg = x∗∗ACAg = 2. In other words, it must be the case that
individuals completely self-insure even after the implementation of the ACA. The first
result then follows directly from Theorem 18.
Next, notice that the bad-health workers will always self-insure after the implemen-
tation of the ACA if they did so before its implementation (Theorem 15). So, as long as
the firm does not set yBg in the benchmark, we get that y
ACA > yB. This second result
follows directly from Theorem 18.
Subcase 2: x∗ACAh = 0 and x
∗∗ACA
h = 2
Again, letting (1 + δ + q + r)e/q = Q, the NSC reduces to:
v(y, 2) =
1
α
v(b, 0) + (1 + δ + q + r)e/q
u(T (y)−R+ S(y)) = 1
α
u(T (b)− m¯h − 1
2
γV ar(m˜h)− P (b)) +Q
T (y0h) =
1
γ
log(
α
e−γ[T (b)−P (b)−m¯h−
1
2
γV ar(m˜h)] − αQ
) +R− S(y0h)
T (y0h) =
1
γ
log(
α
e−γ[T (b)+(R−m¯h−
1
2
γV ar(m˜h)−P (b)−S(y))] − αQe−γ[R−S(y)]
)
Recall that in the benchmark model, when individuals chose to self-insure at income
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b and y (i.e., when x∗h = x
∗∗
h = 2), I had that:
T (yBh ) =
1
γ
log(
α
e−γT (b) − αQe−γRh )
Now, if R−S(y) < Rg, I get that y0g > yBg . To see this, notice that since x∗ACAh = 0, I
have that RACA > S(b) +P (b) + m¯h +
1
2γV ar(m˜h) > S(y) +P (b) + m¯h +
1
2γV ar(m˜h)⇒
(R−m¯h− 12γV ar(m˜h)−P (b)−S(y)) > 0. Notice, however, that I cannot do the same trick
for y0b since, by Theorem 15, x
∗ACA
b = 0 ⇒ x∗Bb = 0, which makes the comparison of the
above wage equations inappropriate. It is, though, entirely plausible to have x∗ACAg = 0,
x∗∗ACAg = 2, x∗Bg = 2, and x∗∗Bg = 2.
Theorem 20 (Efficiency Wage Theorem 4). If the firm does not offer HI, and good-
health individuals stop insuring themselves when unemployed after the introduction of the
ACA but continue insuring themselves while employed, at a lower effective premium, then
yACAg > y
B
g . If, moreover, good-health individuals do not shirk, then wages are higher
after the implementation of the ACA.
If the above conditions hold, but good-health individuals shirk, then wages are still
higher after the implementation of the ACA provided that bad-health individuals only
insure themselves when employed after the introduction of the ACA.
Proof. The conditions of the first statement are equivalent to x∗ACAg = 0, x∗∗ACAg = 2,
x∗Bg = 2, x∗∗Bg = 2 and RACA − S(y) < Rg which, as I already showed above, lead to
yACAg > y
B
g . By Theorem 4, I know that y
B
g > y
B
b . So, as long as the firm ensures that
good-health workers do not shirk (i.e., it gives them a wage greater than or equal to yACAg ,
that wage will necessarily be larger than any possible wage in the benchmark. In other
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words, this gives the result that wages rise after the implementation of the ACA.
On the other hand, if good-health workers shirk but bad-health individuals only insure
themselves when employed after the introduction of the ACA, I have x∗ACAb = 0 and
x∗∗ACAb = 2. Then I can use the above equation, as I did before, to show that y
ACA
b > y
B
g .
Since yBg > y
B
b , I have that wages will increase after the introduction of the ACA.
Putting all these theorems together, I have that for nearly all cases of interest (when
the ACA succeeds in doing what it is supposed to do: induce firms to offer HI or unhealthy
individuals to self-insure, or any combination thereof) wages will increase so long as
effective premiums are lower under the ACA.
In other words, if subsidies under the ACA are such that the effective premium is
lowered, the ACA will (in most cases of interest), cause efficiency wages to increase.
What does this mean for consumer welfare?
Welfare Analysis
As in Shapiro and Stiglitz [1984], I begin with the case where the owners of the firms
are the same individuals as the workers, and ownership is equally distributed among the
B+G workers. Notice that none of the results in this section depended on the production
function of the firm. Indeed, to follow Shapiro and Stiglitz’s result, I will modify the
production function to be a concave and increasing function of the labor force: F (ng, nb),
such that full employment is optimal F ′(G,B) > e (my constant returns to scale function
would not generate the result below, see Shapiro and Stiglitz [1984] for more details).
Furthermore, notice that since the firm is risk-neutral, it is socially optimal for it to offer
HI, provided the utility function of the agents is not risk loving. Then, I can write the
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planners problem that maximizes the total utility of all workers as:
max
y,b,ng,nb,S(b),P (b)
(u(y)− e)(ng + nb) + vb(b, x∗b )(B − nb) + vg(b, x∗g)(G− ng) (2.4.2)
s.t v(y, 1) ≥ v(b, 1) + ( 1− α
α
)vh(b, x
∗
h) + (1 + δ + q + r)e/q for h = b, g (NSC’s)
s.t y[ng + nb] + b[B +G− ng − nb] + ng(m¯g) + nb(m¯b) ≤ F (ng , nb) (Firm Feasibility)
s.t S(b) ≤ P (b) (Gov. Feasibility)
Notice that the choice of ng and nb affect the health insurance exchange which affects
the worker’s self-insurance choice, x∗h, which affects his instantaneous utility, vh(b, x
∗
h).
Furthermore, notice that α, the rate of obtaining a job, can be related to more funda-
mental parameters of the model. In particular, since the flow in must equal the flow out,
I have that, when both NSC’s are satisfied:
α(B +G− nb − ng) = δ(ng + nb)
⇒ α = δ(ng + nb)
B +G− nb − ng
α =
δL
N − L
Where, following Shapiro and Stiglitz [1984], I have let B +G = N and ng + nb = L.
Notice that 1/α is the expected duration of being unemployed, and that no shirking is
inconsistent with full employment ; if L = N , then everyone would shirk, knowing they
would immediately get re-hired if they lost their jobs (since α = +∞). Now, my NSC’s
are functions of the employment rate (FOC’s are in the appendix, for future work).
I can write the competitive problem for the firm that offers health insurance and
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ensures both workers do not shirk as:
max
y,b,ng,nb
F (ng, nb)− y[ng + nb] + b[B +G− ng − nb] + ng(m¯g) + nb(m¯b)
s.t v(y, 1) ≥ v(b, 1) + (1− α
α
)vh(b, x
∗
h) + (1 + δ + q + r)e/q for h = b, g (NSC’s)
Since this problem ignores the welfare maximization of the workers (whose objective
function is strictly increasing in the wage level), it will necessarily have a wage no larger
than what is socially optimal. I can similarly write the competitive problem for the
firm that does not offer health insurance. However, I need not write the problem where
only one group of workers’ NSC conditions hold, since the wage that satisfies this will
necessarily be smaller or equal to the wage that ensures both NSC conditions hold. In
other words, I have (informally) shown that when the firm offers health insurance, it will
offer a wage that is less than or equal to the socially optimal wage level, no matter which
NSC’s hold. It will take more work to show this for the case when the firm does not offer
health insurance.
A simpler (intuitive, but not completely correct) argument is that the firm will
choose to hire L workers and offer them the wage y such that F ′(L) = y and u(y) =
LHS of binding NSC. Thus, the market outcome will be at a wage, y, that equals the
marginal productivity of labor, while the social optimum will be at a wage, y∗, that equals
the average product of labor. Since F (L) is concave, I have that y∗ > y, and the market
outcome is sub-optimal. Indeed, government intervention that raises the equilibrium wage
leads us in the right direction and may provide Pareto improvements.
Theorem 21. The market outcome is socially inefficient. The optimal wage, y∗, is greater
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than the market equilibrium wage, y (when the firm offers health insurance). The ACA
raises wages in many parametric regions, which can be seen as efficiency wage subsidies
towards the socially optimal wage level.
Proof. Informal discussion above, and from Efficiency Wage Theorems 1-4.
2.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I extended the basic model of efficiency wages to incorporate employer-
sponsored health insurance. Analogous to the finding in Shapiro and Stiglitz [1984], I
show that the market equilibrium is not efficient, and that there are circumstances in
which the government’s introduction of the Affordable Care Act is welfare-enhancing.
There is a parallel between this result and the result in Shapiro and Stiglitz [1984]: the
ACA reduces the cost of unemployment by lowering premiums in the health insurance
market, much like unemployment insurance does. There are also some differences: the
mechanism whereby the ACA leads to efficiency wage subsidies is more complex, and this
is primarily driven by heterogeneity in health status. In particular, as subsidies increase,
employers are more inclined to offer HI to their workers. This changes the composition
of health status of individuals using the insurance exchanges, driving premiums down.
In turn, the relative cost of unemployment goes down, forcing firms to increase wages in
order to induce good (no-shirk) behavior.
In effect, I have shown how the ACA reform will affect market wages in a simple
economy with imperfect monitoring, cost-of-effort, and workers heterogeneity in health
status. As an extension, one could consider the problem where workers are heterogeneous
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above and beyond their health status. The problem then is that if workers are not all
identical, being fired will carry a stigma (new employers can infer something about the
fired worker’s health status), and firms may adjust their wage offers accordingly. In other
words, in such a model, worker heterogeneity would introduce adverse selection, above
and beyond the moral hazard present in this chapter. One could also introduce firm
heterogeneity.
Ultimately, the theory developed in this chapter has a meaningful application: a quan-
titative analysis of the ACA. With some simplifications, this model could be combined
with data on employment and health insurance (e.g. the CPS, ASEC Supplement, and
MEPS) to deliver a welfare analysis and counterfactual predictions pertaining to the in-
troduction of the ACA. I leave this for future work.
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3 Mirrlees Taxation with Endogenous Search Ef-
fort
3.1 Introduction
This is the second paper motivated by the hump-shaped lifecycle profile of job search
identified by Aguiar et al. [2013]. This chapter extends Mirrlees’ theory of optimal tax-
ation (Mirrlees [1971]) to a framework with endogenous job search, and applies it to the
estimation of optimal federal tax rates in Canada.
There is a large literature on optimal tax rates, beginning with Mirrlees [1971]. Rather
than perform a detailed analysis of this extensive literature, I point the reader to a
summary by Mankiw et al. [2009], and highlight only a few particularly relevant papers.
Consistent with Mirrlees [1971], Sadka [1976] and Seade [1977] found that the marginal
tax rate should be zero at the income level of the top income level, when the income
distribution is bounded. This chapter is consistent with this result: for the highest tax
bracket, the optimal federal tax rates are indeed zero. More recently, Saez [2001] has
argued that elasticities are the key in calculating optimal income tax rates, and determined
that the optimal tax rate for labor income needs to be between 50 and 80 percent. This
chapter finds that to be the optimal tax rate for the second highest tax bracket.
There is also a large literature on endogenous job search, pioneered by Burdett,
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Mortenson, and Pissarides. For a nice overview, see, in order: Burdett [1978], Mortensen
[1986] and Mortensen and Pissarides [1994]. In this chapter, workers’ search intensity is
endogenous as in Christensen et al. [2005]. While this chapter does not study sorting (in
this chapter, workers are homogenous), there is a growing literature on endogenous search
and sorting; see Lentz and Mortensen [2010] and Bagger and Lentz [2014].
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the economic model. Section
3 details the data. Section 4 discusses the estimation approach, identification issues, and
results. Section 5 concludes.
3.2 Model
Consider the prototypical, partial equilibrium search model of an individual with endoge-
nous search effort. Let λs be the flow rate of job offers when unemployed and λs(w) be
the flow rate of job offers when employed at wage w, where s and s(w) are the endogenous
levels of search effort when unemployed and employed at wage w, respectively. Individuals
all share the same cost function c(s). Let c(s) be concave and increasing with c(0) = 0
and limc→∞ c′(s) = 0. For now, the cost of searching is the same while employed and
unemployed, but I can later generalize the model to make them different.73
The government imposes a net tax on individuals according to the function T (w) when
employed at wage w, and Tu when unemployed. Note that either net tax could, in fact,
be a subsidy. The government chooses the optimal tax rate in order to maximize a social
welfare function, which will have some curvature (inequality aversion) over all possible
states (employed at all wages w and unemployed), weighted by the steady state fraction
73One might think that it is easier for employed workers to find a job, as they have an “in”, but one
may also think it is harder, since they have less free time.
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of individuals in those respective states.
3.2.1 Worker’s Problem
The value function of unemployment can be written as:
ρVu = max
s
{b− Tu + λs
∫
(max{Ve(x), Vu} − Vu)dF (x)− c(s)}
= b− Tu + max
s
{λs
∫
wR
(Ve(x)− Vu)dF (x)− c(s)}
The value function of employment at the wage w can be written as:
ρVe(w) = max
s(w)
{w − T (w) + λs(w)
∫
(max{Ve(x), Ve(w)} − Ve(w))dF (x)− c(s(w)) + δ(Vu − Ve(w))}
= w − T (w) + max
s
{λs(w)
∫
w
(Ve(x)− Ve(w))dF (x)− c(s(w))}+ δ(Vu − Ve(w))
Notice that it need not be the case that wR = b+(Te(wR)−Tu), since search is costly,
though we will show that this is the case.
Let the optimal search effort be s∗ when unemployed and s∗(w) when employed. Then,
I can derive the reservation wage as follows:
ρVu = b− Tu + λs∗
∫
wR
(Ve(x)− Vu)dF (x)− c(s∗)
= b− Tu + λs∗[(Ve(x)− Vu)F¯ (w)]|w¯wR + λs∗
∫
wR
F¯ (x)dVe(x)− c(s∗)
= b− Tu + λs∗
∫
wR
F¯ (x)dVe(x)− c(s∗)
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Where the second line follows from integration from parts after noticing that dF (w) =
d(1− F (w)) = dF¯ (w). Similarly:
ρVe(w) = w − T (w) + λs∗(w)
∫
w
(Ve(x)− Ve(w))dF (x)− c(s∗(w)) + δ(Vu − Ve(w))
= w − T (w) + λs∗(w)
∫
w
F¯ (x)dVe(x)− c(s∗(w)) + δ(Vu − Ve(w))
Taking derivatives of this expression with respect to w, I find (key: use the envelope
theorem, do not take into account derivative of s or c(s) with respect to w since when we
maximize, we set this derivative equal to zero):
ρV ′e (w) = 1− T ′(w)− λs∗(w)F¯ (w)V ′e (w)− δV ′e (w)
⇒ V ′e (w) =
1− T ′(w)
ρ+ δ + λs∗(w)F¯ (w)
Plugging this expression into the value functions of unemployment and employment,
respectively, gives:
ρVu = b+ λs
∗
∫
wR
(1− T ′(x))F¯ (x)dx
ρ+ δ + λs∗(x)F¯ (x)
− c(s∗) (3.2.1)
ρVe(w) = w + λs
∗(w)
∫
w
(1− T ′(x))F¯ (x)dx
ρ+ δ + λs∗(x)F¯ (x)
− c(s∗(w)) + δ(Vu − Ve(w)) (3.2.2)
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Since, by definition:
ρVu = ρVe(wR)
= wR − T (wR) + λs∗(wR)
∫
wR
(1− T ′(x))F¯ (x)dx
ρ+ δ + λs∗(x)F¯ (x)
− c(s∗(wR)) + δ(Vu − Ve(wR))
= wR − T (wR) + λs∗(wR)
∫
wR
(1− T ′(x))F¯ (x)dx
ρ+ δ + λs∗(x)F¯ (x)
− c(s∗(wR))
wR = b+ (T (wR)− Tu) + λ(s∗ − s∗(wR))
∫
wR
(1− T ′(x))F¯ (x)dx
ρ+ δ + λs∗(x)F¯ (x)
+ c(s∗(wR))− c(s∗)
From (3.2.1) and (3.2.2), it is easy to see that the optimal search effort much satisfy:
c′(s∗) = λ
∫
wR
(1− T ′(x))F¯ (x)dx
ρ+ δ + λs∗(x)F¯ (x)
(3.2.3)
c′(s∗(w)) = λ
∫
w
(1− T ′(x))F¯ (x)dx
ρ+ δ + λs∗(x)F¯ (x)
(3.2.4)
Since the integrand of the RHS of (3.2.4) is always positive, the RHS is increasing
in w. Since c is assumed to be concave, this implies that the optimal search effort is
decreasing in w. This is intuitive; as a higher wage job is secured, the individual has
less incentive to search for a better job, since the proportion of higher-wage jobs in the
economy decreases (note that utility is linear here, so concavity of the utility function
does not play a role).
Notice that under this simple specification, s∗ = s∗(wR) and c(s∗(wR)) = c(s∗), so
wR = b. Later, I can change the exogenous component of the arrival rate when unemployed
to κλ, in order to get a difference between s∗ and s∗(wR).
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Steady-State
Equating flow in with flow out of unemployment, I get the following:
λs∗uF¯ (wR) = δ(1− u)
⇒ u = δ
δ + λs∗F¯ (wR)
Let (1−u)G(w) be the number of individuals employed at a wage less than w. Equating
flow in with flow out of employment at wage less than w, I get:
λus∗[F (w)− F (wR)] = δ(1− u)G(w) + λ(1− u)F¯ (w)
∫ w
s∗(x)g(x)dx
⇒ g(w) = λus
∗[F (w)− F (wR)]− δ(1− u)
∫ w−
g(x)dx− λ(1− u)F¯ (w) ∫ w− s∗(x)g(x)dx
δ(1− u) + λ(1− u)F¯ (w)s∗(w)
3.2.2 Government’s Problem
The government’s problem is as follows:
max
T
uVu + (1− u)
∫
Ve(x)g(x)dx
s.t R(T ) ≥ c
Where government revenue, R(T ) is given by:
R(T ) = uTu + (1− u)
∫
g(x)T (x)
In other words, the government levies a net tax on employed workers T (w) and a tax
on unemployed workers Tu such that welfare is maximized subject to a revenue constraint.
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3.3 Data
The data used in this chapter comes from the Canadian Labour Force Survey. It is a
public-use microdata file that provides a snapshot of the state of the Canadian labor
force in May 2014. While it contains over one hundred thousand individuals, the dataset
is not a panel data, and, as such, Limited Information Maximum Likelihood Estimation
(MLE) must be used in estimation. The data set observes workers within an interval
[t0, t1], and provides:
1. Elapsed unemployment duration at t0: τ0
2. Residual unemployment duration after t0: τ1 (note that τ1 ≤ t1 − t0)
3. Accepted wage w at t0 + τ1 if individual leaves unemployment by end of recording
period
The dataset additionally contains some retrograde information, such as length of pre-
vious unemployment spell, and whether there was job destruction or voluntary quits. I
do not use this information in estimation. Below is a summary of the data used.
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Table 3.1: Data Summary by Province
# UE # E Wage ($1000s) Time UE Time E
Ontario 1882 15218 47 6.6 90.8
Quebec 1373 8977 42 6.2 92.2
Alberta 727 6052 57 6.2 68.2
British Columbia 812 5909 46 6.1 81.3
Manitoba 636 5011 43 6.3 83.7
Saskatchewan 450 3770 50 6.7 83.8
Nova Scotia 466 2606 42 6.3 94.1
New Brunswick 478 2511 41 6.3 97.9
Newfoundland 447 1768 50 5.9 87.2
Prince Edward Island 301 1409 40 6.9 85
Provincial tax rates exhibit a lot of heterogeneity. Federal and Provincial tax rates
for May 2014 were obtained from the Canada Revenue Agency. I summarize the marginal
tax rates of the three most populated provinces in the table below. Not shown is the
marginal tax rate in Alberta — a flat 10%.
Table 3.2: 2014 Tax Rate Schedule - Canada
($) Quebec (%) ($) Ontario (%) ($) BC (%) ($) Federal (%)
Tier 1 41495 16 40120 5 37606 5 43953 15
Tier 2 41490 20 40122 9 37607 8 43954 22
Tier 3 17985 24 69758 11 11141 11 48363 26
Tier 4 - 26 70000 12 18504 12 - 29
Tier 5 - - - 13 45142 15 - -
Tier 6 - - - - - 17 - -
I plot the provincial tax functions for the four most populated provinces below.
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Figure 3.1: Provincial Tax Functions
3.4 Estimation
3.4.1 Limited Information MLE
Given the set-up above, durations are distributed according to the exponential distribu-
tion:
G(t) = 1− exp(−λs∗t)
g(t) = λs∗ exp(−λs∗t)
For workers unemployed at time of first interview:
δ
δ + λF¯ (wR)s∗
× (λF¯ (wR)s∗)2−d0b−d0f exp(−λF¯ (wR)s∗(t0b + t0f ))× f(w0)
F¯ (wR)
1−d0f
Let me explain each component:
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1. δ
δ+λF¯ (wR)s∗
is the probability of being unemployed (steady-state unemployment
rate).
2. (λF¯ (wR)s
∗) exp(−λF¯ (wR)s∗t0b) is the probability of an unemployment spell lasting
t0b. If there is left-censoring (i.e., we do not observe the full length t0b, then all we
know is that the unemployment spell is greater than t0b in length, so we use the
CDF: exp(−λF¯ (wR)s∗t0b)).
3. (λF¯ (wR)s
∗) exp(−λF¯ (wR)s∗t0f ) is the probability of an unemployment spell lasting
t0f . Same logic for right-censoring.
4. f(w0)
F¯ (wR)
is the probability of accepting the wage w0 (i.e., conditional on getting an
acceptable wage, w > wR, the probability of getting the wage w0).
For workers employed at time of first interview:
λF¯ (wR)s
∗
δ + λF¯ (wR)s∗
× g(w1)× (δ + λs∗(w1)F¯ (w1))1−d1b ...
exp[−(δ + λs∗(w1)F¯ (w1))(t1b + t1f )]× [δv1(λs∗(w1)F¯ (w1))1−v1 ]1−d1f
Let me explain each component:
1. λF¯ (wR)s
∗
δ+λF¯ (wR)s∗
is the probability of being employed (steady-state employment rate).
2. g(w1) is (conditional on being employed) the probability of being employed at a
wage w1.
3. (δ+λs∗(w1)F¯ (w1)) exp[−(δ+λs∗(w1)F¯ (w1))t1b] is the probability of an employment
spell lasting t1b. If there is left-censoring (i.e., we do not observe the full length t1b),
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then all we know is that employment spell is greater than t1b in length, so we use
the CDF: exp[−(δ + λs∗(w1)F¯ (w1))t1b].
4. (δ+λs∗(w1)F¯ (w1)) exp[−(δ+λs∗(w1)F¯ (w1))t1f ] is the probability of an employment
spell lasting t1f . Same logic for right-censoring.
5. δ
δ+λs∗(w1)F¯ (w1)
is (conditional on observing a transition) the probability of job de-
struction.
6. λs
∗(w1)F¯ (w1)
δ+λs∗(w1)F¯ (w1)
is (conditional on observing a transition) the probability of a job-to-
job transition (“J2J”).
Why is it limited-information?
1. Only using info up to first transition
2. No info used on wages following J2J transition (in data could have w2 < w1, leading
to degenerate likelihood)
With the dataset at hand, I additionally do not see the right side of the employment
or unemployment spells (since I only see a snapshot of individuals - there is no panel data
element). This causes the likelihood to reduce to the following:
For workers unemployed at time of first interview:
δ
δ + λF¯ (wR)s∗
× (λF¯ (wR)s∗)1−d0b exp(−λF¯ (wR)s∗t0b)
And for workers employed at time of first interview:
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λF¯ (wR)s
∗
δ + λF¯ (wR)s∗
× g(w1)× (δ + λs∗(w1)F¯ (w1))1−d1b exp[−(δ + λs∗(w1)F¯ (w1))t1b]
As in Christensen et al. [2005], I assume the cost function to be of the following
parametric form:
c(s) = c0
s
1+ 1
γ
1 + 1γ
Using the above cost function, the search intensity equation (3.2.4) reduces to:
c′(s∗(w)) = λ
∫
w
F¯ (x)dx
ρ+ δ + λs∗(x)F¯ (x)
c0s
∗(w)
1
γ = λ
∫
w
F¯ (x)dx
ρ+ δ + λs∗(x)F¯ (x)
s∗(w) = (
λ
c0
∫
w
F¯ (x)dx
ρ+ δ + λs∗(x)F¯ (x)
)γ
The above is a Volterra equation of the second kind. To solve it numerically, I solve it
backwards using a grid of wage values, noting that at the highest wage offered w¯, the
integral “disappears”.
3.4.2 Identification
This identification discussion closely follows Christensen et al. [2005]. Most parameters of
interest can be identified via maximum likelihood. There are some, however, that cannot.
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For example, λ and c0 are not separately identified. To see this, notice that λ and s
∗ always
appear together in the likelihood function, and that s∗(w) = ( λc0
∫
w
F¯ (x)dx
ρ+δ+λs∗(x)F¯ (x))
γ ∝
h(λ/c0). In particular, what is identified is λs
∗(w) ∝ λγ+1/cγ0 . If I could observe search
effort, these parameters could be separately identified. I elect to fix c0.
Moreover, while ρ could be estimated, there is literature that suggests it is difficult to
do so (see, for example, Hall [1979] or Campbell et al. [1997], chap. 8). In light of this,
I set the discount rate to the standard 5%. I find that varying this parameter between
zero and 10% has no significant effect on the resulting estimates of other parameters.
3.4.3 Results
I coded a federal and provincial tax function, the aggregate of which is the income tax
faced by individuals in Ontario. Then, I used the limited info MLE described above to
obtain parameter estimates. Finally, subject to raising the same amount of tax revenue
as under the current tax system, I solve for the optimal federal tax rates (keeping the
thresholds the same). This involves maximizing over 4 marginal tax rate variables. As
before, without incorporating any concept of inequality aversion, the optimal tax rate
consists of raising all revenue from the lowest income individuals, and subsidizing (or
setting tax rate = 0 if this is not possible) the high income individuals.
A simple fix to this problem is to introduce some concavity to the social welfare
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function. In particular, I amend the government’s objective function to:
max
T
uV 1/κu + (1− u)
∫
Ve(x)
1/κg(x)dx
s.t R(T ) ≥ c
where κ represents the degree of inequality aversion of the social planner.
Solving the government’s welfare maximizing problem subject to the “net-neutral”
budget constraint (i.e., c = 0) and using κ = 1.2, I find that the federal tax rate should be
set to 16.4% for the first $43953 of taxable income, 5.9% for the next $43954 of taxable
income, 75.5% for the next $48363 of taxable income, and 5.8% for taxable income over
$136270. Results are different for different choices of κ, but the same intuition persists:
the government wants to subsidize search effort while generating adequate tax revenue.
Since there is inequality aversion, the optimal strategy is no longer to solely tax the
poorest individuals (since this would lead to high inequality), but to tax everyone but
the richest, and generate more tax revenue from the middle-class since, due to inequality
aversion, they will feel it less.
In other words, the government should lower taxes on the rich to incentive search,
but raise taxes on the middle-class in order to raise its required revenue from the “right
places”, according to its inequality aversion, κ.
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Table 3.3: Optimal Tax Rates using Ontario Subsample
κ = 1 κ = 1.2 κ = 1.5 κ = 2
Tier 1 23.4 16.4 6.6 2.3
Tier 2 0 5.9 41.9 60.5
Tier 3 0 75.5 89.5 90.6
Tier 4 0 5.8 0.6 0
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Figure 3.2: Optimal Federal Tax Rates vs. Inequality Aversion (Ontario)
The results are similar when I use data from all provinces in Canada - the only
difference being the highest tax bracket marginal tax rate stays very close to zero. This is
likely due to the more progressive provincial taxes in other provinces that already make
the Tier 4 tax rates high (compare, for example, the highest marginal tax rate in Quebec
at 26% vs. the highest marginal tax rate in Ontario at 13%).
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Table 3.4: Optimal Tax Rates
κ = 1 κ = 1.3 κ = 1.9 κ = 2.5
Tier 1 24.5 17.6 6.6 4
Tier 2 0 1.4 39.3 49
Tier 3 0 79.6 84.8 85.9
Tier 4 0 0.1 0 0
1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
Ta
x 
R
at
e
κ
Optimal Tax Rates vs. Kappa
 
 
Tier 1
Tier 2
Tier 3
Tier 4
Figure 3.3: Optimal Federal Tax Rates vs. Inequality Aversion (All Provinces)
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I extended Mirrlees’ theory of optimal taxation (Mirrlees [1971]) to a
framework with endogenous job search, and applied to the estimation of optimal federal
tax rates in Canada. Consistent with previous literature, I find that the optimal federal
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tax rates are zero for the highest income bracket. This is driven by endogenous search
effort: the government wants to incentive workers to keep searching on the job until they
receive and accept a higher wage. In general, I find that optimal tax rates are hump-shaped
in income (i.e., they are smallest for very low and very high incomes), but the magnitude
of the tax rates depends heavily on the level of inequality aversion the government has.
In particular, for low levels of inequality aversion, it is optimal to tax the lowest bracket
only, in order to induce them to increase search effort and obtain a higher wage; for high
levels of inequality aversion, the optimal tax of the lowest bracket diminishes, and the
government raises its revenue by taxing the middle two income brackets.
As an extension, one could estimate the general equilibrium model. I have outlined
how to do so in the appendix. In effect, estimating this model amounts to solving a fixed-
point problem in the wage offer distribution function, where each step requires solving
two integral equations. This would allow firms to adjust the wages they choose to offer as
the government changes incomes taxes, and may lead to different optimal tax predictions.
One could also introduce corporate income taxes in this framework, and explore their
interplay with individual income taxes. I leave such analysis for future work.
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A Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Supplementary Summary Statistics and Estimates
A.1.1 Summary Statistics for 2015Q3 Data
Below, I outline some summary statistics of the 2015Q3 sample used in estimation. I
drop the same itineraries and markets as in the 2012Q3 sample. Here, I keep itineraries
operated by the top 7 ticketing carriers, by passengers transported. These are, in order of
passengers transported: Southwest, AA, Delta, United, JetBlue, Alaska, and Spirit. As
before, I do not drop any itineraries by operating carrier.
After all of these restrictions, my sample contains 648 thousand products, and 4496
markets. This is comparable to the 2012Q3 sample. First, I present summary statistics on
the demand-side observables that are aggregated at the itinerary-level. This is to say, the
averages are not passenger-weighted, but “itinerary-weighted”. Notice that the average
fare ends up being over $500 this way. I define variables the same way as I did for the
2012Q3 sample. Notice that about 6% of links in my sample involve stopovers. This is
less than half the percentage of links that had stopovers in the 2012Q3 sample.
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Table A.1: Summary Statistics for the Observables (2015)
Mean SD Min Max
Connection 0.74 0.44 0 1
Fare ($100s) 5.1 3.05 0.4 99
Tourist Cities 0.17 0.38 0 1
Vacation/Resort Locations 0.14 0.35 0 1
Number of Direct Flights 28.3 18.7 0 65
Distance (1000s miles) 2.61 1.48 0.13 11.8
Congested Ends 0.25 0.5 0 2
Congested Connections 0.26 0.58 0 2
Hub Origin 0.32 0.47 0 1
Number of Links w/ Stopovers 0.06 0.38 0 4
Below, I present some additional summary statistics, including the passenger-weighted
fare. Notice how much lower the weighted fare is than the non-weighted one, at $420.
This means that, in our sample, the correlation between fare and number of passengers
is negative. This suggests that larger groups of people are either better at finding lower
fares (or more likely to get a group discount), or they tend to choose products with lower
fares. The average number of products per market is 131; this is the same as in the
2012Q3 sample.
Table A.2: Other Summary Statistics (2015)
Mean SD Min Max
Products Per Market 144 181 1 1830
Unconditonal Product Share (1e-5) 1.31 4.78 0.06 409
Conditional Product Share 0.01 0.02 0 1
Weighted Fare ($100s) 4.2 2.56 0.5 100
Finally, I report summary statistics for the 7 ticketing carriers included in my sample.
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Notice that Southwest offers fewer products than AA, but transports nearly 50% more
passengers than AA. Southwest’s growth from 2012 to 2015 is partially driven by the
fact that it acquired AirTran Airways, which was, in 2012, the next largest carrier after
JetBlue.
Table A.3: Summary Statistics for the Ticketing Carriers (2015)
# Passengers % Passengers # Products % Products
Southwest 914437 31.5 162512 25.1
American Airlines 645551 22.3 183761 28.4
Delta 557321 19.2 161663 25
United Airlines 400820 13.8 115809 17.9
JetBlue 177518 6.2 9071 1.5
Alaska Airlines 106869 3.7 8397 1.3
Spirit Airlines 102292 3.6 6463 1
A.1.2 Estimates using 2015Q3 Data with 2 AA Dummies
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Table A.4: Demand-Side Parameter Estimates (2015)
OLS (1-type) IV (1-type) GMM (1-type) GMM (2-types)
Constant (Tourist) -8.16∗∗∗ -5.752∗∗∗ -5.777∗∗∗ -5.672∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.008) (0.002) (0)
Connection (Tourist) -0.744∗∗∗ -1.148∗∗∗ -1.157∗∗∗ -1.145∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0)
Fare (Tourist) -0.033∗∗∗ -0.709∗∗∗ -0.713∗∗∗ -1.099∗∗∗
(0) (0.002) (0.05) (0.001)
Constant (Business) - - - -7.65∗∗∗
- - - (0.001)
Connection (Business) - - - -1.073∗∗∗
- - - (0.001)
Fare (Business) - - - -0.305∗∗∗
- - - (0.035)
Stopovers -0.263∗∗∗ -0.369∗∗∗ -0.372∗∗∗ -0.369∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0) (0)
Tourist Cities 0.136∗∗∗ 0.258∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.259∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0) (0)
Vacation/Resort Locations 0.437∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0) (0)
Direct Routes 0.007∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.015 0.015
(0) (0) (2.566) (2.327)
Distance 0.035∗∗∗ 0.218∗∗∗ 0.215∗∗∗ 0.222∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.015) (0.016)
Distance2 -0.007∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.025 0.026
(0) (0) (0.214) (0.221)
Congested Ends -0.084∗∗∗ -0.157∗∗∗ -0.158∗∗∗ -0.157∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0) (0)
Congested Connections -0.03∗∗∗ -0.047∗∗∗ -0.047∗∗∗ -0.047∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0) (0)
Hub Origin -0.114∗∗∗ -0.022∗∗∗ -0.022∗∗∗ -0.022∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0) (0)
Southwest -0.389∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0) (0)
Delta -0.518∗∗∗ 0.723∗∗∗ 0.721∗∗∗ 0.731∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.006) (0) (0)
United -0.579∗∗∗ 0.539∗∗∗ 0.54∗∗∗ 0.546∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.006) (0) (0)
American (Legacy) -0.549∗∗∗ 0.394∗∗∗ 0.395∗∗∗ 0.397∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.006) (0) (0)
American (Acquired) -0.546∗∗∗ 0.252∗∗∗ 0.254∗∗∗ 0.254∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.006) (0) (0)
JetBlue -0.073∗∗∗ 0.474∗∗∗ 0.478∗∗∗ 0.477∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0) (0)
Lambda 0.535∗∗∗ 0.446∗∗∗ 0.444∗∗∗ 0.453∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.077) (0.071)
Gamma - - - 0.597∗∗∗
- - - (0.003)
Mu - - 0.099 0.101
- - (0.184) (0.177)
Test of Over Identification (p-value) - 0 - -
1st Stage R2 - 0.32 - -
1st Stage F-test - 1363 - -
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Table A.5: Supply-Side Parameter Estimates (2015)
OLS (no Cap Con) OLS IV
Short-Haul Constant 1.163∗∗∗ 1.181∗∗∗ 1.228∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Short-Haul Distance 0.317∗∗ 0.304∗∗ 0.445∗∗∗
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
Short-Haul Distance2 0.08 0.079 0.126∗∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Short-Haul Connection -0.169∗∗∗ -0.173∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Long-Haul Constant 0.408∗∗∗ 0.442∗∗∗ 0.361∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Long-Haul Distance 0.3∗∗∗ 0.268∗∗∗ 0.599∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Long-Haul Distance2 0.031∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗
(0) (0) (0)
Long-Haul Connection -0.532∗∗∗ -0.542∗∗∗ -0.343∗∗∗
(0) (0) (0.01)
Hub (Origin, Dest or Transfer) 0.331∗∗∗ 0.322∗∗∗ 0.307∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Congested Ends 0.057∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Capacity Constrained - 0.051∗∗∗ -0.472∗∗∗
- (0) (0.01)
Southwest 0.545∗∗∗ 0.533∗∗∗ 0.521∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Delta 1.3∗∗∗ 1.291∗∗∗ 1.588∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
United 1.33∗∗∗ 1.313∗∗∗ 1.548∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
American (Legacy) 1.044∗∗∗ 1.03∗∗∗ 1.252∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
American (Acquired) 0.833∗∗∗ 0.831∗∗∗ 1.199∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
JetBlue 0.581∗∗∗ 0.604∗∗∗ 0.529∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Test of Over Identification (p-value) - - 0
1st Stage R2 - - 0.26
1st Stage F-test - - 643
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A.2 Alternate Supply-Side Estimation Techniques
A.2.1 MC Regression
There is more information I can extract from the capacity constraint data. For example,
I can make the marginal cost specification link-specific, as in Wei [2014], and introduce
a link-level capacity constraint specification, perhaps depending on the nature of the
link constrained (distance, centrality, connectedness, etc.) as opposed to an aggregated
product-level constraint specification.
In other words, I can let the marginal cost on route j be
mcj =
∑
s:s∈j
gs + µ
′wj + ωj
where gs is the marginal cost on link s, wj is a vector of route-level characteristics
that are cost-relevant but not captured in gs(.), and ωj is a route-specific fixed-effect that
captures unobservable determinants of marginal cost.
Then, as in Berry et al. [2006], I can let:
gs = η
′ws + h(ds, Fs, θ)
I can also vary the capacity constraint threshold, κ. Testing the resulting Bayesian Infor-
mation Criterion (“BIC”; see Schwarz et al. [1978]) from 2SLS, I find that the “optimal”
specification (where BIC is minimized) occurs when κ = 0.97. This results in about 1%
of products having capacity constrained links. Below, I plot BIC and the % of products
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with capacity constrained links against κ.
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Figure A.1: BIC and % Products with a Capacity Constrained Link vs. κ
A.2.2 Structural Model
In this section, I discuss the issues with solving the full supply-side model. Solving this
problem is equivalent to solving for the multipliers, µ. Since I already know B and ∇q,
once I know µ, I can solve for marginal costs, and run the same regressions as before.
Usually, in a constrained problem, one can solve for the multipliers by using informa-
tion from the constraints. The problem is that the constraints, as they are written, never
bind. In other words, I never have that Bl,:q = cl for any link l. So I cannot use the
condition that Bl,:q = cl for the capacity-constrained links in order to back-out µl.
Indeed, the empirical condition I have been using to generate “capacity-constrained”
links has been Bl,:q ≥ κ, where κ < 1. But I cannot use this either, since this constraint
is violated by different products - some have load factors slightly above κ, while others
have load factors much greater than κ.
One approach is to exploit the L additional equilibrium constraints from the aggre-
gated load factors (where L is the number of links in my sample.) In particular, I know
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that:
Loadj =
Monthly Demandj
Monthly Capacityj
=
Pr(Dj < cj) ∗ E(Dj |Dj < cj) + Pr(Dj ≥ cj) ∗ cj
cj
Where Dj =
∑
s:s∈j Ds, where s is the set of products that use the link j.
I can invert the above equations to obtain L additional conditions on prices. Since
these will not correspond perfectly to the observed prices, if I can find a way to link the
multipliers to prices in a well-grounded fashion, I can back-out the L multipliers.
One must ask then, what is the meaning of a multiplier if the constraint is regularly
violated? It seems that an approach of this nature would necessarily require data on
flight frequency (which is available but was not used in this paper), and a model that
links individual capacity-constrained flights to an aggregate monthly load factor.
An alternate approach is to do away with this “discrete”, structural notion of capacity,
in favor of a reduced-form continuous one. In particular, consider introducing a cost of
being capacity-constrained into the firm’s optimization problem:
max
p
pij =
∑
j
(pj −mcj)qj(p)− f(B, q(p), c)
This function could be non-zero only above a certain threshold, or even be discrete:
max
p
pij =
∑
j
(pj −mcj)qj(p)− ρ
∑
l
1(Bl,:q(p) ≥ κcl)
I leave this problem for future work.
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A.3 Additional Data
Since stopovers exist in coupon-level data, I cannot always know whether a coupon from
point A to B with carrier C actually went there without stopping, or had a stopover at
point S. If it’s the former, I can use the segment capacity directly from the T-100, but if
it’s the latter, I have to first determine the intermediate airport S, and use information
from the separate non-stop segments (A to S and S to B) to evaluate capacity and load
from A to B. Finding S is non-trivial; indeed, it might be possible that the same carrier
flies both a direct and non-stop flight between points A and B, and it may even fly multiple
direct routes (e.g. A to S’, S’ to B)! This problem necessitates the use of airline-specific
routing data, such as the On-Time Performance data.
The On-Time Performance database contains scheduled and actual departure and
arrival times reported by certified US air carriers that account for at least one percent
of domestic schedule passenger revenue. Moreover, it tells me the tail and flight number
of every plane and flight on each non-stop segment. Using this data, I can map the
routing of an individual plane across a month. I can also keep track of flight numbers,
and determine the intermediate stopover cities, S, that an airplane may have taken on a
direct flight between point A to B.
In order to match tail numbers to aircraft types, I need to use the publicly-available
FAA Aircraft Registry Database. Matching requires two steps: 1) finding the aircraft
manufacturer, model and series codes associated with each tail number (in the aircraft
registration master file), and 2) finding the plane type and capacity corresponding to each
unique manufacturer, model and series code (in the aircraft reference file). Note that I
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can also find out the speed of each aircraft and other characteristics, from this matching
process.
Since an airline may have multiple direct routes that it flies between point A and B
(i.e., there may be multiple stopover combinations), it is difficult to match the non-stop
segment T-100 load information with the coupon-level data of the DB1B. I leave this
problem for future work.
A.4 Extensions
A.4.1 Multimarket Contact
I can incorporate tacit collusion in multimarket contact (“MMC”) by changing the 0
entries in 4 to be a function of multimarket contact, as in Ciliberto and Williams [2014].
Together with the capacity constraints, this model may be enough to empirically test
the distinction between the competitive effect of MMC (C-MMC effect) and the mutual
forbearance (tacit collusion) effect of MMC (MF-MMC effect) pioneered by Arie et al.
[2014]. In other words, I can let:
4jr =

−∂qr∂pj if k = h
−f(mmckh)∂qr∂pj if k 6= h
where
f(mmckh) =
exp(φ1 + φ2mmckh)
1 + exp(φ1 + φ2mmckh)
∈ [0, 1]
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A.4.2 Firm’s Capacity Problem
Let an airline have ki planes of type i, each with capacity si. Let the number of type i
planes allocated to link l be given by nil. Then, the first-stage problem can be written as:
max
nil:l∈R
pi(ci, c−i, θ)
s.t. cl = f(dl)
∑
i∈n
sinil
∑
l
nil ≤ ki
Where f(dl) captures the idea that planes on a shorter route can fly more frequently
and, hence, deliver more capacity: f ′(dl) < 0.
Empirically, I see the types of planes allocated to each route, and can even follow
individual planes (identified via their tail number) across trips. Then, I can solve for the
fixed costs of routes with a moment inequality approach (see, for example, Pakes et al.
[2007] and Holmes [2011]). I also leave this as an extension for future work.
A.4.3 Pricing Constraint
While this paper has largely been concerned with capacity as a network constraint, there
is an additional network constraint that should not be ignored. In particular, consider
the price of a trip with United form Philadelphia to London that has a layover in New
York. If the price of the flight between Philadelphia and New York with United plus the
price of the flight between New York and London were less than the price of the trip with
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both of these bundled, an individual could easily (and at no additional cost74) purchase
the two round trip flights separately.
In other words, airlines are not free to choose whatever price they want for all of their
products — indeed, as they lower the price of products, they could induce zero demand
on other products they offer. They face a constrained maximization problem in prices.
The firm’s problem would be re-written as follows:
max
p
pij =
∑
j
(pj −mcj)qj(p)
s.t. p ≤ Ap
Bq(p) ≤ c
Where the matrix A consists of 1’s and 0’s that capture the network constraint that
the cost of a trip with a stop must not exceed the combined prices of the individual legs.
Letting aij be the ij-th element of the matrix A− I, I get the following modifications to
the firm’s FOC condition:
qj(p) +
∑
r∈Ff
(pr −mcr)∂qr(p)
∂pj
+
∑
l
λlalj +
∑
l
µl
∑
k
blk
∂qk(p)
∂pj
= 0
Re-writing the above in matrix form, and including the complementary slackness condi-
74These arguments could be extended to include itineraries with multiple ticketing carriers, where there
is some cost of switching carriers, capturing, say, the probability of a missed connection. The arguments
above are for tickets with the same carrier, and it seems reasonable to assume that the disutility is
negligible.
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tions:
q −4(p−mc) + (A− I)Tλ+ [(∇q)TBT ]µ = 0
λT [(A− I)p] = 0
µT [c−Bq] = 0
Then, as before, the first line can be re-written as:
mc = p−4−1(q − (A− I)Tλ− [(∇q)TBT ]µ)
Empirically, I will face a similar problem with pricing constraints. In particular, while
I see a distribution of prices for routes, I do not know when tickets were purchased, or for
what class of travel they were purchased for. One way to get around this is to assume a
route, r, is empirically price constrained (λr > 0) if the ratio of the average monthly
fare that route over its single-link-price components exceeds a threshold, κ2 ≤ 1:
pr∑
j:j∈r pj
≥ κ2
The question of how to know solve for these multipliers, λ, remains for future work.
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B Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 Lifecycle Job Search Model
Below, I outline the model and simulation results used to match the hump-shaped lifecycle
profile of job search in the ATUS data identified by Aguiar et al. [2013]. I use the following
three datasets:
1. CPS: Data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) is pooled to obtain unem-
ployment rates and unemployment transition rates (as in Choi et al. [2015]). I use
the 2013 Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) to obtain the percentage
of workers with employer-sponsored health insurance.
2. ATUS (2003-2013): The American Time Use Survey (ATUS) is the main dataset
that provides information on the time use of Americans - in particular, of a subset of
CPS respondents. It details their daily schedules down to the minute. Unemployed
job-searchers are unfortunately only a small subset of the ATUS respondents; over 10
years, I only have data on 6K individuals who engaged in any job search. Moreover,
I cannot capture all the cohort effects present in this 10-year sample of respondents;
yearly FE controls do not suffice.
3. MEPS (2011-2012, round 16): The Medical Expenditures Survey (MEPS) provides
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information on self-reported health status and medical health expenditures. I divide
individuals in this dataset into age bins, and obtain a distribution of medical health
expenditures conditional on age and self-reported health status. In this way, I am
able to estimate a health transition matrix.
The model can be summarized by the following value functions of unemployment, and
employment:
V uj,h = maxcj ,sj
uh(cj , 100− sj) + β
∑
h′
Pr(h′|h, j)[α(sj)
∫
max{V uj+1,h′ , V ej+1,h′ (w)}dF (w) + (1− α(sj))V uj+1,h′ ]
V ej,h(w) = maxcj
uh(cj , 60) + β
∑
h′
Pr(h′|h,w, j)[δV uj+1,h′ + (1− δ)V ej+1,h′ (wj+1)]
The following (separable) utility function:
uh(c, l) =
c1−σ1
1− σ2 + ψ
l1−σ2
1− σ2 + h
The following search (production) function:
α : [0, 100]→ [0, 1]
α(s) = (
s
100
)κ
And the associated first order conditions for optimal search effort.
u2(cj , lj)
α′(sj)
= βE[
∫
max{V ej+1, V uj+1} − V uj+1]
∂s∗
∂(V e − V u) > 0
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If this (benchmark) asset accumulation model with endogenous search is not privy to
any health considerations — i.e., health insurance is not tied to employment, then the
resulting life-cycle profile of job search is decreasing, as evidenced in the other OECD
countries.
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Figure B.1: Benchmark - No Health Considerations
On the other hand, if I introduce health insurance considerations - healthcare is tied
to being employed, and if one is not insured they must bear the cost of a random draw
from the estimated MEPS health expenditure distribution, conditional on health status
that evolves according to the estimated health transition matrix - the resulting lifecycle
profile of job search and hump-shaped and matches the ATUS data closely.
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Figure B.2: MEPS Health Expenditure Data and Health Transitions
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B.2 Proofs and Derivations
B.2.1 Proof of Certainty Equivalent given CARA Utility and Normal
Shocks
I want to find CE(x) such that E[−e−γx] = −e−γCE(x). Let x ∼ N(x¯, V ). Then,
E[−e−γx] = 1√
2piV
∫
−e−γxe− (x−x¯)
2
2V dx
=
1√
2piV
∫
−e− 2γxV+(x−x¯)
2
2V dx
=
1√
2piV
∫
−e− 2γxV+x
2−2xx¯+x¯2+(γ2V 2−γ2V 2)+(−2γV x¯+2γV x¯)
2V dx
=
1√
2piV
∫
−e− (x−(x¯−γV ))
2−γ2V 2+2γx¯V )
2V dx
= −e−−γ
2V+2γx¯
2
∫
1√
2piV
e−
(x−(x¯−γV ))2
2V dx
= −e−−γ
2V+2γx¯
2
= −e−γ(− 12γV+x¯)
⇒ CE(x) = x¯− 1
2
γV
B.2.2 Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. If u is CARA, then it must necessarily be of the exponential form u(x) = −e−γx.
Then, letting fh(x) be the distribution of random medical expenditure shocks given health
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status h,
x∗∗h = 2 ⇒ −e−γ[T (y)−Rh] >
∫
−e−γ[T (y)−x]fh(x)dx
⇒ −e−γ[T (y)−Rh] > −e−γ[T (y)]
∫
eγxfh(x)dx
⇒ e−γ[T (y)−Rh]+γ[T (y)] <
∫
eγxfh(x)dx
⇒ eγRh <
∫
eγxfh(x)dx
⇒ Rh < 1
γ
log
∫
eγxfh(x)dx
⇒ ξh < 1
γm¯h
log
∫
eγxfh(x)dx− 1
Since this result is independent of y, substituting b for y delivers the same result, in other
words:
x∗h = 2⇒ eγRh <
∫
eγxfh(x)dx
This demonstrates equivalency between x∗h and x
∗∗
h .
Next, when medical expenditure shocks are normally distributed, I have that:
x∗∗h = 2 ⇐⇒ u(T (y)−Rh) > Em˜hu(T (y)− m˜h) = u(T (y)− m¯h −
1
2
γV ar(m˜h))
⇐⇒ T (y)−Rh > T (y)− m¯h − 1
2
γV ar(m˜h)
⇐⇒ Rh < m¯h + 1
2
γV ar(m˜h)
⇐⇒ (1 + ξh)m¯h < m¯h + 1
2
γV ar(m˜h)
⇐⇒ 1 + ξh < 1 + 1
2
γ
V ar(m˜h)
m¯h
⇐⇒ ξh < 1
2
γ
V ar(m˜h)
m¯h
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Repeating the same exercise for x∗h at T (b) delivers the desired result.
B.2.3 Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. Let CE(y, x) be the certainty equivalent of the gamble over the random medical
shock x at the wealth level y, in other words:
∫
u(y−x)f(x)dx = u(CE(y, x)) (I omit the
subscript h in this proof since this result holds independently for both health status types).
Since u exhibits DARA, I have that (y−CE(y, x)) is decreasing in y. Then, since T (y) >
T (b) (by innocuous assumption), I have that T (y)− CE(T (y), x) < T (b)− CE(T (b), x).
Then the result immediately follows from:
x∗∗h = 2 ⇒ u(T (y)−R) >
∫
u(T (y)− x)f(x)dx = u(CE(T (y), x))
⇒ T (y)−R > CE(T (y), x)
⇒ R < T (y)− CE(T (y), x) < T (b)− CE(T (b), x)
⇒ x∗h = 2
B.2.4 Derivation of Explicit Value Functions of Unemployment
Expanding,
Uyh = (1− α)[vh(b, x∗) + Uyh ] + α

vh(y,1)−e+ δ1+r [vh(b,1)+U
y
h
]
r+δ
, if HI offered and NSC holds
vh(y,1)+
δ+q
1+r
[vh(b,1)+U
y
h
]
r+δ+q
, if HI offered and NSC does not hold
vh(y,x
∗∗)−e+ δ
1+r
[vh(b,x
∗)+Uy
h
]
r+δ
, if HI not offered and NSC holds
vh(y,x
∗∗)+ δ+q
1+r
[vh(b,x
∗)+Uy
h
]
r+δ+q
, if HI not offered and NSC does not hold
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Simplifying,
Uyh =
1− α
α
vh(b, x
∗) +

vh(y,1)−e+ δ1+r [vh(b,1)+U
y
h
]
r+δ
, if HI offered and NSC holds
vh(y,1)+
δ+q
1+r
[vh(b,1)+U
y
h
]
r+δ+q
, if HI offered and NSC does not hold
vh(y,x
∗∗)−e+ δ
1+r
[vh(b,x
∗)+Uy
h
]
r+δ
, if HI not offered and NSC holds
vh(y,x
∗∗)+ δ+q
1+r
[vh(b,x
∗)+Uy
h
]
r+δ+q
, if HI not offered and NSC does not hold
Now, notice that each case can be solved explicitly for Uyh . For example, in the first case:
(r + δ)Uyh = (r + δ)(
1− α
α
)vh(b, x
∗) + (vh(y, 1)− e+
δ
1 + r
[vh(b, 1) + U
y
h ])
[(1 + r)(r + δ)− δ]Uyh = (1 + r)(r + δ)(
1− α
α
)vh(b, x
∗) + (1 + r)(vh(y, 1)− e) + δvh(b, 1)
U
y1h
h =
(1 + r)(r + δ)( 1−α
α
)vh(b, x
∗) + (1 + r)(vh(y, 1)− e) + δvh(b, 1)
r(1 + δ + r)
In the second case:
(r + δ + q)Uyh = (r + δ + q)(
1− α
α
)vh(b, x
∗) + (vh(y, 1) +
δ + q
1 + r
[vh(b, 1) + U
y
h ])
[(1 + r)(r + δ + q)− (δ + q)]Uyh = (1 + r)(r + δ + q)(
1− α
α
)vh(b, x
∗) + (1 + r)(vh(y, 1)) + (δ + q)vh(b, 1)
U
y16h
h =
(1 + r)(r + δ + q)( 1−α
α
)vh(b, x
∗) + (1 + r)(vh(y, 1)) + (δ + q)vh(b, 1)
r(1 + δ + r + q)
In the third case:
(r + δ)Uyh = (r + δ)(
1− α
α
)vh(b, x
∗) + (vh(y, x∗∗)− e+
δ
1 + r
[vh(b, x
∗) + Uyh ])
[(1 + r)(r + δ)− δ]Uyh = (1 + r)(r + δ)(
1− α
α
)vh(b, x
∗) + (1 + r)(vh(y, x∗∗)− e) + δvh(b, x∗)
U
y0h
h =
(1 + r)(r + δ)( 1−α
α
)vh(b, x
∗) + (1 + r)(vh(y, x∗∗)− e) + δvh(b, x∗)
r(1 + δ + r)
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In the fourth case:
(r + δ + q)Uyh = (r + δ + q)(
1− α
α
)vh(b, x
∗) + (vh(y, x∗∗)− e+
δ + q
1 + r
[vh(b, x
∗) + Uyh ])
[(1 + r)(r + δ + q)− (δ + q)]Uyh = (1 + r)(r + δ + q)(
1− α
α
)vh(b, x
∗) + (1 + r)(vh(y, x∗∗)− e) + (δ + q)vh(b, x∗)
U
y06h
h =
(1 + r)(r + δ + q)( 1−α
α
)vh(b, x
∗) + (1 + r)(vh(y, x∗∗)− e) + (δ + q)vh(b, x∗)
r(1 + δ + r + q)
Notice that, throughout, the subscript 6 h on the superscript y denotes the value function when the NSC does
not hold for workers of health status h.
B.2.5 Derivation of No-Shirk-Conditions
Case 1: Firm offers HI
V
H
h (1) = V
L
h (1)
vh(y, 1)− e + δU
y1h
h
(1)
r + δ
=
vh(y, 1) + (δ + q)U
y16h
h
(1)
r + δ + q
qvh(y, 1) = (r + δ)(δ + q)U
y16h
h
(1)− δ(r + δ + q)Uy
1
h
h
(1) + (r + δ + q)e
qvh(y, 1) =
1
1 + r
[rqvh(b, 1) + (r + δ)(δ + q)U
y16h
h
− δ(r + δ + q)Uy
1
h
h
] + (r + δ + q)e
(1 + r)qvh(y, 1) = rqvh(b, 1) + (r + δ)(δ + q)U
y16h
h
− δ(r + δ + q)Uy
1
h
h
+ (1 + r)(r + δ + q)e
(1 + r)qvh(y, 1) = rqvh(b, 1) + (r + δ)(δ + q)(
(1 + r)(r + δ + q)( 1−α
α
)vh(b, x
∗) + (1 + r)(vh(y, 1)) + (δ + q)vh(b, 1)
r(1 + δ + r + q)
)−
−δ(r + δ + q)( (1 + r)(r + δ)(
1−α
α
)vh(b, x
∗) + (1 + r)(vh(y, 1)− e) + δvh(b, 1)
r(1 + δ + r)
) +
+(1 + r)(r + δ + q)e
Where the fourth line follows from U
y1h
h (1) =
1
1+r [vh(b, 1) + U
y
h ].
Solving, (in Matlab), I get:
0 =
(1 + r)(q[v(y, 1)− v(b, 1)− (1−αα )v(b, x∗)]− e(1 + δ + q + r))
r(1 + δ + r)(1 + δ + q + r)
⇒ v(y, 1) = v(b, 1) + (1− α
α
)v(b, x∗) + (1 + δ + q + r)e/q
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Case 2: Firm does not offer HI
V
H
h (0) = V
L
h (0)
vh(y, x
∗∗)− e + δUy
0
h
h
(x∗)
r + δ
=
vh(y, x
∗∗) + (δ + q)U
y06h
h
(x∗)
r + δ + q
qvh(y, x
∗∗
) = (r + δ)(δ + q)U
y06h
h
(x
∗
)− δ(r + δ + q)Uy
0
h
h
(x
∗
) + (r + δ + q)e
qvh(y, x
∗∗
) =
1
1 + r
[rqvh(b, x
∗
) + (r + δ)(δ + q)U
y06h
h
− δ(r + δ + q)Uy
0
h
h
] + (r + δ + q)e
(1 + r)qvh(y, x
∗∗
) = rqvh(b, x
∗
) + (r + δ)(δ + q)U
y06h
h
− δ(r + δ + q)Uy
0
h
h
+ (1 + r)(r + δ + q)e
(1 + r)qvh(y, x
∗∗
) = rqvh(b, x
∗
) +
+(r + δ)(δ + q)
(1 + r)(r + δ + q)( 1−α
α
)vh(b, x
∗) + (1 + r)(vh(y, x∗∗)− e) + (δ + q)vh(b, x∗)
r(1 + δ + r + q)
−
−δ(r + δ + q)( (1 + r)(r + δ)(
1−α
α
)vh(b, x
∗) + (1 + r)(vh(y, x∗∗)− e) + δvh(b, x∗)
r(1 + δ + r)
) +
+(1 + r)(r + δ + q)e
Where the fourth line follows from U
y0h
h (x
∗) = 11+r [vh(b, x
∗) + Uyh ].
Solving, (in Matlab), I get:
0 =
(1 + r)(q[v(y, x∗∗)− 1αv(b, x∗)]− e(1 + δ + q + r))
r(1 + δ + r)(1 + δ + q + r)
⇒ v(y, x∗∗) = 1
α
v(b, x∗) + (1 + δ + q + r)e/q
B.2.6 Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. From Theorem 2.1, I have that if u exhibits CARA, x∗h ⇐⇒ x∗∗h . Then, subtract-
ing the NSC of the good-health worker from the NSC of the bad-health worker, I can
write:
vg(yg, xg)− vb(yb, xb) = 1
α
[vg(b, xg)− vb(b, xb)] (B.2.1)
Where x∗∗h = x
∗
h = xh.
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Case 1: xb = xg = 2. Then, the equation above becomes:
u(yg −Rg)− u(yb −Rb) = 1
α
[u(b−Rg)− u(b−Rb)]
−e−γ[yg−Rg ] + e−γ[yb−Rb] = 1
α
[−e−γ[b−Rg ] + e−γ[b−Rb]]
(−eγRg)(e−γyg) + (eγRb)(e−γyb) = 1
α
(e−γb)[−eγRg + eγRb ]
Now consider, for a proof by contradiction, that yg ≤ yb. Then:
(−eγRg )(e−γyg ) + (eγRb)(e−γyb) ≤ (−eγRg )(e−γyb) + (eγRb)(e−γyb) = e−γyb [−eγRg + eγRb ]
⇒ 1
α
(e−γb)[−eγRg + eγRb ] ≤ e−γyb [−eγRg + eγRb ]
⇒ 1
α
(e−γb) ≤ e−γyb
⇒ eγyb ≤ αeγb ≤ eγb
Where the third line follows since Rg < Rb ⇒ [−eγRg + eγRb ] > 0. Since α ≤ 1, and
yb > b, I get the desired contradiction.
Case 2: xb = xg = 0. Then, the equation above becomes:
u(yg − m˜g)− u(yb − m˜b) =
1
α
[u(b− m˜g)− u(b− m˜b)]
−
∫
e−γ[yg−xg ]f(xg)dxg +
∫
e−γ[yb−xb]f(xb)dxb =
1
α
[−
∫
e−γ[b−xg ]f(xg)dxg +
∫
e−γ[b−xb]f(xb)dxb]
(e−γyg )(
∫
−eγxgf(xg)dxg) + (e−γyb )(
∫
eγxbf(xb)dxb) =
1
α
(e−γb)[−
∫
eγxgf(xg)dxg +
∫
eγxbf(xb)dxb]
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Again consider, for a proof by contradiction, that yg ≤ yb. Then:
(e
−γyg )(
∫
−eγxg f(xg)dxg) + (e−γyb )(
∫
e
γxbf(xb)dxb) ≤ (e−γyb )(
∫
−eγxg f(xg)dxg) + (e−γyb )(
∫
e
γxbf(xb)dxb)
= e
−γyb [−
∫
e
γxg f(xg)dxg +
∫
e
γxbf(xb)dxb]
⇒ 1
α
(e
−γb
)[−
∫
e
γxg f(xg)dxg +
∫
e
γxbf(xb)dxb] ≤ e−γyb [−
∫
e
γxg f(xg)dxg +
∫
e
γxbf(xb)dxb]
⇒ 1
α
(e
−γb
) ≤ e−γyb
⇒ eγyb ≤ αeγb ≤ eγb
Where the fourth line follows since m˜b first order scholastically dominates m˜g, which
implies that Fb(x) < Fg(x)∀x (with a strict inequality for some x) and, hence, that∫
eγxbf(xb)dxb >
∫
eγxgf(xg)dxg. Since α ≤ 1, and yb > b, I get the desired contradiction.
Case 3: xb = 2 and xg = 0. Then, the equation above becomes:
u(yg − m˜g)− u(yb −Rb) = 1
α
[u(b− m˜g)− u(b−Rb)]
−
∫
e−γ[yg−xg]f(xg)dxg + e−γ[yb−Rb] =
1
α
[−
∫
e−γ[b−xg ]f(xg)dxg + e−γ[b−Rb]]
(e−γyg )(−
∫
eγxgf(xg)dxg) + (e
−γyb)(eγRb) =
1
α
(e−γb)[−
∫
eγxgf(xg)dxg + e
γRb ]
Again consider, for a proof by contradiction, that yg ≤ yb. Then:
(e−γyg )(−
∫
eγxgf(xg)dxg) + (e
−γyb)(eγRb) ≤ (e−γyb)(−
∫
eγxgf(xg)dxg) + (e
−γyb)(eγRb)
= e−γyb [−
∫
eγxgf(xg)dxg) + e
γRb ]
⇒ 1
α
(e−γb)[−
∫
eγxgf(xg)dxg + e
γRb ] ≤ e−γyb [−
∫
eγxgf(xg)dxg) + e
γRb ]
⇒ 1
α
(e−γb) ≤ e−γyb
⇒ eγyb ≤ αeγb ≤ eγb
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Where the fourth line follows since:
xg = 0⇒ −
∫
e−γ[yg−xg ]f(xg)dxg > −e−γ[yg−Rg ]
e−γyg
∫
eγxgf(xg)dxg < e
−γygeγRg∫
eγxgf(xg)dxg < e
γRg < eγRb
⇒ −
∫
eγxgf(xg)dxg + e
γRb > 0
Since α ≤ 1, and yb > b, I get the desired contradiction.
Case 4: xb = 0 and xg = 2. Then, the equation above becomes:
u(yg −Rg)− u(yb − m˜b) = 1
α
[u(b−Rg)− u(b− m˜b)]
−e−γ[yg−Rg ] +
∫
e−γ[yb−xb]f(xb)dxb =
1
α
[−e−γ[b−Rg ] +
∫
e−γ[b−xb]f(xb)dxb]
(e−γyg)(−eγRg) + (e−γyb)(
∫
eγxbf(xb)dxb) =
1
α
(e−γb)[−eγRg +
∫
eγxbf(xb)dxb]
Again consider, for a proof by contradiction, that yg ≤ yb. Then:
(e−γyg)(−eγRg) + (e−γyb)(eγxbf(xb)dxb) ≤ (e−γyb)(−eγRg) + (e−γyb)(
∫
eγxbf(xb)dxb)
= e−γyb [−eγRg +
∫
eγxbf(xb)dxb]
⇒ 1
α
(e−γb)[−eγRg +
∫
eγxbf(xb)dxb] ≤ e−γyb [−eγRg +
∫
eγxbf(xb)dxb]
⇒ 1
α
(e−γb) ≤ e−γyb
⇒ eγyb ≤ αeγb ≤ eγb
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Where the fourth line follows since:
xg = 2⇒ eγRg <
∫
eγxgf(xg)dxg <
∫
eγxbf(xb)dxb
⇒ −eγRg +
∫
eγxbf(xb)dxb > 0
Due to first-order stochastic dominance. Since α ≤ 1, and yb > b, I get the desired
contradiction.
B.2.7 Proof of Theorem 5
Proof. From Theorem 1, I have that if u exhibits CARA, x∗h ⇐⇒ x∗∗h .
Case 1: x∗h = x
∗∗
h = 2. Then, the above equality becomes u(y
1) − u(y0 − R) =
u(b)− u(b−R). Then:
−e−γy1 + e−γ[y0−R] = −e−γb + e−γ[b−R]
eγR[e−γy
0 − e−γb] = e−γy1 − e−γb
e−γy
0 − e−γb > e−γy1 − e−γb
−γy0 > −γy1
y0 < y1
Where the third line follows from eγR > 1 and [e−γy0 − e−γb] < 0 since y0 > b.
Case 2: x∗h = x
∗∗
h = 0. Then, the above equality becomes u(y
1) − Eu(y0 − m˜) =
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u(b)− Eu(b− m˜). Then:
−e−γy1 +
∫
e−γ[y
0−x]f(x)dx = −e−γb +
∫
e−γ[b−x]f(x)dx
−e−γy1 + e−γy0
∫
e−γ[−x]f(x)dx = −e−γb + e−γb
∫
e−γ[−x]f(x)dx
Let
∫
eγxf(x)dx = Q. Notice that since x ≥ 0 (medical shocks cannot be negative), and
there exist some x such that x > 0 (since m¯h > 0), I must have that Q > 1. Then the
proof is as in Case 1:
−e−γy1 + e−γy0Q = −e−γb + e−γbQ
Q[e−γy
0 − e−γb] = e−γy1 − e−γb
y0 < y1
B.2.8 Proof of Theorem 6
Proof. From Theorem 2.2, I have that if u exhibits DARA, x∗∗h ⇒ x∗h.
Case 1: x∗h = x
∗∗
h = 2. Then, the above equality becomes u(y
1) − u(y0 − R) =
u(b)− u(b−R). Then, by concavity of u and y1 > b, I must have that y1 > y0.
Case 2: x∗h = x
∗∗
h = 0. Then, the above equality becomes u(y
1) − Eu(y0 − m˜) =
u(b) − Eu(b − m˜). As before, let CE(y, x) denote the certainty equivalent of the no-
insurance gamble over the random medial expenditure shocks x at the wealth level y.
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Then:
u(y1)− u(CE(y0, x)) = u(b)− u(CE(b,m)) (B.2.2)
For a proof by contradiction, assume that y1 ≤ y0. Then:
u(b)− u(CE(b,m)) = u(y1)− u(CE(y0, x))
≤ u(y0)− u(CE(y0, x))
Since u is DARA, I have that y0 − CE(y0, x) < b− CE(b, x). Concavity of u and y0 > b
delivers the desired contradiction.
Case 3: x∗h = 2 and x
∗∗
h = 0. Then, the above equality becomes u(y
1)−Eu(y0−m˜) =
u(b)−u(b−R). Since x∗∗h = 2⇒ Eu(y0−m˜) > u(y0−R), I have that u(y1)−u(y0−R) >
u(y1)−Eu(y0 − m˜), so u(y1)− u(y0 −R) > u(b)− u(b−R). Then, the proof is the same
as in Case 1.
B.2.9 Proof of Theorem 14
Proof. Expanding (2.3.19), I get:
u(y1)−max{u(y0+S(y0)−R),Eu(y0−mh−P (y)} = u(b)−max{u(b+S(b)−R),Eu(b−mh−P (b)}
Exploiting linear utility as a consequence of risk-neutrality, I get:
y1 − y0 −max{S(y0)−R,−m¯h − P (y0)} = −max{S(b)−R,−m¯h − P (b)}
y1 − y0 = max{S(y0)−R,−m¯h − P (y0)} −max{S(b)−R,−m¯h − P (b)}
y0 − y1 = max{R− S(y0), m¯h + P (y0)} −max{R− S(b), m¯h + P (b)}
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Since S(y0) < S(b) and P (y0) > P (b) (since y0 > b), I have that R−S(y0) > R−S(b) and
m¯h + P (y
0) > m¯h + P (b). Since the max operator is just an upper envelope, it preserves
the inequality. In other words, y0 − y1 > 0. This completes the proof.
B.2.10 Proof of Theorem 15
Proof. From Theorem 1, I have that:
x∗Bh = 2 ⇐⇒ x∗∗Bh = 2 ⇐⇒ RBh <
1
γ
log
∫
eγxfh(x)dx
And from Theorem 8, I have that:
x∗ACAh = 2 ⇐⇒ RACA <
1
γ
log
∫
eγxfh(x)dx+ S(b) + P (b)
x∗∗ACAh = 2 ⇐⇒ RACA <
1
γ
log
∫
eγxfh(x)dx+ S(y) + P (y)
Then,
x∗Bb = 2 ⇒ RBb <
1
γ
log
∫
eγxfb(x)dx
⇒ RACA < 1
γ
log
∫
eγxfb(x)dx
⇒ RACA < 1
γ
log
∫
eγxfb(x)dx+ S(b) + P (b)
⇒ x∗ACAb = 2
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I can show the same for x∗∗ACAb . To prove the second line,
x∗ACAb = 0 ⇒ RACA >
1
γ
log
∫
eγxfb(x)dx+ S(b) + P (b)
⇒ RACA > 1
γ
log
∫
eγxfb(x)dx
⇒ RBb >
1
γ
log
∫
eγxfb(x)dx
⇒ x∗Bb = 0
Finally, from Theorem 10, I have that x∗ACAb = 0⇒ x∗ACAg = 0. Analogous proof follows
for the third line, at x∗∗ACAb .
B.3 Simulation
In this section, I simulate how changes in the exogenous variables PW (y), S(y,R
EX),
T (y), PE(n), etc.
75 will affect the equilibrium offer of wage and health insurance by the
representative firm as well as the decision to self-insure by individuals. I hope to establish
cut-off regions where firms will change their choice of offering health insurance, or firms
will stop ensuring that certain workers exert high effort on the job, or individuals change
their self-insurance decision.76
I impose the following functional forms: S(y,REX) = k2R
EX − k3y, PW (y) = k1y,
T (y) = y, and PE(n) = K where K is a constant. I can later make K(n), where n would
represent the number of employed workers in the steady-state, n = ng + nb.
75Notice that mh is just the expected medical expenditure given to us by the data, firms do not enter
into the health insurance exchange market, they just absorb the costs of the employees they provide
insurance to, in a risk-neutral fashion.
76As an extension for future work, one could also make q endogenous after introducing a cost-of-
monitoring function f(q), or make q(e) and endogenize cost-of-effort e. Moreover, one could let health
status change over time, introduce firm heterogeneity, make b(y) or make COBRA continuation not occur
after firing due to being caught shirking (with probability q).
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B.3.1 Firm Offers HI: Support for Theorem 12
In this subsection, I abstract from the firm’s decision to provide HI by focusing solely on
the subcase where it does, indeed, offer HI. The simulations below support Theorem 12:
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Figure B.3: HI Offered: ACA Effects on HI Coverage while Unemployed
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(a) Firm Profit
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(b) Wage Offer
Figure B.4: HI Offered: ACA Effects on Profits and Wage
The darker the color, the higher the wage, profit or case number. I denote a special
case 2.5 where both cases 2 and 3 can be supported in equilibrium-notice that it is in
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this area that the firm can exploit multiple equilibria to choose the “bad” equilibrium for
individuals (such that the good health remain uninsured), at a lower equilibrium wage
and, consequently, higher profits.
What drives this? Notice first that I proved that y1g > y
1
b—this is to say, it is the
good health workers’ NSC that is binding. Consequently, when it becomes optimal for
them not to purchase HI, the firm can get away with offering them a lower wage (along
with health insurance), knowing that this health insurance offer is now more available
since I are stuck in the “bad” equilibrium where only the bad-health workers buy health
insurance (recall that this drives up the price of health insurance REX).
B.3.2 Complete Firm Decision:
Next, I take into account the firm’s decision regarding whether or not to provide HI (with
the stipulation that it faces a penalty if it chooses not to provide HI). Note that the
simulations below use slightly different parameter configurations than the simulations in
the previous subsection.
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Figure B.5: Complete Decision: ACA Effects on Firm’s Choice of HI offer
(a) Firm Profit (b) Wage Offer
Figure B.6: Complete Decision: ACA Effects on Profits and Wage
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(a) Good Health Self-Insurance Decision (b) Bad Health Self-Insurance Decision
Figure B.7: Complete Decision: ACA Effects on Self-Insurance Decision of Unemployed
Workers
(a) Good Health Self-Insurance Decision (b) Bad Health Self-Insurance Decision
Figure B.8: Complete Decision: ACA Effects on Self-Insurance Decision of Employed
Workers
In the plot describing the firm’s choice of whether or not to offer HI, black indicates
that the firm offers HI while white indicates that the firm does not offer HI. In the self-
insurance decision plots, black indicates that the individual self-insures, grey indicates
that the individual receives HI from their firm, and white indicates that the individual
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remains uninsured.
Notice that as subsidies increase (moving right to left on the x-axis), the firm offers
health insurance, earns smaller profits, and offers a higher equilibrium wage-which is
consistent with some of the theorems proved in the main body of the paper. The firm’s
offer of HI can be explained as follows: when subsidies are very high, the firm offering HI
does not have so much of a “double-edged sword” effect discussed above, since incentives
to shirk and maintain existing HI for an additional period (due to COBRA continuation
payments) is diminished.
The existence of such regions supports the idea that the government can induce higher
wages by increasing premium subsidies; such subsidies induce firms to offer HI and indi-
viduals to self-insure, and help satisfy the “effective premiums under the ACA lower than
in the benchmark” condition required for my wage-increase results. I add an additional
plot below to further support higher wages under the ACA:
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Figure B.9: Wage as Subsidies Decrease, Plotted Against Constant Benchmark Wage
Notice how wages are higher under the ACA above a certain threshold of premium
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subsidies (subsidies increase right to left), as predicted by my Efficiency Wage Theorems
(the small spike in wage occurs when the firm goes from offering HI to not offering HI).
In other words, here is the “cheap” intuition for the Efficiency Wage Result: as sub-
sidies increases, employers are more inclined to offer HI to their workers. In turn, this
changes the composition of health status of individuals using the insurance exchanges,
driving premiums down. In turn, the relative cost of unemployment goes down, forcing
firms to increase wages in order to induce good (no-shirk) behavior.
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C Appendix to Chapter 3
C.1 General Equilibrium
C.1.1 Worker’s Problem
As an extension, consider what happens if the firm’s wage-offer function is endogenous.
Since no firm will offer a wage below wR (it will be rejected for sure), I have that F¯ (wR) =
1. As a result, the steady-state distribution of unemployed workers will be:
u =
δ
δ + λs∗F¯ (wR)
=
λ
δ + λs∗
And
u
1− u =
δ
λs∗
(C.1.1)
The steady-state distribution of employed workers will be given by the implicit equa-
203
tion:
λus∗[F (w)− F (wR)] = δ(1− u)G(w) + λ(1− u)F¯ (w)
∫ w
s∗(x)g(x)dx
δF (w) = δG(w) + λF¯ (w)
∫ w
s∗(x)dG(x)
Solving this integral (2nd order Volterra) equation must be done numerically. However, I
can re-arrange the above equation to get:
F (w)−G(w)
F¯ (w)
=
λ
δ
∫ w
s∗(x)dG(x) > 0
Which shows that G(w) (first-order) stochastically dominates F (w).
Equating flow in with flow out of employment at wage equal to w > wR, I get:
λus∗f(w) + λ(1− u)f(w)
∫ w
s∗(x)g(x)dx = [δ + λs∗(w)F¯ (w)][(1− u)g(w)]
δf(w) + λf(w)
∫ w
s∗(x)dG(x) = [δ + λs∗(w)F¯ (w)]g(w)
δf(w) = δg(w) + λ[F¯ (w)s∗(w)− f(w)
∫ w
s∗(x)dG(x)]
Which, as expected, is just the derivative of the above 2nd order Volterra equation.
C.1.2 Firm’s Problem
Next, we must derive an expression for the steady-state number of workers hired at a
posted wage w, l(w). Let there be N total workers in the economy, then:
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l(w) = lim
→0
N [
G(w + )−G(w)
F (w + )− F (w) ]
The firm must receive equal profit from all offered wages (or else it would not offer
said wages in equilibrium). In other words, we must have:
pi(w) = (p− w)l(w) = p¯i ∀w
In other words, the steps to solve the general equilibrium model are as follows:
1. Given parameters, guess a wage distribution function
2. Solve for s∗(x) — this involves solving an integral equation
3. Solve for G(x) — this also involves solving an integral equation
4. Check if pi(w) = p¯i ∀w. Repeat.
C.1.3 Closed-Form Solution
Consider a simplification that provides an explicit solution. In particular, let us extract
the important contribution of endogenous search effort, namely, that it decreases with
wage.
To this end, assume that
s(w) = 1− w
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where I have normalized the support of w: w ∈ [0, 1].
Then, the integral equation with G(w) reduces to:
δF (w) = δG(w) + λF¯ (w)[
∫ w
dG(x)−
∫ w
xdG(x)]
= δG(w) + λF¯ (w)[G(w)− wG(w) + G(w)]
= G(w)[δ + λF¯ (w)(1− w)] + λF¯ (w)G(w)
Where I have used the fact that:
∫ w
xdG(x) = −w(1−G(w)) +
∫ w
(1−G(x))dx
= wG(w)−G(w)
where G(w) is the antiderivative of G(w).
Re-arranging, I get:
δF (w)
λF¯ (w)
= G(w)
δ + λF¯ (w)(1− w)
λF¯ (w)
+ G(w)
a(w) = G(w)b(w) + G(w)
a′(w) = G′(w)b(w) +G(w)b′(w) +G(w)
a′(w)
b(w)
= G′(w) +G(w)
1 + b′(w)
b(w)
q(w) = y′ + yp(w)
Where I have renamed variables to simplify the final expression. Next, let µ(w) =
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e
∫
p(w)dw. We can solve this ODE:
µ(w)[y′ + p(w)y] = µ(w)q(w)
[µ(w)y]′ = µ(w)q(w)
G(w) =
∫
µ(w)q(w)dw + C
µ(w)
Assuming G(w) and F (w) are both differentiable, I get:
δf(w) = g(w)[δ + λF¯ (w)(1− w)] +G(w)λ[−f(w)(1− w)− F¯ (w)]...
− λf(w)G(w) + λF¯ (w)G(w)
f(w)[δ +G(w)λ(1− w) + λG(w)] = g(w)[δ + λF¯ (w)(1− w)]
l(w) =
δ +G(w)λ(1− w) + λG(w)
δ + λF¯ (w)(1− w)
Notice, from our original equation, that:
λG(w) =
δF (w)−G(w)[δ + λF¯ (w)(1− w)]
F¯ (w)
Plugging into the expression for l(w), I get:
l(w) =
F¯ (w)[δ +G(w)λ(1− w)] + δF (w)−G(w)[δ + λF¯ (w)(1− w)]
F¯ (w)[δ + λF¯ (w)(1− w)]
=
F¯ (w)δ + δF (w)−G(w)δ
F¯ (w)[δ + λF¯ (w)(1− w)]
=
δG¯(w)
F¯ (w)[δ + λF¯ (w)(1− w)]
= H(F (w))
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Where I have plugged in the derived closed form solution for G(w) above to get l(w) as
a function of F (w) only. Then:
H(w)(p− w) = p¯i
H ′(w)(p− w)−H(w) = 0
H ′(w)
H(w)
= (p− w)−1
H(w) = e
1
2(p−w)2
In other words, solving for F (w) involves solving the fixed point problem above, for every
w.
I leave the application of this general equilibrium model for future work.
C.2 Simulation
C.2.1 Parametrization
As in Christensen et al. [2005], I assume the cost function to be of the following form for
simulation:
c(s) = c0
s
1+ 1
γ
1 + 1γ
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Following Lentz and Mortensen [2010], I use the following parametrization:
c0 = 0.10
γ = 5.00
ρ = 0.05
δ = 0.25
λ = 0.125
Using the above cost function, the search intensity equation (3.2.4) reduces to:
c′(s∗(w)) = λ
∫
w
F¯ (x)dx
ρ+ δ + λs∗(x)F¯ (x)
c0s
∗(w)
1
γ = λ
∫
w
F¯ (x)dx
ρ+ δ + λs∗(x)F¯ (x)
s∗(w) = (
λ
c0
∫
w
F¯ (x)dx
ρ+ δ + λs∗(x)F¯ (x)
)γ
The above is a Volterra equation of the second kind. To solve it numerically, I solve it
backwards using a grid of wage values, noting that at the highest wage offered w¯, the
integral “disappears”
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(a) (Exogenous) Wage Offer Distribution
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(b) Steady State
C.2.2 Procedure
To simulate this continuous time model, I use the following procedure (note that for the
exponential distribution, when I say ∼ exp(y), it means drawing from the exponential
distribution with mean 1/y):
1. Everyone starts unemployed (t = 1)
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2. Draw unemployment duration before accepting job offer τu ∼ exp(λs∗F¯ (wR))
3. Draw w ∼ F (w|w ≥ wR)
Now everyone is employed (t = 2)
1. Draw τδ ∼ exp(δ)
2. Draw τj2j ∼ exp(λs∗(w)F¯ (w))
3. Draw w ∼ F (w′|w′ ≥ w)
4. Take min(τδ, τj2j)
Do this many times, say, for t = 1000, and see distribution of wages and unemployment
and employment rates.
Using the optimal tax system (subject to no debt), and the parameters described
above, over 1000 “events” and 1000 individuals, I get the following comparison plot be-
tween simulated and theoretical distribution of wages of employed workers:
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Current Wage
CD
F
Theoretical vs Simulated Distribution of Employed Workers
 
 
Simulated
Theoretical
211
Theoretical steady-state unemployment is 18.27%, while simulated unemployment is
18.20%.
I try both uniform and lognormal exogenous wage offer distributions. For unbounded
distributions like the lognormal, it is important to extrapolate properly after the largest
grid point in wages, since as sample size increases, larger wages inevitably occur. One
way to do this is to increase the grid size, a better way is to include a far off point and
set the PDF equal to zero there, and interpolate between the resulting points. The latter
is the approach used in this chapter.
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